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PREFACE 
This study is concerned with the relationship of the United States 
Senate to the development of national political parties during the 
Federalist Era--the time of the Washington and Adams administrations. 
A statistical analysis of all roll-call votes taken during the F~rst 
through the Sixth Congress indicated the continual presence of legisla-
tive parties. These early parties within the Senate voted with more 
cohesiveness than do their modern counterparts, An examination of the 
subject matter of the roll calls, supplemented by an examination of the 
debates in Congress, newspaper accounts and editorials, and the 
correspondence and diaries of the Senators, indicated that the parties 
sprang from sectional jealousies and contention over the limits of 
governmental power in a republic. The conflicts over the limits of 
power usually focused on efforts to extend the activities and powers of 
the executive branch. The advocates of a powerful executive, the 
Federalists, justified their efforts by a loose construction of the 
Constitution. The opposition, soon known as Republicans, buttressed 
their case by a strict interpretation of the Constitution. As the 
open party conflict spread through the government and the electorate, 
the partisans within the Senate were among the most loyal core of 
activists in both parties. 
I am deeply grateful to Dr. H. James Henderson, my major adviser, 
for the guidance and special assistance that he has provided from the 
,,. 
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inception to the completion of the study. I am also grateful to the 
other members of the committee, Dr. Neil J. Hackett, Jr., Dr. Thomas A. 
Karman, and Dr. Daniel Selakovich, for their assistance, expecially in 
the final stages of the project. The kindness and cooperation of the 
entire committee has often exceeded the requirements of professional 
courtesy. 
I am also indebted to many others. Dr. Charles M. Dollar of the 
National Archives, Washington, D. C., a member of the committee until 
his resignation from Oklahoma State University, provided invaluable 
assistance regarding quantitative techniques and use of the computer. 
Mrs. Iris L. McPherson, Senior Systems Analyst at the University Computer 
Center, also gave indispensable assistance in modifying computer 
programs. My brother, Dr. Winfred 0. Wright, gave many hours of his 
time in proofreading the final draft copy. My special thanks are also 
extended to Mrs. Donna Fredin for typing the early drafts of the manu-
script, and to Mrs. Joyce Gazaway for assistance in preparing the final 
manuscript copies. I am also grateful to the Administrative Council of 
Harding College for providing me with three summer research grants with-
out which the project could not.have been completed. 
Most of all, r.am indebted to my wife, Wanda Adair Wright, and our 
children, Carolyn, Ponder, Jr., and Margie. Carolyn devoted a full sum-
mer assisting me in verifying the mathematical computations which were 
not assigned to the computer and in constructing many of the tables. 
They all gave their enthusiastic support to the project, and made many 
sacrifices in order that I might complete this undertaking. I will be 
forever grateful to them for their unfailing support. 
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C&\PTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The Problem 
The United States Senate played a vital role in the emergence of 
America's first party system. Many competent scholars have probed the 
beginnings of the American party system, but all of the major works 
share a common characteristic--failure to focus close attention on the 
Senate. This study was designed partially to offset this deficiency. 
The past neglect of the Senate may derive from the fact that it was 
less democratic than was the House of Representatives. The Senate met 
in secret for the first six sessions of Congress, and after it opened 
its doors, public stenographers were not allowed. The early minutes of 
the Senate are very cryptic, and debates were not recorded until the 
Adams administration when parties were in open competition. Yet, if 
the origin of the two-party system is to be understood, the Senate must 
be considered. Concensus now holds that the parties originated in the 
Congress, and the Senate has always been the stronger of the two houses 
in certain respects. It approves, amends, or rejects all bills 
originating in the House. It may initiate non-revenue bills, and has 
been the source of some of the fundamental laws of the nation. In addi-
tion to the legislative powers which it shares with the House, it ap-
proves or rejects many Presidential appointments to federal offices, 
'I~" 
1 
including the nominations to the Supreme Court, and must approve all 
treaties negotiated by the Executive. Questions about the Senate's 
relation to the political party system are therefore vital, for the 
Senate constitutes a fundamental branch of the federal government. 
This study was designed as an exploratory effort directed at 
answering some of the basic questions relating to the Senate's role in 
the emergence of the first party system: When did legislative parties 
first appear? How many were there? Which was the stronger? Which was 
the most cohesive? Which issues seemed to have called the parties into 
existence? Was there a connection between the partisanship of the 
Continental Congress and the partisanship of the Senate? What connec-
tions existed between the partisanship of the Senate and that of the 
House? Who were the early leaders of the parties? 
2 
The fundamental hypothesis set forth in this study is that highly 
repetitive alignments involving most Senators appeared in the First 
Congress and continued to exist through the Sixth Congress. During the 
s~arch for the issues which called the parties into being a second 
hypothesis was developed: while there were many factors which con-
tributed to the beginning of the first party system, conflict over the 
proper limits of power in a republic--particularly regarding conflicts 
over the powers and functions of the executive branch--provoked the 
formation of the Senatorial parties and continued to be an important 
consideration in the major party battles of the decade. 
Although there were no formal party organizations during the early 
sessions of Congress, the cohesiveness and stability of the alignments 
from one session to the next justify applying the term party rather than 
faction to these compet~ng alliances. Within a short time the members 
3 
of the Senatorial parties were active participants in the national 
party movements that are known as the Federalist and Republican parties. 
The Senatorial parties became working parts of the national parties, 
and were closely involved in the legislative history of the decade. 
Review of the Literature 
The writings of Charles Beard soon came into wide acceptance after 
the publishing of An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution in 
1913 and The Economic Origins of Jeffersonian Democracy in 1915. 1 Beard 
argued that economic interests had been the primary force behind the 
framing of the Constitution and the forming of the earliest political 
parties. At the Constitutional Convention the delegates represented 
either capitalistic or agrarian interests. Representatives of capital-
ists (basically merchants, money lenders, security holders, finance 
capitalists, manufacturers, ship owners, slave holding farmers, and 
large farmers from the Middle States) won out over the agrarian 
representatives (primarily middle- and small-sized farmers and debtors) 
and designed a new government capable of protecting their interests. 
This same combination of money interests fought their way to victory in 
the state ratifying conventions, and, in the first national elections, 
they rolled up sizable majorities. Bear~ argued that this economic 
struggle has continued to be the major source of political conflict into 
the present times. 
Beard maintained that there was a clear continuity between the 
Federalists of the 1780's ari.d those of the 1790's on the one hand, and 
the Anti-Federalists of the 1780's and the Jeffersonian Republicans of 
the 1790's on the other'; Beard admitted anomalies in his data and 
4 
pointed out the sketchy nature of his research. He called for others to 
complete the research he described, confident that it would confirm his 
hypothesis. The evidence arrayed by Beard and his persuasive reasoning 
carried the day. Beard's views were not universally accepted, but 
significant challenges did not appear until after World War II. 
One of the first major departures from Beardian analysis came in 
Joseph Charles'·The Origins of the American Party System (published 
2 
. posthumously in 1955). Charles did a simple analysis of selected roll 
calls in the House of Representatives. He did not explain the method of 
selection beyond the statement that they pertained to issues of national 
importance or to question involving principles important to the members 
of the House. Congressmen were judged to be members of a party if they 
voted with "one party 66.6% of the time" on the selected issues. 3 Charles 
found that "no-party voting" fell from 42 percertt in 1790 to only 7 per-
cent in the voting on the Jay Treaty--the lowest point it reached until 
1798. 
Charles denied a significant degree of continuity between the Anti-
Federalists and the Republicans of the 1790's. He argued that the 
Federalist party consisted of those in the government who supported the 
programs of Alexander Hamilton, and that the Republicans were the men 
who broke with Hamilton. He believed James Madison was the party leader 
until Jefferson was elected Vice-President in 1796. Charles contended 
that the Jay Treaty caused a sudden rise in partisan behavior in the 
Congress and that new efforts toward building an effective party 
organization grew out of this new conflict. Hence, foreign policy 
provoked more party tensions and developments than did the early economic 
issues. Charles thought the Republican party was basically an expression 
of a growing democratic movement among the masses, and he saw Jefferson 
as a leader who had been singled out by popular demand. Noble Cunning-
ham soon refuted him on this point. 
Cunningham's The Jeffersonian Republicans: The Formation of Party 
Organization, 1789-1801 was published in 1957. 4 Cunningham carefully 
traces the development of the Republican party from a beginning in the 
Congress on through its extension to the grass roots level. He demon-
strated clearly that the party was born of conflict between men in the 
national government and that party spirit grew among the people as the 
opposing forces in the Congress sought public support for their posi-
tions and campaigned for reelection on party tickets. Cunningham 
presented Jefferson as one of the earliest leaders of the Republican 
party. He saw Madison as the early leader in the House of Represent-
atives. 
Cunningham's work substantiated the position of Charles on the 
significance of other than economic issues. His analysis of the 
political situation on the :state level conflicted with Beard's argument 
5 
regarding the continuity of political parties. In general, Cunningham's 
conclusions were closely reasoned and based on extensive and careful 
research, but his analysis of voting patterns in the Congress was very 
elementary, in nature and focused on the House altogether. He gave no 
serious attention to party conflict in the Senate. 
Forrest McDonald published his We the People: The Economic Origins 
of the Constitutions in 1958 as a general refutation of Charles Beard's 
. . 5 
economic determinism. Having completed the extensive research which 
Beard had said would be necessary in order to verify his pypothesis, he 
found that the results '"refuted the theory of economic dualism as the 
prime explanation for the creation of the Constitution, the outcome of 
the ratifying conventions, and the results of the first national elec-
tion. McDonald did not concern himself with party origins, but his 
work clearly refuted the kind of economic determinism on which Beard's 
I 
hypothesis of party origins rested. James Henderson's comment is 
fitting: 
After Forrest McDonald's trenchant critique of Beard's anal-
ysis ••. it was apparent that Beard's other imperative-~the 
tension between capitalist and agrarian interests--required 
even greater modifications. In states where there seemed to 
be little continuity between Constitutional and post-Constitu-
tional partisan policies, the capitalist-agrarian dualism 
often proved quite irrelevant.6 
6 
William Nesbit Chambers, a political scientist, emphasized the func-
tional dimension of political parties in an emerging nation in Political 
Parties in a New Nation: The American Experience, 1776-1809. 7 He 
posited that a political party is marked by distinctive characteristics: 
structure,· functions, a substantial following, and in-group perspectives. 
He stressed that structures need.not be fully developed before the party 
begins tofunction. Chambers' functional model states that parties 
arose to fulfill the needs to: 
. represent, and find some accommodation among the variety 
of interests in the newly extended political arena, and to 
shape opinion; to work complicated machinery of national elec-
tions; to undertake management of the agencies of government, 
separated as they were into the executive, the Senate, the 
House . . • judiciary • . . and to interpret the work of the 
new government to the pub lie . . . 8 
Another model described the conditions necessary for the successful 
functioning of a two party system: the creation of a we-they relation-
ship between the contending parties, acceptance of the legitimacy of 
opposition parties, ability to constitute a stable link between govern-
ment and the people wh±"le competing with orle another, and a reasonable 
1 
chance for each party to win governmental power.9 
Chambers concluded that there was no continuity between the parties 
of the 1790's and the factionalism of pre-Constitutional days. In his 
view, parties developed out of conflicts within the government and the 
efforts of partisans to gain public support. Therefore, the parties 
were the ''products of labor of Hercules, and not 'natural' untended 
flowerings from the soil of independence and popular government, 11 as had 
10 
often been argued. 
Chambers did not engage in basic research but drew upon the works 
of Charles, Cunningham, and others, yet his study was a strong case for 
accepting the existence of 11modern 11 political parties in early America 
even if all the organizational structure had not yet evolved. Chambers 
suggested that his analysis was not definitive, but that it might sug-
gest useful possbilities for further study. Mary Ryan undertook such 
further exploration in her quantitative study of House and Senate voting 
patterns in the first four Congresses. 
Mary Ryan's article, entitled 11Party Formation in the United States 
Congress, 1789-1796: A Quantitative Analysis," utilized sophisticated 
quantitative techniques through the use of a computer and made a signif-
icant contribution to the study of party origins. 11 Ryan discovered the 
emergence of two polarized voting blocs in both Houses of Congress in 
each session of the first four Congresses. She found these blocs to be 
11remarkedly stable, 11 with 73 percent of all Senators remaining members 
of the bloc with which they first identified. Only three Senators were 
judged to be party mavericks, switching from one party to the other 
recurrently. 12 These blocs were found to be highly regional in member-
ship. Most Southerners·''were members of the Republican Party while New 
8 
Englanders were mostly members of Lhe Federalist Party. However, middle 
13 
states men were found to divide about equally between the two parties. 
Ryan, perhaps due to the brevity of the work, tended to over 
simplify the major factors involved in the great issues and stages of 
party development. For example, sectional loyalties determined how 
most voted on the location of the capital, and in the Second Congress, 
the sectional polarization on the issue of reapportionment reflected 
"regional, and particularly Southern, population expectations and the 
14 
consequent geographic concentration of national power." In neither 
case was any mention made of ideological, Constitutional, or other pos-
sibla.factors. This critici~m is even more relevant to her treatment 
of the two blocs which she found to be in opposition on issues of 
funding and assumption. These persistent blocs were found to be formed 
around financial questions, but "were temporary alignments outside the 
dominant party formation." 15 Her findings, surprisingly, showed that 
"Federalists like Rufus King of New York and Oliver Ellsworth of 
16 Connecticut found themselves in opposite camps." This distorts the 
facts considerably. Rufus King and Oliver Ellsworth were both ardent 
supporters of assumption, and were, therefore, in the same camp on this 
fundamental question. They voted on opposite sides on a number of roll 
calls pertaining to secondary issues such as the rates of interest to 
be paid on various portions of the loans covering. the assumed debts and 
on schedules of repayment of the principle. Practically speaking, they 
disagreed over how much speculators and investors in the public debt 
should be allowed to profit from the assumption of state debts by the 
federal government. Failure to distinguish these two types of roll 
calls result~d in the.~isleading conclusion that King and Ellsworth 
9 
were in different camps and casts doubt upon other conclusions drawn 
regarding the significance of the assumption controversy in the develop-
ment of Senatorial parties. 
The neglect of the Senate struggle over the Jay Treaty is also 
disappointing. The reader was told that in the Third Congress the 
Senate exhibited strong partisanship in the category of foreign policy 
when members clashed over the embargo of British goods, yet no reference 
was made to the Senate's debate over the Jay Treaty. Washington over-
ruled the Republicans' hard line when he signed the treaty, and "once 
the conciliatory measures of the treaty were exposed it became another 
b . f . . 1117 o Ject o part1san antagon1sm. Her conclusion was that "partisan 
foreign policy found its fullest expression in the first session of the 
fourth House of Representatives" when appropriations for the treaty 
18 
were debated. The reader was further informed that in the Fourth 
Congress the Senate "was not a forum for the debate of the Jay 
19 Treaty." Hence, the article fails to include any information on the 
third session of the Senate in the Third Congress which was called by 
·Washington for the express purpose of ratifying the treaty. In this 
session, the Senate reached a higher level of polarization than in any 
other of t.he Federalist Era. Thus, the reader is furnished something 
less than a full understanding of partisanship in the Senate. 
Ryan's work, although not without flaws, was a highly revealing 
contribution to the study of party origins. Even though the study 
focused primary attention upon the House of Representatives, it gave 
more attention to the Senate than had previous studies, and it was the 
first published effort at systematic analysis of all the roll calls in 
that body during the F1~deralist Era. Ryan's findings of two consistent 
10 
competitive blocs was suggestive of the fundamental hypothesis to be 
tested in the present study. 
Paul Goodman's essay, "The First American Party System," proved 
to be a highly influential exposition of the beginning of American 
. 1' . 1 . 20 po ltlca partles. It dealt with the development and spread of the 
parties among the electorate. Some of his explanations are highly sug-
gestive of the sources of partisanship in the Senate. While not denying 
the influence of economic self-interests in the formation of the opposing 
parties, Goodman stressed the importance of ideological, social, cultural 
and constitutional influences as well. After freeing themselves from 
the rule of the mother country, Americans had expected to be able to 
solve the competing claims of liberty and authority by a diligent study 
of politics, and for two decades Americans were busy writing and rewrit-
ing their constitutions. In 1789, there was a wide expectancy that the 
new design of government would deliver Americans from "the squabbling 
petty interests whose representatives schemed for the immediate, selfish 
d f h . h. 1 . . ,21 a vantage o t elr parae la constltuencles. Divisions that imme-
diately manifested themselves in the new government were "profoundly 
disillusioning. 11 The republic seemed split into warring factions, each 
of which saw the other as a threat to the nation. One group saw 
aristocrats, financial manipulators, political bigots, and foreign 
agents plotting the destruction of their liberty and freedom. The others 
saw Jacobin-type schemers, "wild Irishmen," blaspheming Illuminati, and 
seditious foreign agents seeking to overthrow established order and 
22 proven leaders. 
I 
Goodman saw that those who built the first party system mi'stook 
'·· 
parties for factions. "'Men of both sides "assumed" that those with whom 
,. 
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they differed were disloyal to the nation and its ideals."23 Goodman 
also found that the basic struggle between the two emerging parties 
involved a basic difference in attitude toward authority. "At first 
Americans misjudged the extent to which independence required the 
centralization of authority. They believed that by locating sovereignity 
in the states, power would be less dangerous to liberty ••. " 24 How-
ever, the American experience under the Articles of Confederation caused 
many to challenge this assumption and to adopt a new Constitution. This 
Constitution "created a new locus of power which promoted greater 
integration requiring the articulation of a national will to decide 
those political questions which had become the responsibility of all the 
people." 25 But, the new Constitution presented no mechanism for focus-
ing national attention on pressing issues or for collecting popular 
sentiment. Goodman believed the parties emerged in order to fulfill 
these functions. By creating a new locus of power charged with handling 
solutions that would entail decisions affecting the whole nation there 
resulted a "heightened sense of group differences and local serises of 
'd . . 1126 1 ent1ty. Apprehensive Virginians saw themselves as exploited 
Southern planters while disappointed Massachusetts men saw themselves 
27 
as threatened merchants and Easterners. 
Goodman also argued that the Republican-Federalist dichotomy 
existed before the contest over for~ign affairs began to develop in the 
Third Congress. 
Those who considered themselves Republicans had believed even 
earlier that the decisions made by the earlier, Federalist-
dominated Congresses had depq.rted from republican principles 
'by benefiting the few at the expense of the many. 28 
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But the Federalists were equally convinced that their principles pro-
mated the stability and the prosperity of the nation, and thereby they 
1 . h f h bl' . 29 saw themse ves as assur1ng t e success o t e repu 1can exper1ment. 
As America became involved in reactions to the war in Europe, a 
widespread belief that the future of the republic was being threatened 
was at the heart of party conflict. "When the Federalists moved to pre-
vent British interference with American trade with France from precip-
itating war, they confirmed Republic~n suspcisions that they were 
aristocrats with British sympathies."30 On the other hand, when the 
Republicans attempted to block ratification of the Jay Treaty and 
thereby openly to risk war with Great Britain, "The Federalists were 
confirmed in their suspicions that Republicans were Jacobine with French 
sympathies.••31 Hence, the intense concern over foreign policy affected 
people wherever they lived and whatever their local circumstances, 
aroused wide-spread, deep, and fierce partisan sentiments, and simplified 
and dramatized the electorial choice. 32 
Partisan identity in the 1790's and early 1800's was often difficult 
to fix with clarity, and shifts from one party to another occurred 
frequently. Goodman finds the reasons for this in the fact that party 
organization was often very rudimentary and that the parties wrire not 
autonomous institutions but "hastily formed, loose alliances of indi-
33 
.viduals and groups." Furthermore, before the 1790's no one had ever 
been born a Federalist or Republican, and thus most ordinary citizens 
34 
and voters did not inherit an ancestoral party loyalty. 
Richard Buel, Jr.'s work, Securing the Revolution: Ideology in 
Ameri.can Politics, 1789-1815, dealt with the ideological aspect of 
party development durihg the Federalist Era. 35 It was based on a study 
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of the public documents which Buel considered to reflect and create 
public opinion, documents to which the people had access: newspapers, 
congressional debates, diplomatic correspondence and presidential 
addresses. Buel gave less attention to private correspondence. He 
argued that the private communications of influence ultimately were 
advocated ·and countered publicly. Even though the Constitution had been 
designed to remove the national government from the immediate reach of 
the populace, the government's power was still ultimately dependent on 
the people so long as it lacked a large revenue and patronage, or a 
sizeable military and judicial apparatus. Therefore, Buel thought that 
public opinion had a stronger influence over the government during the 
Federalist era than at any period of time since. He assumed that public 
opinion was the single most important ingredient in the politics of the 
first party system. 
In brief, Buel found that "early national politics was dominated 
by a disagreement originating in the leadership about how to secure the 
Revolution."36 Some felt that stability was best achieved by adjusting 
the government to fit popular expectations, while others believed that 
government would never be safe until it was invulnerable to popular 
pressure, and that their public duty required them to resist such 
influence. Each opinion was reflective of a basic evaluation of 
republics in generaL Unfortunately, before domestic stability had been 
achieved, the French Revolution triggered international conflict that 
exacerbated the conflict among America's leaders. As the superpowers, 
France and Britain, pressured the young nation to act as their ally in 
the war; America was presented with strategic choices that challenged 
i. 
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the general population to take sides. In this context the "first 
1 .. 37 nationa parties grew up. 
Buel found that "Hamilton's fiscal policy became the initial focus 
of the first party system," because it raised a question "more funda-
mental than any clash of economic interests and one on which there could 
be no comprbmise: How to stabilize the republic and secure revolutionaxy 
achievements." 38 Therefore, fundamentally, it was this ideological 
clash "rather than money matters that set Hamilton in an irreconcilable 
opposition to Madison and Jefferson." 39 The funding and assumption 
program developed by Hamilton was designed to attract the loyalty of 
public creditors and make their prosperity dependent upon the continuing 
40 
success of the national government. Jefferson and Madison believed 
that public debts had bankrupted France and, in keeping with the idea 
ofAdam Smith, that debts were threatening Britain and other countries 
of Europe at that time. Furthermore, the plan of Hamilton was divisive 
and undemocratic since it forced the government to tax the many for 
few. As the fiscal program began to be enacted, Jefferson charged that 
. the ultimate object was to prepare the way for changing the present form 
41 
of government to that of a monarchy. 
The leaders of the early parties agreed upon their ends, according 
to Buel, but were divided over the means of achieving them. The 
Federalists knew that the government under the Constitution was 
momentarily popular but did not think that it could depend upon~ the 
continuation of the present wave of popularity. They felt, therefore, 
that the fiscal system should be used to help develop real governmental 
power that would in the end assure continued order and security within 
15 
the nation. Republicans, on the other hand, wanted to establish federal 
authority by making it responsive to the aspirations and wishes of the 
42 people. 
But with the passage of the Bank bill, the opposition began to 
argue for a strict construction of the Constitution and escalated their 
attack on the bank from that of policy level to the level of Constitu-
. 1' 43 t1ona 1ty. Buel found related ideological implications involved in 
the controversy over reapportioning the House of Representatives in the 
Second Congress, and consequently at the beginning of 1792, "opposition 
polemics against the fiscal system took on a stridency and an ideological 
character formerly lacking." 44 From the beginning, the leaders in the 
emerging parties disagreed on matters of foreign policy, and, as the 
pressure from Great Britain and France mounted, Republicans came to see 
the Federalist desire for peaceful relations with Great Britain as a 
betrayal of Republican principles and as a clue to the Federalist prefer-
ence for aristocracy and monarchy. On the other hand, Federalists con-
tinued to view Republican refusals to strengthen the defenses of America 
and their agitation for a closer relationship with France as an indica-
tion of their sympathy wit\1 the ideological principles of those who had 
brought on the extremities of the French Revolution and convulsed the 
ld . 45 wor 1n war. 
With every major issue that confronted the nation in the Federalist 
era, Buel found the common thread of ideological concern with how to 
best secure for the future the gains that were made in America's late 
Revolution. The two opposing political parties were the political 
expressions of two basically opposed ideological approaches to the same 
end. 
16 
Jackson Turner Main in his work, Political Parties Before the 
Constitution, focused attention upon political partisanship in the 
states during the Confederation era. 46 His computer-assisted study was 
based on a roll call analysis of the votes in the state legislatures 
and a collective biographical study of the state legislators. He found 
strong evidence of a consistently recurring two-party system within 
each state. Main designated these groups as Localists and Cosmopolitans. 
Localists were inclined to favor minimizing the cost of government by 
supporting lower salaries or no salaries. Main noted that the one 
exception was their general preference for paying themselves good 
salaries as state legislators and attributed this to their lower eco-
nomic status. In general, they were in favor of reducing taxes, and 
they favored debtors over creditors. They were usually for inflationary 
policies and consistently worked to secure a plentiful supply of cur-
rency. Their efforts were usually directed toward laws that would be 
beneficial to small farmers and they showed a definite anti-business and 
anti-townspeople proclivity. They were particularly opposed to pros-
perous Loyalists. They were consistently against salaries for judges 
and opposed the establishment of new courts. They were constantly 
agitating for the removal of state capitals from the seaboard cities to 
the interior. In general, they were dissatisfied with the Peace Treaty 
and often objected to forced conformity to its provisions, particularly 
the provision providing for the payment of debts to their British 
creditors. Furthermore, they granted money to the Continental Congress 
but only with great reluctance. Regarding the ratification controversy, 
Localists became anti-Federalists objecting either to the Constitution 
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outright or to adopting it without amendments. On the other hand, the 
Cosmopolitans occupied the opposite ground on the issues enumerated 
above and were consistently strong supporters of the Constitution during 
the ratification controversy. 
Main also concluded that there were leaders who were conscious of 
these loosely knit parties. Their appeals to the public showed that 
they recognized they were existing as parties and that many of the 
Localists saw parties as "a vehicle for popular opposition to authority, 
. . bl . d . 1 d . . 114 7 1nev1ta e 1n an essent1a to a emocrat1c soc1ety. While all the 
various influences on party affiliation existed before the Revolution, 
the parties themselves came into existence after the war. By the end of 
the Confederation period, Main found evidence of party organization in 
several states. These party organizations became the vehicles for 
pressing the ratification debate. 48 
While Main did not commit himself to the hi::;torical continuity 
between the Localists and the Republicans and the Cosmopolitans and the 
Federalists, he did assert that the agrarian-Localists formed a core of 
the Jeffersonian Republican party in the first party system under the 
Constitution and that the commercial-Cosmopolitans merged with the 
Federalists. He was inclined to the idea that the national parties 
under the Constitution adapted to and modified the pre-existent state 
49 blocs. 
Rudolph Bell made a major contribution to the understanding of the 
role of the House of Representatives in the development of the first 
party system with his Party and Faction in American Politics: The House 
of Representatives, 1789-1801. 50 Bell's work was based on a sophis-
ticated computer-assis't'ed analysis of all the roll calls taken in the 
18 
House of Representatives through the first six Congresses. Bell found 
that it was the struggle over determining the proper limits of power for 
the new government under the Constitution that brought into being the 
national parties. Under the Articles of Confederation, the ultimate 
determinants of the limits of power were the state governments. Under 
the new Constitution, even though certain restraints were implied, Bell 
found the reasons that the new government, despite its verbal homage to 
restraints on power, assumed for itself the right. to decide its own 
limits of power. Therefore, a basal shift in government authority 
occurred whereby "power exercised within limits set by external forces 
gave way to power circumscribed only by its own volition." 51 It was the 
Constitution as it was implemented during the 1790's that provided the 
potential mechanism for this change in the nature of power, and in the 
process of the struggle "polarized groups formed to debate and decide 
h . . . 1 . ..52 t 1s cr1t1ca 1ssue. 
Bell found that on a number of issues not directly involving the 
question of the limits of power of the government the opposing coali-
tions that formed over this issue were not highly consistent. He traced 
the struggle over the limits of power on issues relating to the 
President's power to remove appointees confirmed by the Senate, and 
economic issues that increasingly set aside narrow, personal, or state 
interests and confronted the essential thrust of Hamilton's fiscal 
program through the time of the First Congress. He concluded: 
Far from being random or purely state oriented, voting pat 
terns in the First Congress revealed the effective formation 
of interest groups on roll calls involving the power of the 
central government and the allocation of responsibility 
within it.53 
An important milestont:!'was reached when suppression of the Whiskey 
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Rebellion "established central authority limited only by its own 
volition .. s4 Bell found both houses, and particularly the Senate, 
endorsed without.reservation the strong action taken by the administra-
tion in suppressing the rebellion. 55 
Bell discovered that the blocs that formed during the House debate 
over the Whiskey Rebellion voted cohesively on other issues as well. 
From the Third Congress onward, national legislative parties consistently 
formed within the House of Representatives, and by the time of the first 
session of the Fourth Congress, voting on the "Livingston Resolution and 
the closely related Jay Treaty controversy marked the beginning of the 
. 56 
primacy of the party considerations in roll call voting." Bell 
believed that by the time of the Fifth Congress, when the Alien and 
Sedition Laws were passed, voting in the interest of party over policy 
h d h d . 1' 57 a reac e 1ts. c 1max .. 
The time frame of this important analysis of the House coincides 
exactly with that of the present study of the Senate, and this factor 
enhances its value as a comparative study. The work offers numerous 
occasions for contrasts and parallels of the two houses. A close 
comparison of the rate at which parties developed in the two branches 
of Congress will be made in a later chapter. Some of Bell's insights 
into the causation of partisanship in the House also has relevance for 
the study of partisan developments in the Senate. 
H. James Henderson's works on partisan politics in the Continental 
Congress have great relevance for the understanding of the beginning of 
the first party system under the Constitution. 58 Henderson's works 
combined the traditional modes of historical inquiry with computer 
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assisted quantitative analysis of roll calls in the Continental Congress. 
He analyzed all but the unanimous and near unanimous roll calls and came 
to the conclusion that Congressional politics rapidly produced "sustained 
coalitions of delegates that were more than personal 'connections'." 
These partisan alignments, "If judged for behavior rather than motive or 
admission, took the shape of legislative parties."59 Furthermore: 
Considering voting patterns, contests over the control of 
those appointments that Congress had within its grasp, and the 
intensity of partisan rhetoric, party lines were as consist-
ently drawn and battles as sharply fought in the Continental 
Congress as in Congress today.60 
While a number of voting blocs were discovered in various years, 
Henderson found that there were two general blocs that continued to 
reappear year after year. That is, delegates to Congress changed from 
year to year but the blocs continued to exist. The Eastern bloc .was 
made up primarily.of delegates from the New England states with some 
support from the middle and, to a lesser degree, the Southern states. 
The opposition bloc also persisted through every Congress and was made 
up primarily of delegates from the Southern and middle states with still 
fewer coming from New England. 
With neither of the three regions of the country able to dominate 
national politics on its own, regional alliances were necessary in order 
to achieve any degree of success in the Congress. Since the New England 
and Southern states tended to be consistently opposed, the balance of 
power rested largely with the middle states which could give victory to 
either side by combining forces. Middle state representatives were in 
some instances the center of the controlling coalition with New England 
or the Southern states giving the supportive strength, but in general, 
"they were constantly 'pulled toward a dich'otomization of the Congress 
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around the New England and southern extremities."61 
"Actually sectional division increased rather than diminished over 
time .. 62 But Congressional politics, though structured in a highly 
sectional manner, were not static, for, beneath the constant sectional 
character of Congressional factionalism, there was a dynamic progression 
of sectional ascendancies. Henderson found that from 1774 through 1779 
the Eastern states were in the ascendancy, and from 1780 through 1783 
the locus of power shifted to the middle party. By 1784, the Southern 
delegates achieved such a high level of cohesion that they were able to 
lead in shaping policy on most issues. 63 
In 1786, the year of crisis for the Confederation, two sectionally 
oriented blocs emerged with the Northern coalition being the stronger. 
The Northern coalition was made up. of representatives from New England 
and the middle states, and the Southern coalition consisted of delegates 
from Maryland southward. The·single most responsible factor behind this 
alignment was the dispute over the acceptance of the treaty which had 
been negotiated by John Jay, Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and Don 
Diego de Gardoqui, Spanish Minister to the United States. Jay had 
agreed to relinquish American claims to navigation of the Mississippi 
for the life of the treaty--either 25 or 30 years. In return, he had 
won concessions that were quite .favorable to the middle and New England 
commercial and shipping interests. The South was adamantly opposed to 
any compromise of free navigation of the Mississippi River and 
depreciated the commercial benefits that had been secured by the treaty. 
But their "prime grievance was that the treaty sacrificed the interest 
of one part of the Union for the presumed advantage of another."64 
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Henderson found both ideology and economic factors to be among the 
sources of the regional parties. It was "apparent in retrospect a basic 
source of the problem was that regional cleavages and controversies not 
only were a result of economic sectionalism" but they were "freighted 
with ideological content involving the meaning of the Revolution and 
the definition of Republican party."65 
Ideology was found to be a particularly strong influence on Congres-
sional politics through the period of Eastern ascendancy through the war 
years. Through this time, New Englanders were the champions of extreme 
radical republicanism while the Southerners created the image of being 
conservative aristocratic elitists. With the shifting of power from the 
Eastern to the middle states from 1780 to 1782, the influence of ideology 
. d 1. 66 was 1n ec 1ne. As the South gained the ascendancy after 1783, 
ideology increased in importance once more. The Southern "ideology" 
of agricultural expansion pointing westward included enough of the 
earlier Eastern attitudes toward the dangers of governmental power and 
the need for constitutional restraints to place it in the category of 
republicanism. But where the Eastern Republicans had deprived their 
republicanism from religious faith, the Southern ideology of the West 
was strikingly secular in nature and origin, It looked forward to. 
continental grandeur rather than back to ancestral virtue. It was 
individualistic rather than collective and stressed personal liberties 
h h 1 bl . . 67 rat er t an communa o 1gat1ons. The Southern interest in the 
Western expansion was a significant influence in changing the ideological 
stance of the South. Henderson also pointed out it was this Southern 
concern for expansion of the West that helped to move Madison and other 
Southerners into suppHtt of a strong nationalism which characterized 
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Southerners and particularly Virginians during the period of the forma-
tion and adoption of the federal Constitution. 68 
Henderson's discovery of legislative parties within the Continental 
Congress provided the primary inspiration for the present study, for, of 
the two houses of Congress under the Constitution, the Senate of the 
Federalist era resembles the Continental Congress much more closely than 
did the House of Representatives. The Senate, like the Continental 
Congress, was made up 6f men selected by the state legislatures for the 
.purpose of representing their respective states, whereas the larger House 
of Representatives was elected by the people often voting by districts 
within their states. Furthermore, the early Senators, as a group, were 
predominantly former delegates to the Continental Congress. Therefore, 
the present study was designed to determine, among other things, if the 
legislative parties that had functioned consistently through the 
Continental Congress would be found operating in a similar manner in the 
federal Senate. 
Methodology 
This study utilizes multiple modes of inquiry, combining quantita-
tive techniques with the more traditional methods of historical analysis. 
Since it was thought that parties probably began before the leading 
personalities were willing to admit their existence, it was decided that 
a quantitative anslysis of roll-call behavior would be the most reliable 
means of determining the beginning and extent of early partisan behavior 
within the Senate. This focused attention upon basic legislative 
behavior rather than rhetoric, which was oft.en designed to reduce the 
influence of their oppbnents rather than describe events as they really 
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were. The statistical findings did indicate that partisan voting char-
acterized the Senate much earlier than the participants were willing to 
admit and much earlier than most modern historians have recognized. 
Therefore, traditional modes of historical inquiry were used to test the 
validity of the conclusions drawn from the statistical evidence and 
relate the findings to the general political developments of the time. 
The analysis began with a search of each session of Congress in 
order to find when repetitive alliances involving most of the Senate 
began to appear in each successive session. This was carried out by 
constructing cluster blocs based on percentage of agreement scores 
derived from comparing each Senator's voting record with that of every 
other Senator. The procedure generated evidence of two generally 
repetitive alliances in each session of the first six Congresses. The 
results of this procedure were then compared to the results obtained 
from cumulative scaling. This comparison resulted in a general confirma-
tion of the indications of partisanship derived from cluster bloc anal-
ysis. Assuming the existence of parties, three measures of inter-party 
conflict were then employed: the frequency with which the majorities of 
each party opposed each other, the frequency with which majorities of 
80 percent or higher from each party opposed each other, and the 
computation of indexes of polarized cohesion for each roll call and the 
frequencies with which selected levels of conflict were measured. The 
last index was useful in analyzing the issues which produced the greatest 
conflict, and allowed a direct comparison of partisanship within the 
Senate with that of the House as measured by Rudolph Bell. Two measures 
of intra-party behavior were then employed to produce a more refined 
picture of partisanship than was develope~by the first technique. 
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Indexes of relative party cohesion were employed for both parties on 
each roll call of every session and averaged to give a general view of 
party strength through the session. Finally, indexes of relative party 
loyalty were computed for every member of the Senate in each session. 
Each procedure measured a different aspect of group or individual 
behavior, and helped to fill out a general description of partisanship 
that in some respects exceeds that of the modern Senate. 
The more involved computations were performed by the assistance of 
a computer. Lesser tasks were carried out with an electronic calculator. 
Since the quantitative procedures utilized are among those widely used 
in legislative analysis, the statistical procedures are not described in 
detail. However, since it is anticipated that some students of history 
who might wish to consult the study may not be familiar with the statis-
tical processes involved, a brief explanation of each analytical proce-
dure is incorporated in the review of the quantitative findings in the 
following chapter. For those who desire more technical information, a 
number of works on quantitative procedures useful to historians are 
readily available in university and college libraries. Some of the more 
helpfulare listed in the Bibliography. The work by Anderson, Watts, 
and Wilcox will possibly prove to be more useful to the beginner, 
expecially in regard to cumulative scaling. 
It should be noted that although cumulative scaling is most fre-
quently used to analyze differing attitudes toward an issue on a set of· 
preselected roll calls (a universe), scaling procedures can also be used 
t 1 t . f 1 bl f 1 1 . 69 o se ec a un1verse o sea a e votes rom a . arger popu at1o~. The 
latter function is also employed in this study. In order to make each 
universe as inclusive as possible and yet 'have reliable scales, all 
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votes within the population possessing a mutual Q value of plus or minus 
.5 or higher were included in the universe, as suggested by Dollar and 
70 Jensen. Only a very few roll calls selected in this manner had to be 
excluded because they proved to be unscalable. Senators were not 
classified if they were absent on over half of the roll calls or were 
given an "error" as a result of casting an errant/vote on over 20 per-
cent of the roll calls. There were some instances when the situation 
seemed to justify classifying a Senator even though these standards were 
not met, but all such cases are clearly identified on the figures in 
in Appendix A. 
Three methodological options affected the outcomes of all analytic 
procedures to some extent. First, a small number (28 out of 554) of 
unanimous and near unanimous votes (those reaching 90 percent agreement 
or higher) were excluded from most calculations because they reveal 
nothing of the lines of party makeup. These were clearly non-partisan 
votes. However, when frequency of cohesion or conflict were the subject 
of inquiry these votes were included in the calculations. Second, all 
absences were treated as missing data and did not, therefore, affect the 
outcome of the various indexes. This resulted in all indexes being 
relative indexes, computed on the basis of votes actually cast. This 
type of index was computed because it was concluded that most absences 
were non-tactical in nature, being due to health, transportation, family, 
or financial problems. Given the frequent long absences the relative 
indexes give a much more realistic measure of the actual strength of 
partisanship than would absolut~ indexes. Third, it was decided to 
compute all indexes by sessions rather than by Congresses. In some 
sessions the indexes i~~ a party were slightly raised or lowered, in 
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others there would have been no significant difference. The most signif-
icant result came in an exaggerated amount of shifting from one party to 
another. Had the indexes been computed by Congresses ra.ther than by 
sessions, the appearance of party stability would have been greatly 
enhanced, and in some cases exaggerated. The results of computing 
indexes of party loyalty by Congresses are shown in Appendix C. 
The quantitative analysis was indispensable in the search for' 
partisan behavior and its accurate measurements, but statistical results 
in legislative analysis can sometimes be misinterpreted, for a statis-
tical examination of a roll call can reveal how a legislator voted on a 
given occasion, but it cannot explain his motives. Therefore, the more 
traditional modes of historical inquiry were used to interpret the 
significance of the statistical data and to gain extra insight into 
unique patterns of voting, particularly on the issues of assumption and 
the location of the national capital during the second session of the 
First Congress. Traditional modes were also essential to relating the 
Senate to the growth of parties within the government and among the 
electorate. 
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CHAPTER II 
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
Introduction 
The basic hypothesis of this study holds that the larger portion of 
the United States Senate was bipolarized into consistently opposing 
legislative groups, or parties, during the Federalist era. There were 
some Senators who had weak or no party attachments, and sometimes state 
and regional interests might overrule partisan loyalty or inclinations, 
but in every session of the era two blocs of highly consistent member-
ship opposed each other on a majority of the roll calls. The several 
analytic procedures reviewed in this study all repetitiously compliment 
each other in clearly corroborating this hypothesis. 
Cluster-Bloc Analysis 
The first quantitative analysis involved the construction of 
cluster-blocs based on percentage of agreement scores derived from pair-
wise comparisons. Each vote in every session of the Senate was examined. 
Only 28 out of 554 roll call votes from the first six Congresses were 
discarded because they exceeded 90 percent agreement. With the aid of 
a computer, the vote of every Senator was then compared to the vote of 
every other Senator on each roll call and a matrix of agreement scores 
was constructed. Senators who voted regularly together were then 
'' 
32 
33 
assigned to the same cluster-bloc. As clusters of Senators were 
identified for each of the 15 sessions of the Federalist period, an 
indisputable picture of two highly consistent groups of l~gislative 
adversaries emerged. 
Most members of the Senate fell into one of two major blocs that 
appeared in every session. Furthermore, the membership of these two 
blocs was basically the same from session to session. Further examina-
tion of the blocs showed 73 percent of the 93 Senators were identified 
with only one party during their incumbency. Thus, only 25 Senators 
were ever identified with more than one of the major legislative 
groups. Eleven of this number changed bloc associations only once, 
either remaining a part of the opposition group after once voting with 
it, or changing their bloc association only in the last session of 
their incumbency. Of the other 14, 8 reverted to their original voting 
identity after one or two sessions. Therefore, only 6 of the 93 Senators 
(only 6 percent of the total) can be classified as independents or non-
partisans. It is doubtful that even all of this small group can be 
accurately labeled non-partisan. 
Then, as now, overriding state, local, or personal interests might 
cause a legislator to cast a number of votes against his party on a given 
issue without identifying permanently with the opposition. When this 
is taken into consideration and coupled with the fact that most public 
men disavowed and condemned partisan behavior, the Senatorial blocs 
shown in Table I are surprisingly consistent in size and membership. 
This remarkable continuity in the composition of the legislative blocs 
from the earlier Congresses through the closing Congresses, when the 
Federalist and Republ:t'tan parties function~d openly, is the basis for 
i ~· l·c·, 
I 
State Seat 1 2 
VT 1 - -
2 - -
NH 1 R r-
2 f R 
CT 1 F f-
2 f F 
MA 1 F F 
2 F f 
RI 1 - f-
2 - f-
NY 1 f F 
2 f- F 
PA 1 r R 
2 F r-
NJ 1 f r 
2 F F 
DE 1 F R 
2 F R 
MD 1 r- R 
2 r- r-
KY 1 - -
2 - -
VA 1 R /r-
2 R R 
TE 1 - -
2 - -
NC 1 - R 
2 - r-
TABLE I 
BLOC (PARTY) ASSOCIATIONS DERIVED 
FROM CLUSTER-BLOC ANALYSIS 
Bloc Associations by Congress and 
II III IV 
3 1 2 1 2 3 1 2 1 
- f F R r /F F f- F 
- F f R R R R /f F 
f F F r r- R R R R 
F F F /f r- F F F R 
F F F F F F f /F F 
F /f F /F f /F F /F F 
F /F f F F F F /F F 
F f F F F F F /F F 
f F F F f F F f f-
F f F /F F F F f- F 
F f f F F F F /F F 
f- /f- R R R R R r- 0 
Rl 
f 0 0 r- f F f F F 
f r f F f- /F f F F 
F /f F f F F f F F 
/F r- F /F f F f- F F 
F f F /F f- F F F F 
f f F 0 /F F F F F 
R r /r f f- F f /f- F 
r R f f f F r- r f-
- - r- R R R R R R 
- - R R f- /f- r- f f-
/R R R R 0 /R r r- R 
R R /R R /r- R R R R 
-
- - - - - -
R R 
- -
- - - - -
r R 
R R r- r f /R R R R 
f " R f /R r R R r R 
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Session 
v VI 
2 3 1 2 
f F F F 
F F F F 
R R R R 
f- f F f-
F F F f-
F F F F 
F F F /f._ 
F F /F /F 
f F F R 
/F F F f-
F f- F /R 
1/F /F /f F 
F f- F F 
f f F F 
F /F /F F 
F F /F F 
/F /F F F 
F f F F 
F f f F 
/f F F /F 
R R R R 
r- r- r- r 
R R R R 
R 0 R /R 
R /R R R 
/R 0 /R R 
R R R R 
r- R /R R 
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TABLE I (Continued) 
Bloc Associations by Congress and Session 
I II III IV v VI 
State Seat 1 2 3 1 2 1 2 3 1 2 1 2 3 1 2 
sc 1 R f- R R r- R 0 R R /R R f /R R r-
2 r- f- R r f- F F /F f F F f f- F F 
GA 1 nc f- R R R /R R R /r R R r /R R R 
2 r r- r R R R R F f R r- f- r- f f 
Key: F = core number of Federalist bloc, reserved for those who agreed 
with every other Senator in the group at least 67 percent of the 
time and usually the percentage of agreement is significantly 
higher; f =moderate Federalist, reserved for those who agreed 
with the majority of the core members at least 67 percent of the 
time; f- =weak Federalist, reserved for those who do not meet the 
above requirements yet vote with them more than with the opposi-
tion; R, r, r- = Republicans meeting the same standards of associa-
tion as described for the Federalists; - = state not yet in the 
Union; o = absent or seat vacant; I =a new Senator has q,ssumed 
office; // = two Senators held office and voted during the term, 
but their agreement levels and party identification are the same; 
nc = not classifiable due to either excessive absences or splitting 
votes equally between parties. 
Note: Albert Gallatin of Pennsylvania was removed from office early in 
th~ session on the grounds that he did ~ot meet the Constitutional 
requirements for citizenship; while a Senator he voted seven out 
of eight times with the Republicans on highly polarized issues. 
His successor, Senator Ross, receives a rating of r- for the 
remainder of the session. 
identifying the opposing blocs by these terms from the First Congress on, 
even though these labels were not commonly used at the outset. 
Regionalism is the most obvious characteristic of the blocs revealed 
by the table. The Federalist bloc is made up predominantely of Senators 
from the New England and middle states. The Republican bloc was always 
predominately composed r:,of Southerners. The strong core of the latter 
·."' 
TABLE II 
MEMBERS OF THE SENATE, FIRST THROUGH THE SIXTH CONGRESS 
ARRANGED BY SEAT AND ORDER OF SERVICE 
State Seat Name of Senator 
VT 1 Stephen R. Bradley (2:1-3:2) /(Elijah Paine (3:3-) 
2 Moses Robinson (2:1-4:1) /Isaac Tichenor (4:2-5:1) 
/Nathaniel Chipman (5:2-) 
NH 1 John Langdon (1:1-) 
CT 
2 Paine Wingate (1:1-2:2) /Samuel Livermore (3:1-) 
1 Oliver Ellsworth (1:1-4:1) /James Hillhouse (4:2-) 
2 WilliamS. Johnson (1:1-1:3) /Roger Sherman (2:1-2:2) 
/Stephen M. Mitchell (3:1-2) 
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MA 1 Tristram Dalton (1:1-1:3) /George Cabot (2:1-4:1) /Benjamin 
Goodhue (4:2-6:1) /Dwight Foster (6:2-) /Caleb Strong 
(1:1-4:1) /Theodore Sedgwick (4:2-5:3) /Samuel Dexter (6:1) 
/Jonathan Mason (6:2-) 
RI 1 Theodore Foster (1:2-) 
2 Joseph Stanton, Jr. (1:2-2:2) /William Bradford (3:1-5:2) 
/Ray Greene (5:2-) 
NY 1 Rufus King (1:1-4:1) /John Laurance (4:2-6:1) /John 
Armstrong (6:2-) 
2 Phillip John Schuyler (1:1-1:3) /Aaron Burr (2:1-4::2) /John 
S. Hobart (5:2) /William North (5:2) /James Watson (5:3-
6:1) /Gouverneur Morris (6:1-) 
PA 1 William Maclay (1:1-1:3) /Albert Gallatin (1:3) /James Ross 
(3: 1-) 
2 Robert Morris (1:1-3:2) /William Bingham (3:3-) 
NJ 1 Jonathan Elmer (1:1-1:3) /John Rutherford (2:1-5:2) /James 
Davenport (5:3) /Jonathan Dayton (6:1-) 
2 William Peterson (1:1-1:2) /Philemon Dickinson (1:3-2:2) 
/Fredrick Frelinghuysen (3:1-4:1) /Richard Stockton (4:2-
5:3) /James Schureman (6:1-) 
DE 1 Richard Bassett (1:1-2:2) /John Vining (3:1-5:1) /Joshua 
Clayton (5:2) /William H. Wells (5:3-) 
2. George Read (1:1-2:2) /Henry Latimer (3:2-) 
TABLE II (Continued) 
State Seat Name of Senator 
MD 1 Charles Carroll (of Carrollton) (1:1-2:1) /Richard Potts 
KY 
VA 
TE 
NC 
sc 
GA 
(2:2-4:1) /John E. Howard (4:2-) 
2 John Henry (1:1-5:1) /James Lloyd (5:2-6:1) /William 
Hindman (6:2-) 
1 John Brown (2:2-) 
2 John Edwards (2:2-3:2) /Humphrey Marshall (3:3-) 
1 William Grayson (1:1) /John Walker (1:2) /James Monroe 
(1:3-3:1) /Stevens T. Mason (3:3-) 
2 Richard Henry Lee (1:1-2:1) /John Taylor (2:2-3:1) /Henry 
Tazewell (3:2-6:1) /Wilson C. Nicholas (6:1-) 
1 
2 
1 
2 
1 
William Blount (4:2-5:1) /Joseph Anderson (5:2-) 
William Cocke (4:2-5:1) /Andrew Jackson (5:2) /William 
Cocke (6:1-) 
Benjamin Hawkins (1:2-3:2) /Timothy Bloodworth (3:3-) 
Samuel Johnston (1:1-2:2) /Alexander Martin (3:1-5:3) 
/Jesse Franklin (6:1-) 
Pierce Butler (1:1-4:1) /John Hunter (4:2-5:2) /Charles 
Pickney (5:3-) 
2 Ralph Izard (1:1-3:2) /Jacob Read (3:3-) 
1 William Few (1:1-2:2) /James Jackson (3:1-3:3) /Josiah 
Tattnall (4:1-5:3) /Abraham Baldwin (6:1-)* 
2 James Gunn (1:1-) 
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Key: Numbers within parentheses designate the sessions of Congress in 
which a senator actually voted. (1: 1-) = began serving the first 
session of the First Congress and continued through our period of 
study; no reference is intended regarding service beyond the second 
term of the Sixth Congress. Numbers connected by a dash (1:1-3:2) 
indicate the beginning and ending term. Reference to a single term 
not followed by dash (3:2) indicates that the Senator only served 
one term. 
*Walton preceeded Tatnall but only cast three votes; therefore, he has 
not been included in the tabulations. 
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came mostly from Virginia, Tennessee, North Carolina and Kentucky in 
that order. Men from Virginia and Tennessee most always voted a 
majority of the time each session with the Republicans. After the 
second session of the Second Congress, Ralph Izard of South Carolina and 
his successor, Jacob Read, always belonged to the Federalist Party. 
After the last session of the First Congress, Few, Jackson, Tatnall and 
Baldwin, all of Georgia, were always a part of the Republican core 
except for the second session of the Fifth Congress when Tatnall ranked 
only as a moderate. Maryland Senators voted consistently with the 
Republicans until the last of the Second Congress when Henry was 
attached to the Federalist moderates. From the beginning of the Third 
Congress on, both Maryland Senators cast the majority of their votes 
with the Federalists except for Henry who voted with the Republicans 
for both sessions of the Fourth Congress and then reverted to the 
Federalists for his last term in the Senate. 
From states north of Maryland, the most enduring Republican support 
came from New Hampshire's John Langdon who voted consistently with that 
party for six Congresses with the exception of the last session of the 
First through the Second Congress. Aaron Burr of New York voted with 
the Federalists in the first session of the Second Congress and then 
voted with the Republicans until he left the Senate after the close of 
the Fourth Congress. William Maclay of Pennsylvania strongly opposed 
the Federalist measures in the first two sessions of the First Congress; 
but in the third session, he agre~d with the Federalist majority on the 
establishment of the national bank and amending the bill providing for 
the location of the capital. Robinson of Vermont voted with the 
Republicans the last ~'our sessions of his 'senatorial career after 
i 
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voting with the Federalists his first two sessions. Bradley, of the 
same state, followed a similar pattern, voting Federalist for two terms 
and then Republican during his last two terms. Thus, it is clear that 
Republican strength in the Senate came mainly from the Southern states. 
Federalism thus drew most of its support from states outside the 
South. Indeed, with the exceptions noted above, Senators from New 
England and the middle states behaved as Federalists consistently through 
the entire six Congresses of the Federalist era. Connecticut and 
Massachusetts men were strong Federalists with no exceptions. Rhode 
Island voted solidly Federalist except for the last session of the Sixth 
Congress when Foster voted with the Republicans. New Jersey and 
Delaware each voted with the Republicans in one session. Except for one 
seat from South Carolina, Senatorial Federalism could count on no 
dependable support south of Maryland and in the first two Congresses 
they could not count on Maryland. Federalism in the Senate, even more 
than Republicanism, was a sectional movement. 
Finally, it is obvious that the Federalists were in the majority in 
the Senate throughout all six Congresses. Only in the second session of 
the First Congress did Republicans appear to match the Federalists, but 
that session was unique. The struggles over assumption and funding and 
the location of the capital domainted the session, and each of these 
issues involved sub-issues that produced atypical combinations. Conten-
tion over assumption and funding created many votes on secondary issues 
in which both friends and foes of assumption combined temporarily out of 
mixed motives. These secondary issues resulted in unusual alignments 
for Northern Federalists in particular. The struggle over the site of 
the capital was partli shaped by regional ~elf-interest and prejudices 
! 
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that created extraordinary voting combinations. Voting on the matter 
of a temporary residence created exceptional alliances especially for 
Southern Republicans. A quick check of Table I reveals that this 
session was the only session in which five Senators who changed parties 
immediately reverted to their original party identification in the next 
session, never to change again. Further explanation of the uniqueness 
of the voting patterns of this session is reserved for the next chapter, 
the point now being that the apparent 50-50 split between the two oppos-
ing groups in this session need not detract from the otherwise obvious 
numerical superiority of the Federalists in the Senate throughout the 
entire Federalist era. 
Cluster-bloc analysis revealed the Senate tended to divide 
consistently into two sectionally oriented alignments. Other analytic 
approaches were used to determine the degree of conflict between the 
parties and the cohesiveness within each of them, as well as the nature 
of the issues that provoked the strongest conflict. 
Cumulative Scaling 
In order to further validate or refute the assumption that the 
composition of voting blocs was highly regular from one session of 
Congress to the next, cumulative scaling, often referred to as Guttman 
scaling, was utilized. Theoretically, cumulative scaling is most useful 
in an analysis of legislative behavior when the object is to measure the 
influence of a single variable such as an attitude on an issue or party 
affiliation on a given universe of roll calls. However, in the present 
study the procedure has been used to search for the largest possible 
universe of scalable roll calls in effort to discover the probable limits 
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of party affiliation as a controlling factor in the behavior of a given 
body of legislators. 
It was decided that, if cumulative scaling was to confirm the 
existence of Senatorial parties as indicated by cluster-bloc analysis of 
percentage of agreement scores, the derived scales should possess three 
characteristics: the scales should be based upon a majority of the roll 
calls taken during the session; they should portray a polarized body; 
and the membership of the emerging blocs constructed from the scales 
should portray a high degree of consistency--that is, they should dis-
close that a majority of the Senators tended to vote with the same 
bloc in every session of Congress. If, on the other hand, large 
multiple-issue scales (universes) failed to emerge, or if the scales 
failed to show a habitually polarized body, or if the membership of the 
opposing blocs was found to be essentially different in each scale, 
then the conclusions drawn from the percentage of agreement cluster 
blocs would be negated. The scaling results confirmed the findings 
derived from the percentage of agreement analysis. 
After carrying out the scaling procedures, it was discovered that 
in every session but one, the second session of the First Congress, 
only one major universe emerged. In the second session of the First 
Congress, there were three highly related universes. The criterion of 
a majority of votes being scalable if partisanship characterized the 
Senate's behavior was amply exceeded. Seventy-four percent of all roll 
call votes (exclusive of the 28 unanimous or near unanimous votes) were 
included in the scales. 
Striking parallels with the results of the earlier cluster-bloc 
analysis emerged from·'1'the scaling procedures. In every major scale, 
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bipolarization was clearly evident. 
Table III shows the number of Senators placed in each level of 
possible support or opposition to the major alliances. It is evident 
from this table that 490 ranking assignments were made, and of this 
number only nine (1.8 percent) were placed in either of the two lower 
categories of party support. On the other hand, 65.1 percent of the 
rankings fell within the 90 to 100 percent level of partisan support. 
If the measurement is extended to include the 80 percent support levels, 
the percentage of rankings rises to 80. Extended to 70 percent, the 
figure rises to 86.5 percent. 
Only 30 times did a Senator fail to be classified with one or the 
other of the two parties, and this translates into a mere six percent 
of the total occasions. Of this number, 21 were so classified because 
they were absent for over 50 percent of the voting. 
Cumulative scaling provides substantiating evidence of bipolariza-
tion in every Congress of the Federalist era. When the membership of 
the blocs constructed from cumulat~ve scales.(Table IV) are compared 
with the blocs derived from percentage of agreement scores (Table I) 
for the 15 sessions, it is readily obvious that the composition of the 
blocs derived from the two independent procedures are so comparable that 
it is highly improbable that the results could derive from chance. 
Table V facilitates this comparison by listing all the men who are 
perceived to have changed agreement patterns according to both methods 
of analysis. Out of 95 Senators whose votes were quantified, only 27 
names appear on the table. Only three appear on the list from cluster-
~ : . 
bloc analysis that do not appear on the tables derived f~qm,cumulative 
" 
TABLE III 
LEVELS OF PARTISAN SUPPORT DERIVED FROM CUMULATIVE SCALING 
Percentage of Federalist SUEEort Percentage of ReEuhlican SuEEort 
NC 1 Congress Session 90-100 80-89 70-79 60-69 51-59 51-59 60-69 70-79 80-89 90-100 
First First 82 1 3 4 5 
Second 
"' Scale-1 9 3 2 4 7 1 
Scale-2 8 1 4 5 7 1 
. Scale-3 10 2 4 1 9 
Third 12 4 2 8 
Second First 9 1 2 1 6 6 2 
Second 14 5 2 8 
Third First 12 3 2 8 5 
Second 7 2 4 4 1 7 4 
Third 17 1 1 10 1 
Fourth First 13 1 1 3 7 5 
Second 12 3 1 2 3 1 9 1 
Fifth First 11 5 1 1 1 9 3 
Second 14 4 2 2 2 2 6 1 
Third 10 3 1 3 2 1 8 1 
Sixth First 14 6 2 1 1 1 8 
Second 12 3 1 1 1 9 5 
Totals (N = 490) 192 40 16 16 5 4 11 16 33 127 30 
1 . NC = non-classified due to excessive errors or absences. 
2Numbers in column represent the number of individuals in each decile. 4:--w 
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TABLE IV 
BLOC ASSOCIATIONS DERIVED FROM CUMULATIVE SCALING 
Bloc Associations by Congress and Session 
I ·n III IV v VI 
State Seat 1 2 3 1 2 1 2 3 1 2 1 2 3 1 2 
VT 1 - - - F F R R /F Nf F F F F F F 
2 - - - F F R R R R /F F /F F F F 
NH 1 Nr r* F F F R R R R R R R R R R 
2 Nf R F F F /F R F F Nr r- F F F Nf 
CT 1 F f~ F F/1 F F F F Nf /F F F F F N 
2 f F F /F F /F F /F F /F F F F F F 
MA 1 F F F /F F F F F F /F F F F F /Nf 
2 N f:l! F F F F F F F /F F F F /F /F 
RI 1 - f- F F F F F F F F f- F F F R 
2 - f- F F F /F F F F Nf F /F F F f 
NY 1 F F F Nf F F F F F F F F Nf F r 
2 F F F /N R R R R R R o /IF /F /F F 
PA 1 R R F 0 0 !t/RII F F F F F F F F F 
2 F r F R F F F /F F F F F F F F 
NJ 1 Nf r* F F F F F F F F F 0 F F F 
2 . F F /F R F /F F F Nf /F F F F /F F 
DE 1 F R F F F /F f F Nf F F F /F /F F 
2 F R F f- F 0 /N F F F F F F F F 
MD 1 R R R R /R F f F F /R F F F F F 
2 R R F R F Nf N Nf R R Nf /F F F /F 
KY 1 - - - - R R R R R R R R R R R 
2 - - - - R R f /f- R F Nf R R R Nr 
VA 1 R /R* /R R R R 0 /R Nr R R R R R R 
2 R R R R /R R /Nr R R R R R 0 R R 
TE 1 -·. - - - - - - - - R R R /R R R 
2 - - - - - - - - - R R /R 0 /R R 
NC 1 - R R R R R F /R R R R R R R R 
2 . - r* R R F /R R R R R R Nr R /R R 
,\i! 
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TABLE IV (Continued) 
---
Bloc Associations by Congress and Session 
I II III IV v VI 
State Seat 1 2 3 1 2 1 2 3 1 2 1 2 3 1 2 
sc 1 R f R R R R 0 R R /Nr R F /R R Nr 
2 R f~ R R F F F /F F F F F R F F 
GA 1 N r* R R R /R R R /r- R R N R /R R 
2 R R R R R R Nr F F R N Nr R F F# 
Key: F = core member of Federalist bloc, reserved for those scoring 70 
percent or more on the scale (usually much higher); f =Federalist 
moderates who score from 60 through 71 percent on the scale; f- = 
Federalist fringe members who score between 50 and 60 percent on 
the scale; R, r, r- = Republicans ranked according to the same 
standards as those described above for Federalists; - = state not 
yet in the Union, o = absent or seat vacant; I = a new Senator has 
assumed office; // = two new Senators divided this term but their 
voting pattern was similar; N = non-classified by the scale due to 
excessive absences or scale "errors"; Nf/r or Nr = was non-
classified by the scale but very obviously of the type indicated, 
no reference is intended as to party level; * = a rating resulting 
from averaging ratings for three universes in the second session 
of the First Congress in order that comparisons can be readily 
made with the cluster blocs derived from percentage of agreement 
scores; II = the party rating is given due to the opinion of the 
researcher that strict rules for treating excessive absences or 
errors would tell less truth than to assign the party rating. 
scaling, and only two appear on the cumulative scaling list that do not 
show up on the cluster analysis charts. This means a general discrepancy 
rate of far less than one~half of one percent. 
Cumulative scaling has been used in the present study as an 
independent test of the fundamental hypothesis which posits partisanship 
in the Senate from the First Congress onward. The procedure was not 
used as a means of measuring partisan support or opposition on specific 
TABLE V 
SENATORS WHO CHANGED BLOC IDENTITY: A COMPARISON OF RESULTS 
DERIVED FROM CLUSTER~BLOC ANALYSIS AND CUMULATIVE 
SCALING (CALCULATED BY SESSIONS)l 
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One Change Two Changes Three or.More 
State 
VT 
NH 
RI 
NY 
Senator 
Bradley 
Robinson 
Langdon 
Wingate 
Livermore 
T. Foster 
2 Burr 
' 
PA Maclay 
NJ 
DE 
MD 
KY 
NC 
sc 
GA 
Morris 
Ross2 
Elmer 
Dickinson 
Bassett 
Read 
Potts 
Henry 
Howard3 
Edwards 
Marshall 
Hawkins 
Johnston 
Butler 
Hunter 
Izard 
Read3 
Few2 
Gunn 
Blocs Scales 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
Blocs Scales 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
Blocs Scales 
X X 
X X 
X X 
X X 
X X 
X 
Key: One change = changed bloc association only one time; two changes = 
reverted to original bloc identity after voting with the opposition 
one or more sessions; three or more = changed identity after three 
or more times. 
1 
2All Senators not listed here identified with one bloc only. 
A change indicated by"' cluster-bloc analysis only. 
3A change indicated by cumulative scaling only. 
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issues. Used as a test of association on a broad spectrum of issues, it 
produced striking parallels to the results of cluster-bloc analysis of 
percentage of agreement scores and provided strong confirmation of the 
fundamental hypothesis, The results show that the Senate definitely 
polarized into two generally repetitive alignments in every session of 
every Congress in the Federalist era. (See Appendix B for the figures 
showing the results for each session.) 
Party Unity Votes 
One of the most meaningful and widely used measures of partisan 
behavior within a two party assembly is the percentage of votes to be 
classified as party unity votes. By definition, these are the recorded 
votes in which a majority of one party opposes the majority of the 
opposition party. Votes in which one or both parties divide evenly are 
excluded along with the roll calls in which the majorities of both 
parties agree against a minority from either or both parties. 
By identifying the party unity votes, it is possible to determine 
the percentage of roll calls that actually polarized the Senate. It is 
also usable as an expedient in identifying the issues that evoked 
partisan behavior. In this particular study the procedure provides 
another check on the validity of the contention that partisanship was 
present in the earliest Congresses, for, if the partisan groups 
identified by cluster bloc analysis did indeed exist, party unity voting 
can reasonably be expected to have occurred on a majority of the roll 
calls. Conversely, if only a minority of roll calls were polarized, it 
would indicate that parties either did not exist or were of limited 
importance. Using the'''party identification developed from the percentage 
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of agreement analysis (see Table I), the party unity votes were 
identified for each session of Congress. The statistical results of 
this procedure are summarized in Table VI. 
TABLE VI 
FREQUENCY OF PARTY UNITY VOTING 
Percentage of Total Number of Votes 
Including Excluding Including Excluding 
Unanimous Unanimous Unanimous Unanimous 
Congress Session Roll Calls Roll Calls Roll Calls Roll Calls 
I 66 68 
1 67 67 
2 67 67 
3 60 69 
II 70 73 
1 66 69 
2 88 88 
III 74 79 
1 76 80 
2 58 65 
3 86 100 
IV 82 84 
1 83 85 
2 87 87 
v 1 90 94 
2 77 80 
3 74 90 
VI 76 81 
1 82 83 
2 65 77 
Percent of Combined Roll Calls 75 79 
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Examination of the percentages of roll calls qualifying as party 
unity votes, when the behavior of those identified as Federalists are 
Republicans are contrasted, produces strong. evidence of consistent 
partisan behavior. Computed by Congresses, and counting all votes 
recorded in the Annals, the percentage of party unity votes ranges from 
66 percent in the First Congress to 84 percent in the Fourth, the 
average for the six Congresses being 76 percent. If the roll calls with 
p+ (the percentage of support given to the majority position on a roll 
call) values of 90 percent or higher are excluded as unanimous votes, 
then the party unity scores for the First and Fourth Congresses become 
68 percent and 85 percent respectively, and the average for the six 
Congresses becomes 79 percent. 
A comparison of the percentage of party unity voting in the modern 
Senate with that of the Federalist Senate is most revealing and is sum-
marized in Table VII. Within the 12 years, 1964 through 1975, the per-
centage of party unity votes ranges from a low of 32 percent in 1968 to 
a high of 50 percent in 1966.with an average of 40 percent for the 12 
years. The Federalist Senate's low of 66 percent in the First Congress 
exceeds the modern Senate's 1966 high by 16 percentage points. The low-
est level of ,party unity voting in the Federalist Senate exceeds the 
low point in the modern Senate by 34 percent! While there are differ~ 
ences in the two situations, this comparison does seem to indicate the 
plausibility of concluding that the voting behavior of the Senate, even 
in the First Congress, corresponds to that expected in situations where 
legislative parties are knpwn to exist. 
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TABLE VII 
FREQUENCY OF PARTY UNITY VOTING IN THE MODERN SENATE 
Year Percentage of the Total 
1964 36 
1965 42 
1966 50 
1967 35 
1968 32 
1969 36 
1970 35 
1971 42 
1972 36 
1973 40 
1974 44 
1975 48 
Average 41 
Source: Years 1964 through 1970 taken from Frank J. Sorauf, Party 
Politics in America (Boston, 1968), pp. 350-351; 1971 through 
1975 take;-from "Party Unity Voting Rose Sharply in 1975," 
Congressional Quarterly (January 24, 1976), pp. 179-180. 
Eighty Percent Majorities 
A still more rigorous standard of party conflict calculates the 
frequency with which a majority of 80 percent or more of the members of 
one party oppose 80 petcent or more of the opposition party on roll-call 
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votes. ln general, this measure of partisan conflict is much too 
rigorous to be a practical means of describing the behavior of modern 
American legislatures. Even in the urban, two-party states of the 
northeast this standard of conflict is seldom reached, and the Congress 
i 1 h . 1 s even ess co es1.ve. However, in the Federalist era, the Senate 
r~ached this level of conflict as often as the modern Senate reaches the 
less demanding standard of conflict between simple majorities, as is 
demonstrated by a comparison of Tables VII and VIII. 
Calculated against the total number of roll calls in the Annals of 
Congress, including the unanimous votes, ~enatorial parties of the First 
Congress reached or exceeded this level of conflict 22 percent of the 
time. The Second Congress reached the 24 percent level, and the Third, 
Fourth, and Fifth Congresses ranged from 43 percent down to 41 percent. 
The parties in the Sixth Congress reached this level of polarization on 
58 percent of all roll calls. In fact,· the Senate of the Federalist 
decade reached the 80 percent level of opposition on an average of 38.3 
percent per Congress. Totaling the votes for all 12 years, the standard 
was reached on exactly 40.8 percent of the total roll calls recorded. 
If the roll calls with values exceeding p+ .90 are excluded, the per-
centage ri.ses to 43. percent. When it is recalled that the modern Senate 
reached the much lower level of conflicting majorities only 41 percent 
of the time during the 12 year period, the case for concluding that 
legislative parties were operative throughout the Federalist era seems 
even stronger. 
Congress 
I 
II 
III 
IV 
v 
VI 
Average 
TABLE VIII 
FREQUENCY OF OPPOSING PARTY MAJORITIES OF 
80 PERCENT OR ABOVE 
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Percentage of Total Number of Votes 
By Session By Congress 
Including Excluding Including Excluding 
Unanimous Unanimous Unanimous Unanimous 
Session Roll Calls Roll Calls Roll Calls Roll Calls 
22 23 
1 44 44 
2 19 19 
3 20 23 
24 25 
1 26 2S 
2 13 13 
43 46 
1 43 45 
2 16 18 
3 79 92 
41 42 
1 49 50 
2 20 20 
41 42 
1 47 50 
2 43 44 
3 30 37 
58 62 
1 63 64 
2 49 58 
38 41 
Indexes of Polarized Cohesion 
A more sophisticated, yet rather direct, method of measuring the 
level of polarized conflict is the index utilized by Rudolph M. Bell 
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in his study of the voting patterns in the House of Representatives dur-
ing the Federalist era. 2 The index value is computed by determining the 
percentage of support for. a measure that is reflected in the vote of 
each party .and subtracting the lesser from the greater. The index value 
is the remainder derived. For example, in the first roll call vote 
recorded for the Senate in the Annals, 90 percent of the Northern bloc 
supported the measure compared to 44 percent of the Southern bloc. 
Subtracting 44 percent from 90 percent gives a,n index value of 46. If 
the Southern bloc had unanimously opposed.the measure the index value 
would then have been 90. But if 90 percent of the Southern bloc had 
supported the measure, the Index of Polarized Conflict (IPC) would have 
b~en zero. Thus, it can be seen that values range from 0 to 1.00. If 
two parties polarize on a vote ~ith approximately two-thirds of one 
party opposing two-thirds of the opposition party, the IPC may be 
expected to be approximately 33.3. Table IX may be used to readily 
assess the significance of a given IPC value. For those more accustomed 
to the widely used Index of Likeness, the value for this index can be 
derived by subtracting the IPC value from 100. 
By using Bell's index, a close ~ompar~son of the Senate with the 
House of Representatives can be made by comparing the IPC values of the 
Senate with those derived for the House by Bell in the study referred 
to above. While each House did not always d~vote the same proportion 
of roll calls to a given issue as the other, the number of total roll 
calls quantified in both studies are somewhat comparable. The House 
generated more votes than the Senate in the First, Secoqd, flnd Fourth 
Congresses, but the Senate produced the greater number in the Third, 
Fifth, and Sixth Congre·sses. There were 612 roll calls recorded for the 
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TABLE IX 
SELECTED VALUES OF THE INDEX OF POLARIZED COHESION 
Vote Divisions by Party 
Party A Party B Resulting 
Percent Percent Index 
Yea/Nay Yea/Nay Values 
55/45 55/45 .0 
55/45 45/55 .10 
60/40 45/55 .15 
60/40 40/60 .20 
65/35 35/65 . 25 
65/35 34/66 .30 
67/33 30/70 .33 
70/30 25/75 .40 
75/25 25/75 .so 
80/20 80/20 .55 
80/20 20/80 .60 
90/10 10/90 .70 
90/10 5/95 .80 
95/5 5/95 .90 
100/0 0/100 .95 
100/0 1.0 
House and 554 for the Senate, a difference of only 58 votes for the 12 
year period. By making this comparison, it will be demonstrated that 
\ 
the Senate, judged by standards Bell used for the House, reached a 
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permanently bipolarized condition during the First Congress. The House 
did not reach this stage of partisanship until the Third Congress. 
As a criterion for selecting and classifying votes as indicative 
of partisanship in the House, Bell determined that the vote division 
must reflect the equivalent of two-thirds of one party opposing two-
3 thirds of the other party. This means an IPC value of .33 or .34. 
Bell discovered that the majority of the votes in the House during the 
first two Congresses fell below this standard, reflecting that factional 
alignments were unstable and changed from issue to issue. 4 However, in 
the Third Congress the IPC values exceedeq .33 on 72 percent of the roll 
I 
i 
calls (see Table X). The situation in the Senate was strikingly dif~ 
ferent. 
By examining the IPC levels in the Senate (Tables XI and XII), it 
can be seen that the Senate generated similar levels in the first and 
third sessions of the First Congress when this level of polarization 
was exceeded 67 percent of the time in the former and 73 percent of the 
time in the latter. The second session of this Congress is the most 
cdmplex session of the Federalist era. Considering all recorded roll 
calls, the IPC values exceed the standard of significance set by Bell 
50 percent of the time. However, this lower than average index is 
partially_ the result of the persistent efforts of a small minority from 
both parties led by Robert Morris to secure higher interest rates and 
other conditions favorable to investors in the public debt when assump-
tion and funding was uttder consideration. Morris and his few allies 
! 
TABLE X 
LEVELS OF POLARIZED COHESION IN THE HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES, 1789-1801 
Percentage of Roll Calls in Each Range 
Ranges of Indexes of Congress 
Polarized Cohesion 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 
0-34 69 56 28 29 9 
35-64 28 43 43 34 23 
65-100 3 1 29 37 68 
Mean Index 28 31 48 53 72 
Source: Rudolph M. Bell, Party and Faction in American Politics: 
House £f Representatives, 1789-1801 (Westport, 1974), 
TABLE XI. 
LEVELS OF POLARIZED COHESION IN THE SENATE, 
1789-1801 
p. 
56 
6th 
10 
13 
77 
72 
The 
184. 
Percentage of Roll Calls in Each Range 
Range of Indexes of Congress 
Polarized Cohesion 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 
0-32 44 (31) 26 20 20 19 12 
33-64 24 (30) 33 26 27 24 19 
65-100 32 (39) 41 52 54 57 68 
Note: This tabulation excludes roll calls reaching 90 percent unanimity. 
( ) = percentages derived when non-partisan roll calls on sec-
ondary issues relating to funding the national debt are elim-
inated from th~ calculations. It is believed that this reflects 
more accurately the partisan nature of the Senate in the second 
session of the First Congress. The uniqueness of these votes is 
. discussed in Chapter IV. 
TABLE XII 
LEVELS OF POLARIZED COHESION IN THE SENATE, 
1789-1801, COMPUTED BY SESSIONS 
Percentage of Roll Calls in Each Range 
Congress and Session 
Range of Indexes of First Second. Third Fourth Fifth 
Polarized Cohesion 1st 2nd 3rd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 3rd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 3rd 
= 
0-32 33 50(36) 27 29 12 18 37 14 22 13 11 18 26 
33-64 22 24 (31) 27 32 38 31 32 0 22 40 21 26 17 
65-100 44 26 (33) 47 40 50 51 32 86 56 47 68 56 27 
Percentage of roll calls 
reaching ;33 or above 67 50(64) 73 71 88 82 63 86 78 87 89 82 74 
P~rcentage reaching .33 
for the entire Congress 56 (67) 74 79 80 82 
Percentage reaching .33 
with unanimous votes 
excluded 58(69) 77 85 82 87 
Mean Index .46(.53) .53 .61 . 61 .61 
Mean excluding 
unanimous .47(.54) .55 .65 .62 .65 
Note: ( ) = ;indicates the resulting percentages when a number of nonpartisan votes on secondary 
lating to funding of the n.ational debt are excluded from the calculations .. 
Sixth 
1st 2nd 
8 22 
18 22 
74 57 
92 78 
88 
93 
.69 
.74 
issues re- Vl 
--.J 
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were resisted just as determinedly by the majority of the Federalists as 
the Republicans. Hence, this sizable quantity of nonpartisan votes is 
unique. Both the majority of friends of assumption as well as its foes 
were opposed to these particular proposals, but the Senate was anything 
but nonpartisan on the question of assumption. There are sound reasons 
for discounting this group of roll calls in measuring the general 
degree of partisanship that characterized the Senate as they moved· 
through consideration of the various issues of the session. (This 
matter is explored in greater depth in Chapter IV.) If these roll calls 
are eliminated from the calculations (with other less significant issues 
that generated agreeing majorities being included), the number of votes 
rating an IPC of .33 or greater for the Senate in the First Congress 
rises from 50 percent to 61 percent. This latter score more accurately 
reflects the degree of polarization during the Congress and is corrob-
orated by an examination of the average IPC values. 
When the two higher categories of IPC values for the House and · 
·Senate are examined in Tables XI and XII, it is seen that the Senate 
had a considerably larger percentage·of votes falling into the highest 
levels of polarization during the first four Congresses. A comparison 
of the mean IPC values for both Houses can be made from Tables XI and 
XII. A conflict level o~ 85 percent versus 80 percent results in an 
IPC of .65, and in the Senate, votes reached or exceeded this level 32 
percent of the time in the First Congress. The House conflict reached 
this level in only three percent of the votes in the First Congress and 
only 29 percent of the time in the Third. The frequent high level 
conflict in the Senate is reflected in high average IPC values. Table 
XIII reveals that the average IPC in the Senate during tpe First Congress 
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was .46 (this index value is produced by a conflict level equivalent to 
73 percent majorities in both parties). 
Congress 
First 
Second 
Third 
Fourth 
Fifth 
Sixth 
TABLE XIII 
MEAN INDEXES OF POLARIZED COHESION FOR THE SENATE, 
BY SESSION AND CONGRESS (EXCLUDING p + .90) 
Mean Index Mean Index 
Session for Session for Congress 
.47 (.54) 
First .55 
Second .42 (51) 
Third .65 
.55 
First .54 
Second .61 
.65 
First . 64 
Second .50 
Third .91 
.62 
First .64 
Second .57 
.65 
First . 7 3 
Second .63 
Third .67 
. 74 
First .75 
Second .71 
Mean 
Including 
Unanimous 
.46 (53) 
.53 
.61 
.61 
.61 
.69 
Note: ( ) ~ indexes derived when a number of nonpartisan votes on 
secondary issues relating to funding the national debt are 
excluded from the tabulation. Use of Table IX may be useful in 
analyzing the significance of the above indexes. 
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The average index of conflict created by the Senate in the First 
Congress was not matched by the House until the Third Congress. By that 
time, the conflict in the·senate produced an average index of .61, mean-
ing the average vote involved party decisions equivalent to conflicting 
majorities of 80 percent. The House did not reach this level of 
struggle until the Fifth Congress when conflicts over foreign affairs 
and the alien and sedition laws produced slightly higher average levels 
of consistent polarization in the House tpan in the Senate. If the 
level of conflict between Federalists and Republicans in the House dur-
ing the Third Congress warrants the conclusion that House behavior was 
then transformed from factionalism into party behavior, the conflict 
level in the Senate indicates the Senate made this transition during the 
unfolding of the First Congress. 
Leaving aside comparisons with the House, an analysis of the levels 
of polarized cohesion for the Senate alone validates the conclusion 
that the Senate behavior was indeed partisan through all the Federalist 
decade. Historians generally agree that parties were flourishing in 
both the House and Senate during the Fifth and Sixth Congresses. Tables 
XII and XIII reveal that the Senate was almost as polarized in the Third 
as it was in th~ Fifth and only slightly less so than in the Sixth 
Congress. Furthermore, the average IPC value in the Fifth is only 8 to 
11 (depending upon the use of unanimous votes) ·points higher than in the 
First Congress if the nonpartisan secondary issues, discussed above and 
in Chapter V, are excluded from the calculations. In other words, the 
average IPC value of .53 or .54 in the First Congress signifies an 
average conflict level of about 77 percent versus 77 percent. The same 
general level is observed for the Second Congress while the average 
index for the Third, Fourth, and Fifth indicates conflict between 
opposing majorities of 80 percent. Even if the group of roll calls on 
the nonpartisan secondary issues relating to methods of funding the 
national debt are included along with the unanimous and near unanimous 
that are assigned an index of zero, the average IPC value is found to 
be .46. This indicates an average pola~ization equal to opposing 
majorities of 73 percent. This represents a much higher level of 
conflict than observed in the modern Senate and indicates a high level 
of partisanship in even the First Congress in harmony with the other 
analtyic methods reviewed above. 
Indexes of Relative Party Cohesion 
The index of party cohesion reveals how unified the party was on 
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any given roll call, and by grouping roll calls an average for a session, 
a Congress, or an issue can be determined. The indexes of cohesion 
utilized in this study are relative rather than absolute cohesion. This 
means they are computed on the basis of votes cast without relating 
absences to the outcome. While some of the absences undoubtedly were 
tactically motivated, a study of the Annals and correspondence of the 
Senators led to the conclusion that the greater number of absences were 
probably for reasons unrelated to tactics. Some members were delayed 
in arriving at the capital. Others were not appointed until after the 
Congress had convened. Some near their homes or centers of business, 
and others not so near, were on occasions absent for business reasons. 
Others were absent due to illness. A number had perfect voting records 
while others were present for only a portion of the session, and yet 
when present, t;hose in·less attendance were often as partisan, even 
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more so in cases, as those who were there for the whole session. On 
balance, it seemed that a more reliable description of party cohesion 
would be obtained by computing relative, rather than absolute, indexes. 
The relative index is computed by determining the percentage of 
the party membership that constituted the party majority on a roll call. 
For example, if 80 percent of the Federalists voted "yea" and 20 percent 
voted "nay" on a roll call, the Federalist index of relative cohesion 
would be 80 percent. If the Republicans split equally on the same vote, 
their index would be 50 percent. Cohesion indexes, therefore, range 
from 50 to 100 percent. A party's index of cohesion for a session, a 
Congress, or a group of votes on a given issue is calculated by averag-
ing the indexes derived from each roll call under consideration. 
The indexes of cohesion obtained for both parties during the 
Federalist era give a clear picture.of partisan solidarity and furnish 
strong confirmation of the findings produced by the analytic methods 
reviewed above. Table XIV gives the indexes of relative cohesion for 
both parties. Since on some roll calls the majority of both parties 
agreed, the best indicator of partisan solidarity is probably the index 
derived from party unity votes; i.e •. , where the majorities of both 
parties are in conflict. The indexes for these roll calls show that 
both parties were, in general, equally cohesive. It is also clear that 
even though their cohesiveness in the First Congress was less than in 
the later Congresses, they were voting with remarkable solidarity for 
American political parties even in the First Congress. 
Two comparisons strengthen the impression of party cohesion in the 
Federalist era. Table XIV reveals a Federalist cohesion level of 79 
percent in the First Cohgress and an overall average of 80 percent when 
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·TABLE XIV 
MEAN INDEXES OF RELATIVE PARTY COHESION ON PARTY 
UNITY VOTES, 1789-1801 
Mean Index of All Mean on All Roll 
Mean Index Roll Calls of Calls with IPC 
of Total 1 Opposing Reaching .33 
Roll Calls Majorities or Above 
Congress Session Fed. Rep. Fed. Rep. Fed. Rep. 
First 76% 78% . 79% 2 83% 2 83% 87% 
First 82 78 89 86 
Second 74 75 . 78 80 
Third 81 87 79 92 
Second 77 84 82 90 80 89 
First 76 84 81 91 
Second 82 84 84 86 
Third 86 82 88 86 89 85 
First 85 80 87 85 
Second 82 77 86 78 
Third 94 97 94 97 
Fourth 83 82 86 82 . 87 85 
First 84 83 74 90 
Second 82 79 83 77 
Fifth 84 85 89 86 88 87 
First 86 87 87 89 
Second 84 84 90 86 
Third 84 87 84 88 
Sixth 86 90 91 92 88 91 
First 88 90 92 91 
Second 83 91 87 93 
Mean 82 84 86 87 86 87 
1 These calculations exclude the roll calls reaching 90 percent 
unanimity. 
2 Compare these with the modern Senate, Table XV. 
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the votes of the six tongresses are tombined, while the Republicans 
averaged 83 percent solidarity in the First Congress and an overall 
unity score of 87 percent for the combined 12 years. This compares 
favorably with the situation in the modern Senate. The year 1975 was 
a record year for cohesiveness in the modern Senate (Table XV) and in 
that year the Democratic party· earned an index of 76 percent and the 
Republican party rated 71 percent on party unity votes. Added to this 
consideration of slightly higher cohesion indexes for the parties of 
the First Congress is the cogent fact that the early parties were 
opposing one another on a much higher percentage of the total number of 
roll calls than were the modern parties. The Federalists and Republicans 
were in conflict two-thirds of the time. In 1975, the parties were in 
opposition less than one-half (48 percent) of the time (Table VI). 
Year 
1976 
1975 
TABLE ·xv 
MEAN INDEXES OF RELATIVE PARTY COHESION ON PARTY UNITY 
VOTES IN MODERN SENATE, 1974-1975 
Democratic Republican 
72% 68% 
76 71 
Source: These indexes were derived from information in "Party Unity 
Voting Rose Sharply in 1975," Congressional Quarterly (January 
24, 1976), p. 180. 
·,:. 
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Party Loyalty Indexes 
Concluding that the existence of two Senatorial parties were 
established, party loyalty indexes were computed for each Senator who 
cast more than one vote during the first six Senates. Only party unity 
roll calls were examined. Again, the relative index (absences were not 
calculated) was chosen because the majority of absences seem not to have 
been tactically motivated. The index shows the percentage of a Senator's 
total votes cast in harmony with the majority of his party as they were 
opposed by a majority of the opposing party. This index gives the single 
most accurate quantitative measure of partisanship for individual 
legislators in a bipolar body. Therefore, the loyalty scores 6f each 
Senator in every session and for each combined Congress are set forth 
in Tables XVI through XXI. These indexes were used in constructing the 
histograms in which the degree and composition of polarization in each 
session is visually demonstrated. The histograms showing the distribu-
timi of indexes by individual sessions are in Appendix B. The distribu-
tion of indexes computed by Congresses are in Appendix C. 
Examining Table XVI reveals that a sizable majority of the Senators 
who served in the First· Senate were indexed. consistently as either 
Republicans or Federalists. Only 11 .members were indexed with one 
party in two sessions and with the other party in the other session. 
These facts alone indicate a surprising amount of partisan behavior at 
this stage of history. Upon examination of the issues involved during 
the First Congress, it appears that one issue which came before the 
Senate in the second session caused most of the deviance. The question 
of where to locate the capital created a large number of party unity 
,. 
TABLE XVI 
INDEXES OF RELATIVE PARTY LOYALTY, FIRST CONGRESS, 
BASED ON PARTY UNITY ROLL CALLSl 
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Federalist Indexes ReEublican Indexes 
Session Session 
Senator State 1st 2nd 3rd Gong. 1st 2nd 3rd Gong. 
Dalton MA 83 80 100 83 
Strong MA 100 73 89 76 
Foster RI 66 89 71 
Stanton RI 55 78 62 
Ellsworth CT 1002 69 100 78 
Johnson CT 67 97 100 92 
King NY 100 95 89 94 
Schyler NY 100 95 63 91 
Dickinson NJ 78 78 
Patterson NJ 67 87 84 
Johnston NC 59 51 
Butler sc 70 51 100 100 
Izard sc 80 62 67 100 
Few GA 50 61 51 100 
Langdon· NH 56 100 58 57 
Wingate NH 68 89 80 63 
Maclay PA 88 80 84 73 
Morris PA 100 56 65 55 
Elmer NJ 100 89 67 54 
Bassett DE 83 100 93 72 
Read DE 86 56 82 67 
Carroll ND 68 74 100 77 
Henry ND 68 93 86 89 
Grayson VA 100 100 
Lee VA 100 88 100 94 
Non roe VA 100 100 
Walker VA 87 87 
Hawkins NC 78 100 82 
Gunn GA 70 76 86 79 
Mean 75 76 
1 There were 55 party unity roll calls during the First Congress. Nine 
occurred in the first session, 40 in the second and nine in the 
third. 
2This Senator voted only twice in this session. 
l'.l,'i' 
TABLE XVII 
INDEXES OF RELATIVE PARTY LOYALTY, SECOND CONGRESS, 
BASED ON PARTY UNITY ROLL CALLSl 
67 
Federalist Indexes ReEuhlican Indexes 
Session Session 
Senator State 1st 2nd Cong. 1st 2nd Cong. 
Bradley VT 93 67 83 
Robinson VT 92 71 87 
Langdon NH 96 86 94 
Wingate NH 88 71 84 
Cabot MA 100 86 . 97 
Strong MA 87 86 87 
Foster RI 84 100 88 
Stanton RI 64 100 72 
Ellsworth CT 96 100 97 
Sherman CT 68 100 75 
King NY 70 86 73 
Rutherford NJ 83 83 83 
Bassett DE 73 86 77 
Read DE 68 87 72 
Burr NY 57 83 72 
Morris PA 71 79 68 
Dickinson NJ 86 71 58 
Carroll MD 77 77 
Henry MD 71 96 81 
Potts MD 100 100 
Lee VA 88 88 
Monroe VA 96 86 94 
Taylor VA 100 100 
Brmvn KY 71 71 
Edwards KY 100 100 
Hawkins NC 92 71 88 
Johnston NC 71 96 81 
Butler sc 96 86 91 
Izard sc 71 80 69 
Few GA 88 100 90 
Gunn GA 92 83 90 
Mean 84 83 
1 
·There were 32 party unit roll calls during the Second Congress. 
Twenty-five occurred in the first session, and seven in the second 
session. 
Senator State 
Paine VT 
Live more NH 
Cabot MA 
Strong MA 
Bradford RI 
Foster RI 
Ellsworth CT 
Mitchell CT 
Trumbull CT 
King NY 
Ross PA 
Morris , PA 
Bingham PA 
Frelinghuysen NJ 
Rutherford NJ 
Vinning DE 
Latimer DE 
Henry MD 
Potts MD 
Marshall KY 
Read sc 
Izard SC. 
TABLE XVIII 
INDEXES OF RELATIVE PARTY.LOYALT:Y, THIRD CONGRESS, 
BASED ON PARTY UNITY ROLL CALLSl 
Federalist Indexes 
Session 
1st 2nd 3rd Cong. 1st 
83 83 
81 92 75 
97 100 100 98 
96 90 100 96 
95 91 100 95 
82 73 100 84 
92 91 100 94 
100 89 96 
100 100 
85 100 100 100 
67 100 56 81 
97 67 93 
100 100 
87 86 100 89 
91 90 91 91 
87 67 89 85 
100 100 91 
67 100 71 
71 100 74 
58 58 
83 83 
94 78 91 
ReEublican Indexes 
Session 
2nd 3rd Cong. 
70 
50 
50 
0' 
CXl 
TABLE XVIII (Continued) 
Federalist Indexes Re:eublican Indexes 
Session Session 
Senator State 1st 2nd 3rd Gong. 1st 2nd Jrd Cong. 
Bradley VT 88 73 83 
Robinson VT 93 90 100 94 
Langdon NH 73 70 100 75 
Burr NY 100 100 100 100 
Gallatin PA 88 88 
Monroe VA 97 97 
Taylor VA 100 100 
Mason VA 100 100 
Tazewell VA 100 100 100 
Brown KY 89 88 92 90 
Edwards NC 67 100 84 
Martin NC 91 80 92 89 
Hawkins NC 70 70 62 
Bloodworth NC 92 92 
Butler sc 85 92 87 
Gunn GA 92 68 100 54 
Jackson GA 81 100 100 88 
Mean 89 87 
1 62 party unity roll calls during the Third Congress; 39 occurred the first 11 in There were in session, 
the second session, and 12 in the third. 
Senator State 
Paine VT 
Tichenor VT 
Livermore NH 
Cabot MA 
Strong MA 
Goodhue MA 
Sedgwick MA 
Bradford RI 
Foster RI 
Ellsworth CT 
Hillhouse CT 
Tracy CT 
Trumbull CT 
King NY 
Laurance NY 
Bingham PA 
Ross PA 
Frelinghuysen NJ 
Rutherford NJ 
Stockton NJ 
Latimer DE 
V;ining DE 
Howard MD 
Potts MD 
TABLE XIX 
INDEXES OF RELATIVE PARTY LOYALTY, FOURTH CONGRESS, 
BASED ON PARTY UNITY ROLL CALLSl 
Federalist Indexes 
Session 
1st 2nd Cong. 1st 
100 70 83 
86 70 70 
85 74 
100 100-
93 93 
68 68 
100 100 
97 70 89 
90 69 84 
67 67 
100 100 
78 78 
97 97 
95 95 
92 92 
84 92 87 
81 92 84 
62 62 
81 90 83 
92 92 
94 92 93 
100 75 80 
64 64 
58 58 
ReEublicari Indexes 
Session 
2nd Cong. 
54 
'-.1 
0 
TABLE XIX (Continued) 
Federalist Indexes ReEublican Indexes -
Session Session 
Senator State 1st 2nd Cong. 1st 2nd Cong. 
Read sc 88 92 91 
Gunn GA 74 66 71 
Robinson VT 90 90 
Langdon NH 80 92 88 
Burr NY 87 50 80 
Henry MD 69 58 66 
Mason VA 100 75 87 
Tazewell VA 91 92 91 
Brown KY 97 77 91 
Marshall KY 62 58 51 
Blount TE 80 80 
Cocke TE 92 92 
Bloodworth NC 94 92 94 
Martin NC 82 85 83 
Butler sc 89 89 
Hunter sc 100 100 
Tattnall GA 83 73 80 
Mean 84 84 
1 There were 47 party unit roll calls during the Fourth Congress; 34 occurred in the first session and 13 in 
the second session. 
TABLE XX 
INDEXES OF RELATIVE PARTY LOYALTY, FIFTH CONGRESS, 
BASED ON PARTY UNITY ROLL CALLS1 · 
Federalist Indexes Re_eublican Indexes 
Session Session 
Senator . state 1st 2nd 3rd Cong . 1st· 2nd 3rd Cong. 
Paine VT 87 89 94 89 
Tichenor VT 93 93 
Chipman VT 96 88 94 
Livermore NH 72 81 70 53 
Goodhue MA 100 96 94 93 
Sedgwick MA 100 92 100 94 
Bradford RI 71 71 
Foster RI 53 85 80 85 
Greene RI 91 82 90 
Hillhouse CT 82 92 93 92 
Tracy CT 100 93 94 94 
Hobart NY 87 87 
Laurance NY 100 86 85 57 
North NY 79 79 
Bingham PA 94 81 77 96 
Ross PA 93 90 59 74 
Rutherford NJ 100 78 88 
Stockton NJ 100 97 100 98 
Davenport NJ 100 100 
Latimer DE 94 93 83 92 
Vining DE 100 100 
Clayton DE 89 89 
Henry MD 54 54 
Howard MD 82 77 76 77 
"'-.1 
N 
TABLE XX (Continued) 
Federalist Indexes ReEublican Indexes 
Session Session 
Senator State 1st 2nd 3rd Cong. 1st 2nd 3rd Cong. 
Lloyd MD 97 86 95 
Read sc 94 86 53 83 
Langdon NH 100 91 100 94 
Mason VA 100 100 100 100 
Tazewell VA 100 96 96 
Brown KY 94 86 100 83 
Marshall KY 62 74 56 65 
Blount TE 100 100 
Cocke TE 100 100 
Anderson TE 95 100 83 
Jackson TE 97 97 
Bloodworth NC 94 9 100 94 
Martin NC 94 64 94 71 
··Hunter sc 51 75 57 
Pickney sc 100 100 
Gunn2 GA 50 50 56 53 
Tatnall GA 94 73 92 80 
Mean 87 85 
1 135 party unity roll calls during the Fifth Congress; 17 occurred in the first session, 101 in There were 
·the second session, and 17 in the third. 
2This Senator only voted four times in the first session and only 12 times in the second session. 
-...1 
w 
Senator State 
Chipman VT 
Paine VT 
Livermore NH 
Dexter MA 
Goodhue MA 
D. Foster MA 
J. Mason MA 
T. Foster RI 
Greene RI 
Hillhouse CT 
Tracy CT 
Laurance NY 
Morris NY 
Watson NY 
Bingham PA 
Ross PA 
Dayton NJ 
Schureman NJ 
Latimer DE 
Wells DE 
Howard MD 
Lloyd MD 
Hindman MD 
Read sc 
Gunn GA 
TABLE XXI 
INDEXES OF RELATIVE PARTY LOYALTY, SIXTH CONGRESS, 
BASED ON PARTY UNITY ROLL CALLSl 
Federalist Indexes 
Session 
1st 2nd Gong. 1st 
93 91 93 
95 86 92 
88 59 80 
95 95 
83 83 
61 61 
96 96 
86 68 
93 58· 85 
82 56 76 
97 96 97 
90 90 
83 92 90 
93 93 
88 100 89 
88 95 90 
100 96 99 
94 95 93 
94 95 94 
98 96 97 
94 96 95 
91 91 
100 100 
95 96 95 
77 75 76 
ReEublican Indexes 
Session 
2nd Gong. 
82 
-...J 
~ 
TABLE XXI (Continued) 
Federalist Indexes ReEublican Indexes 
Session Session 
Senator State 1st 2nd Cong. 1st 2nd Cong. 
Langdon NH 95 91 94 
Armstrong NY 75 75 
S ""' T. Mason VA 98 92 96 
Nicholas VA 98 92 96 
Brown KY 94 91 94 
Marshall KY 60 52 57 
Cocke TE 97 96 97 
Anderson TE 75 91 80 
Bloodworth NC 93 92 93 
Franklin NC 89 92 89 
Pickney sc 93 100 96 
Baldwin GA 97 96 96 
Mean 89 89 
1 86 party unity roll calls during the Sixth Congress; 62 occurred in the first session and 24 in There were 
the second session. 
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votes. The highly involved maneuvering on the matter, especially after 
it became intertwined with the question of assuming state debts, was 
responsible for nine Senators casting votes with those who were their 
opponents on most other issues, causing them to receive a misleading 
loyalty index--that is, an index that they themselves probably would not 
have accepted as accurately portraying their voting behavior through the 
Congress. Wingate of New Hampshire, Morris·of Permsylvania, Bassett and 
Read of Delaware, and Elmer of New Jersey were in general strong 
Federalists, but on the residence issue, they supported strategic and 
tactical maneuvers associated with the bargain between Morris and the 
delegations from Maryland and Virginia to place the capital on the 
Potomac after removing from New York to Philadelphia for an interim. Of 
this number only Bassett and Wingate opposed the assumption of state 
debts. 
Four Republican types, Johnston of North Carolina, Butler and Izard 
of South Carolina, and Few of Georgia were indexed as Federalists, 
primarily because they agreed with the majority of the Federalists in 
supporting New York for the temporary residency. For example, Johnston 
and Few voted with the majority of Southern Republicans on locating the 
permanent capital on the Potomac, against funding and assumption, and 
against establishing the bank in the third session. Izard and Butler, 
because of the burdensome debts of South Carolina, voted for the assump-
tion of state debts. It is obvious that, at the time, a Senator's stand 
on Hamilton's fiscal measures of assumption and the bank were not 
necessarily the final determinant of party identity as it was later 
assumed by many. Maclay of Pennsylvania was a bitter antagonist of the 
Federalists and fought,•fiercely against the assumption of state debts, 
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yet he voted in support of the bank in the third session. However, his 
Journal makes it clear that this was done reluctantly and probably with 
hopes that it would bolster his sagging chances for reelection to 
another term. It is absolutely certain that he did not intend to signal 
a union with the party supporting the administration. It is harder to 
speak confidently of John Langdon's party identity during the First 
Congress. During the first session, he was absent for all but two of 
the roll calls recorded in the Annals, and these he cast with the 
Republicans. In the second session, he voted with the Potomac bloc on 
the residence, but supported assumption. His votes on the capital 
assured his statistical identity as a Republican even though he 
received a low ranking Republican index for the second session. For 
the combined Congress, he earned a Federalist index for the third 
session by supporting the bank on every roll call. During the Second 
Congress he voted as a strong Federalist. Analysis of the content of 
the roll calls indicates that his personal inclinations may have 
impelled him toward many Republican principles, while his extensive 
shipping and financial interests nudged him into the Federalist orbit 
as Hamilton's fiscal system took shape. As American politics became 
embroiled with the debate over the best response to the Anglo-French 
war, Langdon's voluminous trade with the French West Indies caused him 
to move into the French oriented Republican party. From the Third 
Congress onward, he voted as a solid Republican. His movement from one 
party to another is easily traced on Table XXII which lists all the 
Senators who in one session or another were indexed with both parties. 
It can also be seen from Table XXII that Robert Morris of 
Pennsylvania and Dickinson of New Jersey voted with the Republicans 
TABLE XXII 
SENATORS WHO CHANGED PARTIES, BASED ON PARTY UNITY ROLL CALLS 
Congress and Session 
Senator State 1:1 1:2 1:3 2:1 2:2 3:1 3:2 3:3 4:1 4:2 5:1 5:2 5:3 6:1 6:2 
Bradley VT F F R R 
Rofiinson VT F F R R R R 
Langdon NH R R f- F F R R R R R R R R R R 
Wingate NH F R F F F 
Livermore NH F R F F r nc F F F F 
-
T. Foster RI F F F F F F F F F f- F F F R 
Burr NY f R R R R R r-
Laurance NY F F F r- F 
Maclay PA R R F 
Morris PA F R F R F F F 
Ross PA R f F F F F F f F F 
Elmer NJ F R F 
Dickinson NJ F R F 
Bassett DE F R F F F 
Read DE F R f- F F 
Henry MD R R R R F F F F R r- f-
Potts MD R F f F F 
Edwards KY R R f '-! 00 
TABLE XXII (Continued) 
Congress and Session 
Senator State 1:1 1:2 1:3 2:1 2:2 3:1 3:2 3:3 4:1 4:2 5:1 5:2 . 5:3 . 6:1 6:2 
Harshall KY f r- f F R r- r r 
Hawkins NC R R R R R F 
Johnston NC F R R F 
Butler sc R F R R R R 0 R R 
Izard sc R F R R F F F 
Hunter sc R R f-
Gunn GA R r- R R R r R F F R nc nc r F F 
Few GA nc F R R R 
Key: F or R designates 68 to 100 percent support of Federalist or Republican party; f or r designates 
party support of 58 to 67 percent; f- or r- indicates marginal party support; indicates atypical 
-identity in the session due to such factors as overriding state interests or unique combination of 
roll calls (such as in 1:2) but does not necessarily indicate that an intentional realignment was 
intended. 
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a majority of the time in the first session of the Second Congress. In 
this session the matter of reapportioning the House of Representatives 
occupied the major attention of the Senate. In the long struggle Morris 
con~istently voted with the Southern Republicans in supporting apportion-
ment plans that enhanced the power of Pennsylvania in the House. 
Dickinson of New Jersey apparently followed Morris on most of the roll 
calls, for, in siding with Morris and the Southerners, he was not 
promoting the interests of New Jersey. Both were voting consistently 
with the Federalists in the following sessions. Therefore, it is 
obvious that the apportionment issue did not cause a partisan realign-
ment, although the extended bitter fight may have helped to harden 
party loyalty for many. 
Comparatively few Senators definitely shifted from one party to 
another. In addition to Langdon, who was mentioned above, Bradley 
and Robinson of Vermont voted as Federalists in the Second Congress, but 
in the Third Congress moved into the main body of Republicans. Izard 
and Henry moved solidly onto the Federalist side in the second session 
of the Third Congress. Also, in that session Johnston of North Carolina 
voted with the Republicans. 
These shifts in the last session of the Second and the early ses-
sions of the Third Congress seem to reflect changing individual reactions 
to the growing discord over the proper American response to the Anglo-
French struggle and the pressures the two antagonists were putting 
upon the nation for support. In his work on the Continental Congress, 
Henderson demonstrated the post-war tendencies of the South toward 
militarism as opposed to the Eastern opposition to a national military. 
As the Anglo-French struggle threatened to involve America, the Eastern 
based Federalists became advocates of military preparedness capable of 
resisting attacks from either foreign disputant. On the other hand, 
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the militarism of most Southern Republicans gave way before a reluctance 
to allow the Federalist-dominated national government to build a strong 
military machine. This inversion of attitude did not affect all at the 
same time, nor was it universal. 
The issue of national preparedness seemed to intertwine with the 
Federalist desire for a more centralized and stronger policing of the 
Western frontier. Bradley and Robinson of Vermont were unwilling to 
endorse these new expressions of centralism and militarism and began to 
vote with the Republicans. Conversely, Republicans such as Henry and 
Potts of Maryland, Johnston of North Carolina, and Izard of South 
Carolina were unwilling to oppose the principle of military preparedness 
and found themselves voting consistently with the Federalists. Izard, 
who had supported the assumption but opposed the bank, was a holder of 
a sizable portion of the public debt, and was closely allied with his 
son-in-law, William Laughton Smith, who had become one of Hamilton's 
leading lieutenants in the House. .As the electorate in South Carolina 
and the nation polarized, Izard definitely shifted to the Federalist 
party. The personal decision to support the national defense measures 
seem to have also moved Hawkins of North Carolina and Edwards of 
Kentucky into the Federalist column during the second session of the 
Second Congress, each Senator's last session in the Senate. 
Humphrey Marshall succeeded Edwards in the third term of the Third 
Congress, the special session called in order to consider ratifying the 
Jay Treaty. He supported ratification of the treaty, but in the next 
session he was indexed as a strong Republican. At the start of the 
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session, a memortal from some in the Kentucky legislature asking that 
Marshall be tried for perjury by the Senate was received. The governor 
of Kentucky wrot.e asking that the memorial be ignored. Republicans 
I 
opposed the Federalist majority in an effort to spare Marshall. 
Marshall voted with the Republicans the remainder of the session but 
reverted to theiFederalists the following session. In the second ses-
sion of the Fifrh Congress he again reverted to the Republican side. 
I 
On his overall rvoting record he supported the Republicans slightly more 
than the Federalists. 
James Gunn moved from a regular Republican association in the third 
session of the Third Congress when he supported the Jay Treaty (the votes 
of Gunn and Marshall were essential to ratification). According to the 
loyalty indexes, Gunn's party identity changed four times during the 
remainder of the Federalist era. In his case his attendance was so 
sporadic that the precision of these identifications may be questioned. 
He only cast 102 votes out of 268 party unity roll calls during the next 
three Congresses. Of these he voted 72 to 40 as a Federalist. There is 
no doubt that he considered himself a Federalist following the ratifica-
tion of the Jay Treaty, for he wrote to Rufus King in August of 1795 
encouraging him to resign from the Senate and accept the position of 
Secretary of State if the President offered it to him saying, "Colonel 
. 6 
Hamilton will take your place in the Senate and all will be well." 
Ross of the extreme Western frontier of Pennsylvania was selected 
to succeed Albert Gallatin after the Federalists denied him his seat 
in the Senate in the early part of the Third Congress. He voted as a 
Republican throughout the first session and then became a strong 
Federalist. 
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The Federalist index for Aaron Burr in his first session in the 
Senate is partly attributable to the fact that the Federalist-sponsored 
effort on reapportioning the House assigned New York slightly more 
power in the House than did the measures sponsored by the Republicans. 
There may also have been an element of tactical maneuvering on Burr's 
part. Known as a strong member of the old Anti-Federalist Clintonian 
party in New York, he was nevertheless selected to replace the Federalist 
Phillip Schuyler (the father-in-law of Alexander Hamilton), although he 
was seeking reappointment. Since the legislature at the time was 
dominated by Federalists, it is likely that they had in mind wooing Burr 
over to the Federalists. While Burr sided with the Federalists on a 
majority of the votes, he did manage to vote with the Republicans on 
some highly contested issuei, but his votes on the Republican side were 
never crucial·to the outcome. He thus retained his options and remained 
in an excellent position to bargain his influence in national politics 
as the Vice-Presidential election of 1792 approached. 
The other comtemporary changes in party indexes in such cases as 
those of Livermore of New Hampshire and Laurence of New York did not 
signal an intended change in political associations. However, the shift 
of Theodore Foster of Rhode Island in the last sessions of the Sixth 
Congress may reflect the rapid development of the Republican party in the 
state following the controversy over the Alien and Sedition laws. 
Thus the indexes of party loyalty furni~h a rather distinct picture 
of the strength of partisan loyalties within the Senate of the Federalist 
era. Of the 95 Senators who served during the Federalist years, at least 
72 percent voted with the same party in every session of their encum-
bency. Not more than 11 Senators (12 percent) seem to have purposefully 
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changed parties. Considering the general disdain in which partisanship 
was almost universally held, the experimental stage of the government, 
and the intensity of the issues, the fledging parties demonstrated 
remarkable stability. 
The sectional orientation of the .two parties that was evidenced by 
cluster bloc analysis and cumulative scaling was definitely confirmed by 
the more precise party loyalty scores. Table XXIII shows the sectional 
makeup of the parties for each session. On an average, 90 percent of 
the Federalist types came from New England and the middle states, 
whereas only 10 percent were from the South. On the other hand, 
Southerners made up 71 percent of the Republican membership while 16 
percent came from the middle states and only 13 percent came from New 
EngLand. 
Summary 
The quantitative evidence is clear. The Senate voted in patterns 
of associations that characterize modern legislative bodies where 
political parties are known to exist. Measures of interparty conflict 
revealed that the level of partisan conflict exceeded the levels of 
conflict within the modern Senate. There are differences between the 
two situations, but the level of persistent polarization in the early 
Senate is indicative of organized partisanship. The same is true of 
measures of intra-party behavior. These findings suggest that perhaps 
too much attention has been paid to the disclaimers of partisanship by 
early party leaders. The following chapters demonstrate that there was 
much in the political behavior of the leaders of the period to 
'I· 
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TABLE XXIII 
SECTIONAL REPRESENTATION WITHIN THE PARTIES, BASED ON LOYALTY 
INDEXES DERIVED FROM PARTY UNITY VOTING 
Congress Federalist ReEublican 2 Middle3 4 2 Middle3 and 1 New Eng. Southern New Eng. Southern Session No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % 
1:1 5 42 7 58 0 0 1 11 3 33 5 56 
1:2 6 46 3 23 4 31 2 15 7 54 4 31 
1:3 8 so 8 so 0 0 0 0 2 20 8 80 
2:1 10 67 5 33 0 0 0 0 4 33 8 67 
2:2 10 53 7 37 2 11 0 0 2 20 8 80 
3:1 7 47 7 47 1 7 3 21 2 14 9 64 
3:2 6 38 9 56 1 6 4 40 1 10 5 so 
3:3 8 40 9 45 3 15 2 20 1 10 7 70 
4:1 8 44 8 44 2 11 2 17 2 17 8 67 
4:2 8 44 8 44 2 11 2 15 2 15 9 69 
5:1 8 42 9 47 2 11 2 18 0 0 9 82 
5:2 9 41 10 45 3 14 1 10 0 0 9. 90 
5:3 9 47 9 47 1 5 1 10 1 10 9 90 
6:1 9 43 10 48 2 10 1 9 0 0 10 91 
6:2 9 45 9 45 2 10 1 8 1 8 10 83 
Mean 46 45 10 13 16 71 
4 
1In Session 1:1 one Southern Senator was not classified. In Session 3:2 
one Southern Senator was not classified. In Session 4:2 one middle 
state Senator was not classified. In Session 5:1 one Southern Senator 
was not classified. In Session 5:2 one Southern Senator was not 
classified. 
2 New England states are Vermont, New Hampshire, Connecticut, Rhode 
Island, and Massachusetts. 
3Middle states are New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Delaware and 
Maryland. 
4 Southern states are Kentucky, Tennessee, Virginia, North Carolina, 
South Carolina and Georgia. 
',, 
substantiate and explain the quantitative evidence of party set forth 
in this study. 
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3rbid., pp. 12-13. 
4Ibid., pp. 183-185. 
5Mames Gunn to Rufus King, August 22, 1975, in Robert Ernst, Rufus 
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CHAPTER III 
THE EMERGENCE OF SENATORIAL PARTIES 
The Peaceful Beginning 
Proponents of the Constitution expected the Senate to be above 
partisan behavior. The House of Representatives was expected to produce 
coalitions of loc~l factions, but the Senate would be nationally 
oriented and removed from the partisan behavior that was firmly de-
nounced by all political thinkers of the time. Every state but Virginia 
chose as Senators men who had worked for adoption of the Constitution 
in the late ratification struggle. And, while Virginia's Richard Henry 
Lee and William Grayson had been strong opponents of adoption, they had 
come to the Senate dedicated to the task of furthering the interests of 
Virginia and the nation within the framework of the new Constitution. 
All were dedicated to making the experiment in republican government 
succeed, and in this they were successful, but they failed in their 
effort to abstain from partisanship. The secrecy which they imposed on 
their proceedings and the brief and cryptic minutes which they published 
helped to obsecure this fact from the public and many later historians. 
The Senate convened on March 4, 1789, but was unable to conduct 
business until after April 6, due to lack of a quorum. In keeping with 
both the elitist nature of the Senate and the precedent of the Continen-
tal Congress, the decision was made to conduct all business behind 
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closed doors. No roll call votes were to be taken unless demanded by 
one~fifth of those present, as was prescribed by the Constitution, and 
no reports on the deliberation or progress of bills were to be made to 
anyone outside the Senate. For nearly three and one-half months, the 
Senate conducted business without a roll call. In mid-July, passage 
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of the bill creating the judiciary required a roll call. After this 
vote, a month passed before another roll call was taken. Then, between 
August 25 and September 29, roll calls were demanded at least eight 
times. In the next session, they were requested and taken 58 times and 
on a wide variety of issues. Roll call analysis revealed the consistent 
polarization of two basic groups even in the votes of the first session 
as detailed in Chapter II. Thus, the first session started amid wide 
expectations of harmonious and non-partisan behavior, but it ended with 
the members of the Senate embroiled in partisan conflict. These facts 
suggest two basic questions: When did repetitive polarization begin to 
occur? And what issue, or issues, produced, or revealed the cleavage? 
Questions about the origins of legislative parties within the 
Senate cannot be fully answered by an examination of the official 
minutes of the Senate published in the Annals of Congress for the.y are 
extremely obscure for the first Congresses. The minutes for the First 
Seriate consist largely of brief descriptions of the subject of business 
and the committees formed to handle various tasks. But they do not 
record the debates or give clues as to who made the major motions. 
Therefore, the information in the Annals must be supplemented by informa-
tion from private correspondence, diaries, newspapers, and other records. 
Given the general expectancy of a deliberative and non-partisan Senate 
and the total membership dedicated to the task of launching a successful 
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national government, it would be logical to argue, on the basis of the 
Annals only, that the first months of the Congress were basically 
harmonious. But the contrary is true. The Senate was not able to 
function in general secrecy and harmony for very long. This is plainly 
evident from the extensive and highly illuminating notes recorded by 
William Haclay, the crusty Senator from the interior of Pennsylvania. 
The Roots of Division 
Senator Maclay's private notes, written from memory, and brief 
notes at the close of most every day (subsequently published as the 
Journal of William Maclay) constitute an indispensable source for the 
study of the First Congress and most especially the first session. 
Maclay's descriptions of "interests," deals, compromises, acrimonious 
debates, and the emergence of a "court party" belie what might otherwise 
be inferred from the composition of the Senate and the small number of 
roll calls in the session. If Maclay is credited with moderate accuracy 
in his statements of the debates, events and factional alignments, then 
it becomes necessary to conclude that, for most Senators at least, their 
commitment to nationalism was sharply circumscribed by parochial 
sentiments and state and regional loyalties. Equally important, if not 
more so, the Senators tended to gravitate around two conflicting 
ideological poles concerning the nature of governmental authority within 
a republic. 
It is only natural that ideological and sectional conflict would 
erupt so quickly in the Senate. The Senate was composed of men who had 
had considerable experience in governmental affairs all through the 
Revolutionary period. ''Most had been delegates to the Continental 
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Congress. Some had been members of the Constitutional Convention. 
Others such as John Adams, who as Vice-President served as President of 
the Senate, Ralph Izard, and Richard Henry Lee had also served as 
diplomatic representatives abroad. All were men who had been selected 
by their respective state legislatures as knowledgeable men who could 
be expedted to represent the most powerful interests of their respective 
states. As men long accustomed to thinking in terms of state and 
sectional interests, conflicts, and loyalties, these Senators were not 
apt to abandon the concerns of their special interests simply because 
a new political contract had been intrigued into adoption. 
All now realized that a powerful central government had been 
established, and that if this new government fell into the control of 
those who were unconcerned with or antagonistic to the interests of 
their state and region, great harm could befall them. Therefore, men 
of the Senate, acting as guardians of their states, and especially the 
dominant interests of those states, began to scrutinize every 
legislative proposal and governmental action in light of their own and 
others' special, state, and sectional interests. Knowing that a working 
majority in the Senate would control the legislative outputs of Congress 
and Presidential appointments, they quickly looked to every section of 
the country for allies in a common cause. Out of this situation there 
developed within the Senate the legislative parties which soon became a 
working part of the developing national parties. 
A major part of the task facing the First Congress was "fleshing 
out" the Constitution, since the farmers of the Constitution had left 
unresolved many details that had to be decided as the organization of 
the new government proceeded. The Constitution had created a government 
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in which the branches shared powers to a degree not fully defined. The 
... 
Convention had deliberately left some questions unresolved in order not 
to create unnecessary antagonism against the adoption of the general 
plan. But the ambiguities, the overlapping of powers, and the structur-
ing of new machinery to exercise the new powers granted to the govern-
ment required the First Congress to settle a number of matters left 
unresolved by the Constitutional Convention. This task gave rise to 
the clash of conflicting views of the purposes of the late Revolution 
and the nature of republican government. Political ideology became 
inextricably intertwined with special, state, and regional interests. 
As noted in Chapter I, Richard Buel and others have argued the 
importance of ideology in the Federalist era. Some Americans, the 
Federalist sort especially, saw the· late Revolution as one that had 
freed the American states from English domination only. For this group 
the President and Congress were the proper replacements of Crown and 
Parliament. According to their view, the relationship of the people to 
government would remain basically unchanged. Government without a 
republic would still be by the gifted and influential "better sorts." 
In this government by elites, the executive department needed broader 
grants of power in order to administer an efficient government. In 
brief, effective sovereignty resided in the elected government and its 
agents rather than the people. On the other hand, those who came to 
be known as Republicans saw the Revolution as one that freed the people 
from aristocratic dominance as well as the autocratic rule of King and 
Parliament. The relation of people to government had been changed, and 
the American government was more truly republican in nature than the 
British system had ever been. The people, not their elected 
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representatives in government, were sovereign. The executive should not 
be powerful enough 'to enforce laws that the people did not wish the 
Congress to enact. 
These ideological distinctions were highly significant in applica-
tion. As the young-government moved from one decision to another, 
divergent theories and their practical applications became a matter of 
concern to an ever-growing number of citizens. It was this clash of 
perspectives intermixing with state and regional interests that created 
the tensions and schisms within the Senate that William Maclay began to 
describe so regularly in his private journal. This intermixing of 
ideology with local interests helped to produce the partisan cleavages 
within the Senate that were revealed by the roll call analysis set forth 
in Chapter II of this study. 
The Symbols of Aristocracy 
William Maclay came from Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, as a supporter 
of the new Constitution. He also believed that most Americans shared 
his firm conviction that the Revolution had been fought to free the 
people from indigenous, aristocratic dominance as well as the British 
Parliament and Crown and to secure the right of the people to a genuine 
republican form of government. After only three weeks of deliberations, 
Maclay was disillusioned and began to keep a private journal in which he 
recorded his observations and evaluations of the contest between 
ideologies and interests which he believed to be transpiring not only 
in the Senate but in the general government as well. 
The first entry in his Journal, dated April 24, less than three 
weeks after the Senate':~began conducting its business, shows that the 
94 
opposing views of government had already produced heated conflicts 
within the Senate. A running debate over the questions of proper 
governmental ceremonies and elevated titles for the President, Vice-
President and officers of the Congress had been going on for several 
days. The previous day the committee for selecting a proper title for 
the President had been appointed. 
By April 29, he disavowed the aspirations of Federalists for the 
new government which he described as being "a most expensive and 
enormous machine of a Federal Judiciary, pompous titles, strong efforts 
after religious distinctions, coercive laws for taking oaths, etc."1 
Maclay perceived that conflicting attitudes toward the Constitution were 
basic to the emerging conflict within the Senate. As for his part he 
declared, "Never will I consent to straining the Constitution, nor never 
will I consent to the exercise of a doubtful power." 2 He specifically 
noted his own view of representation that precluded the creation of a 
powerful Senate, saying, "We came here the servants, not the lords, of 
3 
our constituents." The same entity shows that he felt he held a 
minority view, for he believed that he had "sacrificed every chance of 
being popular and every grain of influence in the Senate" by his opposi-
tion to the Senate" by his opposition to the expansion of governmental 
powers beyond what he thought were bestowed by the Constitution. 4 But 
Maclay was confident that the people in general shared his views and that 
the "high-handed measures" of his opponents would likely cause a revul-
sian among the people. The government had not yet been accepted by the 
people and "instead of being a powerful machine whose authority would 
support any measure," needed "props on all sides" and the support of the 
ablest and "most shinir'l'g characters" in order to succeed. 5 He was still 
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hopeful of winning out over his opponents. It is obvious that he began 
keeping his diary when he sensed that the Senate was dividing into two 
hostile camps and that he was a member of the opposition group. 
According to Maclay, the Senate spent most of its time from the 
beginning until the middle of May considering questions relating to 
matters of governmental ceremonies and Presidential titles, and these 
matters continued to agitate members for some time later. For some, 
exalted titles for the President and stately ceremonies were necessary 
to give the new government the degree of dignity necessary to command 
proper respect. For Maclay and others there was a deep.suspicion that 
the real design was to adorn the President in the trappings of royalty. 
His entry for April 25 reveals Maclay's chagrin at John Adams' address 
in which he expressed the idea that the framers of the Constitution had 
either "the two kings of Sparta or the two Consuls of Rome in mind when 
designing the offices of President and Vice-President."6 
The lines seem to have been firmly drawn from at least April 30 
when Vice-President Adams attempted to style Washington's inaugural 
address as "his most gracious speech"--the customary way to refer to 
an address from the throne by the British Monarch. Maclay and. others 
took strong exception to the phrase and Adams replied that even though 
he had been one of the first into the late Revolution that "he never 
would have drawn his sword" if he had foreseen such developments (object-
' 
7 ing to the British forms of government). Maclay retorted that the 
people had revolted against the British form of government and that the 
former oppoents of the Constitution would point to this phrase, if it 
remained in the minutes, as being "the fiq;t st~p of the ladder in the 
8 descent to royalty.'' 1He confessed in his diary that it was obvious 
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that the Revolution had been fought for differing motives. Some, 
obviously including John Adams and his New England colleagues, had 
fought in order to obtain a ''translation of the diadem and scepter from 
London to Boston, New York or Philadelphia; or, in other words, the crea-
tion of a new monarchy in America and to form niches for themselves in 
9 the temple of royalty." Maclay obviously viewed the Revolution as a 
rejection of aristocracy and privilege as well as British rule. 
The debates in the weeks that followed increased Maclay's 
suspicions about the attitudes of the New England men toward monarchy 
and royalty. ·on May 4, it was unofficially announced that the Committee 
on titles would recommend the title of "Elective Majesty" for the 
President. Three days later, the Senate debated Adams' suggestion that 
a special chair be placed in the Senate chamber to be used by the 
President when addressing the Senate, and Maclay was rankled by Adams' 
explanation that the chair was called a "throne" in England. 10 Proposals 
for Presidential titles of "excellency," "highness," and "elective 
highness" were voted down on May 8. On May 9, the committee on titles--
Lee, Ellsworth and Johnson--officially recommended "His Highness the 
President of the United States of America and Protector of the Same."11 
The division on these later proposals can be approximated as shown in 
Table XXIV. 
Some may have taken their stand on titles for strategic rather 
than ideological reasons. For example, Maclay knew that Lee was 
an ardent Anti-Federalist and doubted that he really was interested in 
elevated titles for the President. 12 He thought that Lee was simply 
trying to win the favor of the New England delegates so that they would 
follow him in a campaign to assume the leadership of the Senate along 
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TABLE XXIV 
DIVISION OF VOTES ON THE QUESTION OF TITLES 
For Titles Against Titles 
Langdon New Hampshire Maclay Pennsylvania 
Wingate New Hampshire Morris Pennsylvaniia 
Ellsworth Connecticut Elmer New Jersey 
Johnson Connecticut Carroll Maryland 
Dalton Massachusetts Henry Maryland 
Strong Massachusetts Read Delaware 
Paterson,'' New Jersey Bassett Delaware 
Lee Virginia Grayson Virginia 
Izard South Carolina Few Georgia 
Gunn Georgia 
New York men not yet in attendance 
*Probably voted this way, see pages 24, 26, 37. 
Source: William Mclay, The Journal of William Maclay, United States 
Senator from Pennsylvania, 1789-1791, ed. Edgar S. Maclay 
(New York, 1890). 
98 
with Southern delegates. He though that Izard "followed Lee" and 
' personally wanted only the title of "excellency." It was John Adams 
and the New England men who followed his lead that Maclay then suspected 
of nurturing a deep attachment to monarchy. The New England men were 
also judged to be cooperating with the Southerners for strategic 
purposes. They were flattering to Lee in hopes of gaining his coopera-
tion in opposing Philadelphia as the location of the capital. 13 Maclay 
was probably right in judging the harmony between Lee and Izard and the 
New England men as a strategic maneuver rather than an expression of 
a common ideology. The old Lee-Adams junta, which included Izard, 
reached back through the years to the Revolution. 14 Izard and Lee had 
worked to give the President the symbols of monarchial power, but when 
the Senate later considered specific legislative grants of power to the 
President which had not been enumerated in the Constitution, both Lee 
and Izard were in the opposition. 
This Senate struggle over titles and ceremonies was not "much ado 
about nothing" to their contemporaries. The matter was of great and 
enduring interest to the public. John Fenno, in his Gazzette £f the 
United States, the paper dedicated to upholding the new government as 
it functioned as the unofficial voice of the administration, reported 
at length on the social and political functions of the President. 
Feno always referred to the President as "His Excellency" and prompted 
Congress to adopt a formal title or "style" for all officers of the 
government. He wi·shed that the President might be further distinguished 
by "Your Magistracy" or "Your Supremacy" because the term "Excellency" 
was conferred on foreign emissaries. The title of "President" was not 
only too simple but it.•was open to being confused with that of the 
Vice-President when he served as President of the Senate. 15 After the 
first session ended, Fenno announced that he would give regular atten-
tion to the actions of the "Supreme Executive."16 
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The leading anti-administration New York Journal, edited by Thomas 
Greenleaf, was quick to criticize the efforts to appropriate the titles 
of royalty and monarchy to American officials. Greenleaf declared he 
would condone no "serenities, highnesses, or bashaws."17 The dispute 
was echoed by the lesser papers on both sides of the controversy. When 
the newspaper war broke out between John Fenno's Gazette of the United 
States and Philip Freneau's new National Gazette, the first onslaught 
was an attack on the "Aristocrats" who had tried and failed to "establish 
titles of distinction of law," over the pseudonym of "Farmer." "Farmer" 
went on to declare that "yet the destructive principles of aristocracy 
18 
are too prevalent amongst us." Thus it was that the attachment to 
ceremonies and the penchant for distinctive titles served as symbols of 
hope to one party and symbols of fear to the other. One party hoped for 
a strong and respected central government. The other feared that their 
opponents were anxious to establish an American Monarchy and a supporting 
aristocracy. Jefferson's inaugural walk through the mud in 1800 and 
Jackson's rowdy inaugural celebration in 1828 indicate the enduring 
quality of this issue in the minds of Republicans. 
The Senate never resolved the dispute over titles, but eventually 
the House of Representatives rejected all titles except that of 
"President" and, thus, settled the issue in a practical way. Before 
the issues of specific powers of the President reached the floor of 
either House of Congress, the pragmatic concerns of revenue and trade 
regulations had to be resolved. 
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The Revenue Bills 
After the House of Representatives passed two revenue bills setting 
tariff rates on imported items and tonnage rates for ships, the Senate 
revised both bills extensively, but the Annals shed no light on the 
course of the debates over these bills. Maclay's notes show clearly 
that three distinct regionally oriented blocs emerged during the con-
sideration of these measures. On July 11, he summarized his impression 
of the behavior of these blocs in dealing with the tariff bill: 
The Senators from Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, and 
Maryland (New York Senators had not yet arrived), in every 
act, seemed desirous of making the impost productive both as 
to revenue and effective for the encouragement of manufac-
turers and seemed to consider the whole of the imposts (salt 
excepted) much too low. Articles of luxury many of them 
would have raised one half. But the members, both from the 
North, and still more particularly from the South, were ever 
in a flame when any articles were brought forward that were 
in any considerable use among them.l9 
Thus, on the first substantive legislative items considered by the 
Senate, sectionally oriented divisions emerged. The Eastern and Middle 
states formed a coalition advocating the principle of protective tariffs 
while the Southern states, south of Maryland, were adamantly opposed to 
all protective imposts. Maclay said that Lee had "given opposition tc:i 
every article, especially the protecting duties. He declares openly 
against the principle of them," and Lee's colleague from Virginia, 
William Crayson, "declares against all imposts as the most unjust and 
oppressive mode of taxation." 20 Here, on May 28, was one of the first 
of many Southern cries of complaint against the abuse of federal power 
tQ be heard in the Senate. Southern opposition to protective tariffs 
no doubt resulted from the general absence of manufacturing in the 
South. The agrarian South which depended heavily on imports tended to 
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see protective tariffs as a direct benefit to the North at the expense 
of the South. Southern men, persistently seeking to lower the tariff 
rates set by the House, often combined with the Senators from New 
England against those from the middle states to lower items purchased 
in quantity by both, or either, of the two regions. Just as the South 
had stood alone in objecting to the principle of protection when 
debating the tariff bill, Southern men again stood alone in opposing a 
discrimination between American owned and foreign owned ships on the 
tonnage bill. They argued, "in the most unceasing manner" but gained 
21 
no support. Here again the South saw the discrimination on tonnage 
as a "tax" on the South for the benefit of the Northern ship owners for 
the South was heavily dependent upon British bottoms for much of her 
imports and exports. 
According to Maclay, while the Senate was debating the tariff and 
tonnage bills, the majority of the Senators from all three regions 
agreed on only one point that was of national dimension. No sectionally 
oriented divisions formed over the issue of discrimination against 
nations who did not have commercial treaties with the United States. 
Madison and others had succeeded in securing the discrimination (directed 
mainly against Britain) in the House bill. Southern Senator~ opposed 
the discrimination because of their ideological objection to this use 
of governmental power and because they imported so heavily from Britain 
that the discrimination would place an objectionable economic burden on 
the South. Northern Senators, on the other hand, seemed to stress the 
need to refrain from antagonizing Great Britain, for they did not want 
to risk a major disruption of their commercial relations with her. 
Writing of the debates·on this subject on May 26, Maclay, who supported 
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the discrimination, wrote that he had never been "so hard run" in a 
debate. It was argued by the opponents that "this discrimination was 
showing an inimical disposition to Great Britain; it was declaring com-
mercial war with her." 22 Only Maclay and Charles Carroll of Maryland · 
voted against striking the discrimination from the tariff bill. 23 Thus, 
it can be seen from Maclay's account of the Senate's treatment of the 
two revenue bills that the agreement of the South and North on 
discrimination was fortuitous rather than fundamental or typical. 
The Senate's behavior on these matters furnish insight into the 
nature of the Senate. This was an instance of the Senate functioning 
as a deliberative check upon the House, when the Senate in its "wisdom" 
considered implications of proposed legislation that the House had not 
properly considered. It also furnished an instance of Senators acting 
as guardians of state interests (including the leading vested interests 
of their state) while countering a House bill that gre_w out of more 
nationally oriented thinking. The Senate had been designed to protect 
state interests, but it had also been argued that.the Senate would think 
more "nationally" than would the locally elected Representatives. 24 
The Senate had been virtually deadlocked over the issue of elevated 
titles for the President. The debates and maneuvers had revealed a deep 
ideological division between members. The heated debates on the revenue 
bills focused attention on the old and fierce state loyalties and the 
divergent and often conflicting economic interests of the major regions. 
Fundamental issues had been raised and the conflicting ideologies and 
interests that produced these debates would continue to intertwine 
every major issue confronting the nation during the Federalist era. 
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The Balance of Power 
As Congress completed the revenue bills and turned its attention to 
organizing the federal judiciary and the executive departments, many 
more political questions not answered by the Constitution had to be 
resolved. These questions included such matters as the exact nature of 
the federal judiciary and the scope of its power, the division of 
responsibility between the President and the Senate in controlling the 
executive departments, the manner in which the Senate would give its 
"advice and consent" on Presidential appointments and the ratification 
of treaties and the role of the House in approving treaties entered 
after being ratified by the Senate. Answering these questions as they 
structured the new organs of government brought the opposing attitudes 
toward the proper limits of authority in republican government into open 
and sharp conflict. This issue proved to be the catalyst which produced 
the two opposing parties within the Senate. 
On June 22, the Senate began consideration of the bill establishing 
the federal judiciary which had been authored primarily by Oliver 
Ellsworth of Connecticut. On the same day, the House of Representatives 
voted to interpret the Constitution as granting to the President the 
power of removing the appointive heads of the executive departments which 
. 25 
were then being designed by the House. Two days later, the House voted 
passage of the bill creating the Department of Foreign·Affairs. This 
bill and the later ones establishing the Departments of War and Treasury 
contained specific recognition of the President's power to remove the 
principle officer of the department even though his appointment had been 
made only with the consent of the Senate. The obvious intention of the 
'ii\' 
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House was to define a Constitutional principle on which the Constitution 
had not spoken directly. This exaltation of the President at the ex-
pense of the Senate created a major cleavage among Senators when they 
turned their primary attention from the judiciary bill to those creating 
the new executive departments. 
As the Senate began consideration of the judiciary bill, Maclay and 
others developed serious reservations about the proposed strong judiciary 
which proponents of the bill were not able to allay. He wrote on May 7, 
"I 11 f . '11 b h d 1 f h C . ' " 26 rea y ear 1.t w1. e t e gun-pow er p ot o t e onst1.tut1.on. 
However, amendments to the bill and the endorsement of its general 
provisions by a number of respected political leaders outside the Senate 
combined to dispell many of their fears and objections. Maclay's fear 
and objections were at a much lower ebb when, on the evening of July 8, 
he confided to his diary: 
I own (that) the appropriation of so many men of character 
for abilities has lessened my dislike of it, yet I cannot 
think of the expense attending it, which I now consider as 
useless, without a kind of sickly qualm overshadowing me. 27 
Hence, his objection was now based mainly on the financial waste 
that the new courts would entail rather than on misgivings about 
constitutionality. But this would soon change as he came to consider 
the designs of those in the Senate who began to agree with the House in 
allowing the President to exercise the power of removal over federal 
appointees without requiring the consent of the Senate. At the end of 
the next day, July 9, he wrote that the debates over chancery courts 
were "light debates" and that ''Ellsworth has credit with me. " 28 The 
next few days "the lawyers" continued to maneuver on the subject of 
chancery. As the Senators began to consider the bills for the new 
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departments, some of the opponents of strengthening the Presidential 
powers began to see the judiciary bill in a new light. But, as of 
July 9, Maclay had not yet seen an interrelationship between the 
judiciary proposals and the departmental bills. 
On July 9, Maclay obtained copies of all three bills for creating 
the new departments which the House had recently passed. He noted three 
objections in his diary. He saw them as "being calculated on a scale of 
gn•at expense," but his emphasis was on the two other "grand objections." 
First was "the lessening of the power of the Senate" by granting the 
power of removal to the President without·consultation with the Senate 
while allowing the President to appoint an assistant in each department 
withoui the advice ~nd consent of the Senate. This latter appointment 
without the consent of the Senate was of "the first consequence" because 
coupled with the President's power of removal it would allow the 
departments to be administered by men who had not been confirmed by the 
Senate. The second evil connected with these bills was that, by creating 
these departments with their principal officers, the President was being 
placed "above business and thepower of responsibility, putting into the 
hands of his officers the duties required of him by the Constitution."29 
These Constitutional effects were not merely unintended side results of 
the bills, for he wrote, "Indeed, these appear to me to have been the 
moving reasons for bringing forward the bill at all. " 30 
Maclay believed the House was trying to diminish the influence of 
the Senate with these bills. It had not yet occurred to him that.a 
majority of the Senate would support this reduction of the Senate's 
. f f h d p 'd 31 power 1n avor o an en ance res1 ency. Therefore, the matter did 
not yet affect his thirtking regarding the judiciary bill. 
I' 
' 
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On July 14, the Senate took up the bill creating an executive 
dep,trtment to he known as the Department of Foreign Affairs. Maclay 
witl1 a touch of sophistry opened the debate by opposing the legislation 
under guise of protecting the powers of the President. The very creation 
of departments was unwise and in reality a curtailment of the executive 
powers of the President, for Congress was attempting to direct the most 
minttte particle of the President's conduct by this and the other bills 
to be considered. 
He then quickly described how the President should proceed with the 
conduct of the government without the creation of the great departments. 
The President would, when feeling the need for an officer to assist in 
the execution, submit his nomination to the Senate. If the Senate 
approved, the matter would then be submitted to the House for their 
approval, and the House would show their approval by providing the 
salary for the officer. Obviously, this ,.;ould have put the President 
continually at the mercy of both houses of Congress and would not have 
32 been a protection of his Constitutional powers. 
His views were quickly rejected. The discussion then moved to the 
sec<>nd sc·ction which stipulated the President's power to remove the 
principle officer from the department \vith the clear implication that 
the Senate had no right to advise and consent on the matter of removal. 
The issue was explosive and evocative of strong partisan feelings that 
would soori interrelate with considerations of the judiciary systems and 
other issues. Maclay was again on the attack. He argued that it was a 
"direct stroke at the power of the Senate." 33 He objected to the 
i' Jf,', 
appointment of a subordinate officer without the consent of the,Senate 
',· ; ·,I 
when such an officer mi'ght, on removal of the principle officer of the 
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department by the President, come to run the department on a permanent 
basis. But his main argument was that custom, reason, and the Constitu-
tion gave to the Senate, not the President, the sole power of removing 
by the impeachment process those whose confirmation by the Senate had 
been required. Officers once appointed could only be removed by the 
34 Senate through the impeachment process. 
Ellsworth spoke first for those who wished to grant the unrestricted 
power of removal to the President. He closed with a transparent appeal 
to Washington's great popularity. "It is sacrilege to touch a hair of 
his head, and we may as well lay the President's head on the block and 
strLke it off with one blow."35 The debate persiste<;l through to 
adjournment, and, \vhen the Senate convened the following day, debate 
resumed on the same topic. Senator Carroll of Maryland expressed his 
belief that the President had too little power and that his powers 
should be increased. He also condemned the "atrocious assumption of 
power in the States" and made many favorable references to the British 
king. He asserted in a second round of debates that the British 
Parliament, not the Crown, had been the source of American grievances 
in the past. He warned that the new government would ultimately fall 
d 1 k f . h p . d 36 ue to a ac o power ln t e resl ency. 
When adjournment delayed the debate until the morrow, Maclay made 
the following entry in his diary the night of July 15: 
I have seen more caballing and meeting of members in knots 
this day than I ever observed before • . • there seemed a 
general hunt and bustle among the Members. I see plainly 
public speaking on this subject is now useless.37 
And, "It seems as if a court party was forming; indeed, I believe it was 
38 formed long ago." Maclay's words imply that he was aware that a 
1,•· 
108 
potentially powerful legislative party was forming within the Senate for 
the purpose of advancing the programs and wishes of the President. This 
administration party was called a court party because they were hoping 
to influence the President and benefit from their cooperative associa-
tion with the groups in much the same way as the traditional court 
parties of Europe. "I believe it was formed long ago," was intended 
to remind him that the nucleus of the party had shown itself from the 
earliest days of the new government, for, as noted above, on April 30, 
he had charged Adams and others with having fought the Revolution in 
order to transplant "the diadem and scepter from London to Boston, New 
York, or Philadelphia." Their ambition was to create "a new monarchy 
' ,,39 in America and to form niches for themselves in the temple of Royalty. 
As Maclay saw it, this "monarchial" faction was successfully putting 
together a party in the effort to clothe the judiciary and executive 
with a degree of authority incompatible with true republican principles. 
If Maclay detected a changed and charged atmosphere on Wednesday, 
the session on Thursday, July 16, was even more so. On this day, Maclay 
entered his first precise record of the division of votes--just one day 
before the Senate would enter a roll call on the official records for 
the first time! Maclay arrived at the Hall early in the morning, and, 
contrary to custom, found many there before him. "It was a~l huddling 
away in small parties."40 The Vice-President wasbusily going from one 
huddle to another. Adams was so bold as to attack Lee beligerently on 
the issue of yesterday's debate in the presence of Maclay and others. 
During the debates of the day, Maclay thought Lee dispirited, "languid 
and much shorter than ever I had heard him on almost any subject."41 
If Maclay 1 s interpretat:ion of Lee 1 s earlier hopes of leading the Senate 
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by means of a coalition of Southern and New England states was correct, 
Lee probably saw all hopes for leadership in the Senate evaporate as the 
men from the two sections seemed to be aligning themselves against each 
other in a bitter fashion. A number of Senators, including Dalton of 
Massachusetts and Bassett of Delaware, changed sides. Others, such as 
Paterson of New Jersey and Read of Delaware, seemingly took sides on the 
issue for the first time. The vote to strike the clause granting the 
unrestricted power of removal resulted in the first roll call of the 
Senate. The division is shown in Table XXV. 
To 
TABLE XXV 
DIVISION OF THE VOTE TO STRIKE PRESIDENT'S POWER 
TO REMOVE HEAD OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 
Retain the Clause To Strike the 
Ellsworth CT Langdon 
Dalton MA Wingate 
Strong MA Johnson 
Elmer NJ Maclay 
Paterson NJ Grayson 
Morris PA Lee 
Bassett DE Butler 
Read DE Izard 
Carroll MD Few 
Henry MD Gunn 
John Adams, Vice President 
Clause 
NH 
NH 
CT 
PA 
VA 
VA 
sc 
sc 
GA 
GA 
Source: William Maclay, The Journal £f William Maclay, United States 
Senator from Pennsylvania, 1789~1791, ed., Edgar S. Maclay 
(New York, 1890), p. 116. 
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According to the Annals, the judiciary bill's passage did not 
demonstrate a clear cut sectional conflict; but it did contain certain 
sectional characteristics highly similar to many later votes. New 
England, except for New Hampshire, supported the bill. All the middle 
states men, except Maclay, also supported the bill. From the Southern 
states, Few and Gunn of Georgia and possibly Izard of South Carolina 
voted with the New England and middle states majority. Butler of South 
Carolina and Lee and Grayson of Virginia joined Langdon, Wingate, and 
Maclay in voting against the passage. And there is some room to believe 
that possibly Izard voted in opposition of the bill as will be discussed 
below. If this were the case, the sectional nature of the vote would be 
even more marked and more in harmony with the trend of subsequent roll 
calls. 
After the vote on the judiciary bill had been taken, Grayson 
denounced the recent trends in the Senate in a very heated discourse in 
which, among other things, he declared: 
The matter predicted by Mr. (Patrick) Henry is now coming to 
pass: consolidation is the object of the government, and 
the first attempt will be to destroy the Senate as they are 
the Representatives of the State Legislatures.42 
Maclay also confided to his diary that night that the new judiciary 
system was designed to accomplish three objectives: first, it was to 
draw all legal matters into the federal courts; second, the federal 
Constitution was to consume all states' constitutions by degrees; third, 
the state judiciary systems were to be swallowed by degrees by the new 
43 federal system. This condemnation on the basis of Constitutional 
issues contrasts sharply with his mellowed attitude expressed after 
July 8. 
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Obviously, the bitter fight over giving the President power to re-
move appointees confirmed by the Senate had deeply affected Maclay and 
others. The bold assertions of the need to make the President as 
strong as the British Monarch had renewed Maclay's suspicions of the 
monarchial tendencies of the New England men and certai.n others. Thus, 
he read the issues of the latest controversy into the implications and 
probable influences of the new judiciary system. 
The process of polarization had advanced significantly, perhaps 
more than the vote recorded in the Annals indicated. While it is by no 
means certain, a close reading of Maclay's Journals can generate a ques-
tion about the accuracy of James Otis, Secretary of the Senate, in 
recording of votes in the Annals on Friday, July 17. Maclay often 
complained of Otis' "miserable errors" in record keeping and sometimes 
thought his omissions and errors were deliberate. 44 
At any rate, Maclay recorded the votes on the highly controversial 
section of the foreign affairs bill as if it had been a roll call vote 
and this vote is missing in the Annals altogether. At least one 
inconsistency definitely exists between Maclay and Otis' record of the 
vote on the judiciary. Otis' notes in the Annals shows Izard, Few and 
Gunn voting for the judiciary bill. This is possible, but, on the other 
hand, it may be that Otis erred. Maclay recorded in his diary for 
Sunday, July 19, just two days after the vote on the judiciary, that 
he had, visited ith Izard in his home that afternoon, and "He was most 
violent on the subject of our late measures. He abhors our Vice-
President."45 
The most natural interpretation of this entry is that Maclay and 
Izard were in harmony dn the late measures. It is easy to conclude that 
the phrase "late measures" would include at least the last two major 
issues--issues dealt with in the last three working days and issues 
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that had generated violent debate and resulted in the second roll call 
of the Congress. Certainly, it would have included the latter of the 
two issues--the judiciary vote--on Friday. The reference to Izard 
abhoring the Vice-President would also reinforce this, for Arlams favored 
a strong judiciary. If Izard did vote with Maclay in opposing final 
passage of this bill, his posture would be inconsistent with their agree-
ment on subsequent issues involving constitutional questions such as the 
votes on the President's power of removal, reapportionment, and the 
establishment of a national bank. 
On Monday, July 20, Maclay sought and received permission from the 
Senate to be absent for three weeks due to his health. He returned to 
New York City late Saturday night, August 15. On Sunday, he visited 
Izard and received a report on events during his absence. ·Izard reported 
that significant developments had occurred. As Maclay understood it, 
"He gave me a short history of the court party which (as might be ex-
pected) is gaining much ground."46 
Izard recounted a conference with Washington in which the President 
had stated that he had conferred with members of the House of 
Representatives on appointments to be made but had not conferred with 
Senators because they would eventually get their opportunity to give 
their advice and consent. Maclay saw this as further proof of what he 
thought he had been witnessing previous to his leave"--the President 
courting the House of Representatives in order to depress the influence 
of the Senate and exault his "pt;"erogatives on.the ruins." Maclay 
continued, ''Mr. Izard was clearly of the opinion that all the late 
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measures flowed from the President."47 Furthermore, Izard thought that 
Madison was "deep in this business." It is not certain if Maclay was 
expressing the ideas of Izard or more probably his own appraisal of 
Izard's report when he said, "The President may, however, be considered 
as in a great measure passive in the business. The creatures that sur-
round him would place a crown on his head, that they may have the handl-
. f . . 1 .. 48 1ng o 1ts Jewe s .. 
Izard's report contained other disturbing elements. In dining with 
the President, Izard has also been informed that all Maclay's measures 
were "reprobated and will be rejected." It is not clear what all 
Maclay's "measures" might have been. Maclay had set himself as an out-
spoken opponent of the "court party" in opposing titles (he won this 
fight), a large judiciary (he lost this one), and the power of removal 
being given to the President rather than the Senate on the bill for the 
Department of Foreign Affairs (here he had lost only by the vote of 
the Vice-President). But during his leave of absence, others in the 
opposition succeeded in deleting the grant of power in the bill creating 
the Treasury Department, passing on Presidential nominations by voice 
vote (he had won on this), and advocated removal of the Congress to the 
Susquehannah in Pennsylvania (this had not yet been debated by the 
Senate but all knew that it was being advocated and would soon be 
brought before the Senate). Maclay made special note of this specifying 
that the voting on nominees by balloting was to be reversed. 49 This 
bore great significance, for, if true, it signaled that Presidential 
· support had increased in the Senate and the President was confident of 
achieving his goals in the future. 
The first of the two opposition victories that were to be over-
turned under pressure from the administration was that of voting on 
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-Presidential nominations by secret ballot. The issue of how the Senate 
should proceed in giving its "advice and consent" on Presidential 
appointments first stirred controversy in the Senate on June 17. John 
Jay was before the Senate to supply information on William Short who 
had been nominated to succed Thomas Jefferson at the Court of France, 
Jefferson desiring to come home. The House of Representatives had 
already been debating whether the Senate or the President should have 
final control over removing officers whose appointments had to be 
confirmed by the Senate as they developed the legislation for creating 
a Department of Foreign Affairs. 
Maclay saw Washington's approval of Jefferson's desire to leave 
Paris without consultation with the Senate as the first step in assuming 
the.full power of removal before Congress settled the matter. 50 He 
wished to maintain the full prerogatives of the Senate, and, when Adams 
began to give instructions on how the Senate should proceed in approving 
the nomination of William Short as a replacement for Jefferson in France, 
Maclay quickly countered Adams' suggestion of a voice vote. He argued 
that the nomination was in essence an election and should be dealt with 
by secret ballot only. The debate on the matter went into the second 
day. Maclay successfully battled to protect the Senators from 
President'ial pressures. He argued that voting viva voce would subject 
a Senator to three possible sources of pressure. First, the "wealthy, 
powerful and bold" might intimidate members unless the Senators were men 
"independent in spirit as well as in fortune . • (He did not think 
this would always be tHe case.) Secondly, there was the threat of 
Presidential disfavor which he stressed to his colleagues: 
T would not say, in European langua1~e, that there would be 
court favor and court resentment, but there would be about 
the President a kind of sunshine that people in general 
would be well pleased to enjoy the warmth of. Openly voting 
against the nominations of the President would be the sure 
mode of losing this sunshine.52 
Third, "the disappointed candidate will retaliate the injury which he 
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feels against the Senator." This danger might even extend to the time 
h h S ld 1 h S d . . l'f 53 w en t e enator wou eave t e enate an reenter pr1vate 1 e. On 
the positive side he argued that voting by a ballot would be an antidote 
and a bane to "caballing" and buying votes. The vote on Maclay's motion 
to use secret ballots came on June 18. He had rallied a majority of 
54 11 to 7. 
Scarcely a month after winning this legislative victory, Maclay 
was being told on August 16 that during his three-week absence the 
President had gained sufficient support for the extension of his power 
and influence, and not only were his measures to be reversed but Maclay 
himself was now in disfavor with the President. According to Maclay's 
version he was told: 
We have all been to dine with the great man. 
agreeable to him, and will be altered, etc. 
hints of my loss of character at court, and 
influence of the President with the members 
etc.ss 
It's all dis-
He gave clear 
in the direct 
or Congress, 
Maclay's own evaluation of the r.ecent developments seem sound: 
It was to counteract a growing. influence which I observed to 
gain ground that I moved the consent to appointments by 
ballot. The having carried this matter was passing the 
Rubicon in transgression, as it went to pluck up patronage 
by the roots, and to undo this, it seems, a knot worthy of 
Presidential interference.56 
The President successfully cut the knot in the next five days. 
116 
On Friday, August 21, the committee that had been appointed to 
confer with the President reported. The first part of their report 
dealt with proper ceremony and procedure to be followed when Washington 
was visiting the Senate chamber. But the second resolution of the 
report called for the Senate giving its advice and consent in all cases 
of Presidential nominations by voice vote. Maclay objected that this 
conflicted with the recent decision of the Senate following a full debate 
on the subject. Izard (a member of the committee) arose and said it was 
true the resolution was intended to repeal the former resolutions as 
it was assumed that there had been a change of opinion on the matter. 
Robert Morris rose and confirmed that there had been a change of opinion 
in the Senate and said he hoped his colleague would change his sentiments 
also "for h1.' s own sake • .,S 7 Wh h k 1 "d en t e vote was ta en, on y one un1 en-
tified Senator voted with Maclay in opposing the President's clearly 
conveyed wishes. As Haclay had prophesied only a month earlier, most 
Senators wanted to enjoy the warmth of the "sunshine" around the 
President, and it was feared that defying his expressed wishes would be 
a sure way to lose that favor. 
The retreat of the administration's opposition was very temporary, 
for four days later the President's power of removal was reinstated in 
the.bill creating the Treasury Department only by the vote of Vice-
1 
President Adams. Washington most likely had inadvertently revived the 
opposition by his unwise deportment before the Senate on August 24, the 
day following the Senate's acquiescence under Presidential pressure on 
the matter of considering Presidential nominations by voice vote rather 
than by secret ballot. 
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Washington appeared in the Senate chamber with General Knox, his 
acting Sl!Cretary of War, for the purpose of gaining the "advice and 
consent" of the Senate regarding planned negotiations with certain 
Indian nations. Washington assumed the chair of the presiding officer, 
and Vice-President Adams took a seat among the Senators. Washington 
presented the proposals and called for their "advice and consent" 
obviously expecting more "consent" than ''advice." It was William Maclay 
who broke the long embarrassed silence. Once he had objected to rushing 
into consent to the Presidential papers without proper knowledge and 
deliberation, others, including even Robert Morris, supported him. In 
spite of the obvious and strong anger of Washington, the Senate voted 
to commit all the papers pertaining to the matter before them to a 
special committee for consideration before taking up the matter in the 
full Senate again on Monday, August 24. 
Washington angrily tried to persuade them that he and Knox could 
provide them with all the necessary information essential to voting on 
the matter that day. Obviously, the minority party was not alone in 
thinking the President had attempted to go too far. Maclay wrote: 
I cannot now be mistaken. The President wishes to tread on 
the necks of the Senate. Commitment will bring the matter 
to discussion, at least in the committee, where he is not 
present. He wishes us to see with the eyes and hear with 
the ears of his Secretary only.· The Secretary to advance 
the premises, the President to draw the conclusions, and to 
bear down our deliberations with his personal authority 
and presence ,58 
Washington returned to the Senate on Monday and sat through a long 
and tedious Senate consideration of his proposals. The session was 
marked by clamness and courtesy between the President and the Senate, 
but on Tuesday, when the Senate reconsidered the dispute between it and 
. ~.,, 
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the House concerning the President's power to remove the Secretary of 
the Treasury without the previous advice and consent of the Senate, it 
was obvious that the President's influence had been reduced. When the 
crucial vote was taken, exactly one half of the Senate voted against 
allowing the President the power of removal. Thus it was that John 
Adams decided this most momentous question (see Table XXVI). 
The Southern opposition to granting the unrestricted removal power 
to the President was exerted in spite of the fact that James Madison 
threw his full influence behind writing the Presidential privilege into 
the original bill and had also led the successful fight to adhere to the 
original bill rather than accept the Senate's effort to strip the 
President of the disputed power. 
The close margin by which the opposition lost gratified Maclay and 
no doubt surprised the administration forces. Evidently, under 
Presidential persuasion, a majority of the Senators had pledged to 
retreat from the amendment which stripped the power from the President 
just as they had already given way on the matter of considering 
Presidential nominations by voice vote. It is to be noted that, when 
Maclay made his journal entry the following day, he said that "A number 
of the Senate had recanted again on this bill, and were against the power 
of the President's removing, and had answered accordingly."59 The even 
division of the Senate was not due to absences on either side. Only two 
were absent, Grayson of Virginia, foe of expanding Presidential power, 
and Strong of Massachusetts, who had voted to give the President the 
power of removal previously. It is evident one half of the Senate was 
unwilling to give the President the pmver of removal in what was to be 
the largest departmen(''of the government. 
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TABLE XXVI 
ROLL CALLS GRANTING THE PRESIDENT THE POWER OF REMOVAL 
Senator 
Langdon 
Wingate 
Ellsworth 
Johnson 
Dalton 
Strong 
King 
Schuyler 
Maclay 
Morris 
Elmer 
Paterson 
Bassett 
Read 
Carroll 
Henry 
Lee 
Grayson 
Butler 
Izard 
Few 
Gunn 
Vice President 
State 
NH 
NH 
CT 
CT 
MA 
MA 
NY 
NY 
PA 
PA 
NJ 
NJ 
DE 
DE 
MD 
MD 
VA 
VA 
sc 
sc 
GA 
GA 
Adams 
State Department 
+ 
+ 
+ 
0 
0 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
Treasury Department 
+ 
0 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
0 
+ 
Key: +=vote favoring President's removal power;-= vote against the 
President's power to remove; 0 =absent on this vote. 
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The retreat before Presidential pressure was clearly over for many. 
However, the developing Republican opposition was not as strong as the 
vote division would indicate (Table XXVI), for Dalton of Massachusetts 
and Johnson of Connecticut, two strong Federalists, were certainly not 
in the. process of becoming Republicans. Their vote may reflect little 
more than an effort to block curtailment of Senatorial power. It is 
equally true that there was a significant number of the Senate who 
opposed the expansion of the executive branch because they objected to 
the further consolidation of powers under the federal government. 
It is indisputable that there was much conflict prior to the period 
for which roll calls begin to appear in the Annals. The roll calls that 
do appear give a picture of distinct polarization. And there is strong 
evidence in Maclay that a good number of roll calls were stricken from 
the record. For example, four roll call votes on the issue of discrim-
ination in compensation for members of the House and the Senate were 
taken on Friday, August 28, in the midst of very acrimonious debates. 
The following day, Maclay asked Otis to show him the minutes and found 
the record of the motions and voting satisfactory. But the following 
Monday, when the minutes were read, the records of the motions and the 
votes on them had been redone, and Maclay protested the altering of the 
minutes. Otis promised to present the documents behind the minutes 
as he had constructed them, but he never did. 60 The Annals do not 
record any votes for Friday, August 28. Also, according to Maclay,, 
the task of setting salaries for officials and agents of the Treasury 
Department created very strong opposition within the Senate, but no 
record of the vote divisions can be found. Maclay wrote that a number 
wanted to give "princely incomes to all the Federal officers." Morris 
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either "moved or seponded the effort to raise the salary set for every 
officer'' by the House of Representatives. 61 Maclay claimed that, on 
most of the cases, his vote was the decisive one. But on the following 
day, he was too sick to attend, and the Senate reconsidered a number of 
the salaries. Being evenly divided without Maclay, the decisions were 
made in favor of the higher salary, "Bonny Johney Adams giving the cast-
ing vote." The "moderate part of the House" protested "violently" 
taking such advantage of Maclay's absence and gained a postponement 
until the following day, but Maclay was not able to attend. 62 If these 
and other votes had been preserved in the official records, the number 
of roll calls to be found in the Annals for the First Congress would be 
multiplied, and it would be readily apparent from the Annals alone that 
the Senate was already a bipolar body before it attempted to select a 
permanent residence for the new government near the close of the 
session. 
Parties in Opposition 
Most of the roll calls in the Annals for the first session relate 
to the residence issue. All expected the capital to be a great economic 
boon to the region in which it was to be located. But there was an 
important ideological element involved also. It was widely expected 
(as ~ill be more fully discussed in the next chapter) that the host 
region would have greater influence over every branch of government than 
any other region. To locate the capital in Philadelphia or New York 
would allow the mercantile and financial interests to exert greater 
influence upon the government than they otherwise could. Their desire 
for a powerful central. government with a vigorous executive would thus 
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be served. On the other hand, a location on the Potomac or in the 
interior of Pennsylvania would remove the government from such baneful 
influences and give the advantage to the agrarian element that tended 
to prefer a less centralized and more limited government. 
When the volatile matter was before the Senate, it divided repeat-
edly along already familiar lines. Except for Maclay, all Senators 
from New England and the middle states, including Delaware, supported 
the effort to locate the permanent capital in Philadelphia. Maclay 
joined the Southern Senators in attempting to gain the residence 
for the Potomac. Congress reached the adjournment date without resolv-
ing the matter. 
By combining information from the Annals with that of Maclay's 
Journal, it is possible to reconstruct the vote on 13 questions, and 
only three failed to produce party unity voting. Of the 10 party unity 
votes, 86 percent (19 out of 22) of the Senators earned partisan 
loyalty scores of 70 percent or higher (see Figure 1), and over erie-
half of them gained loyalty indexes ranging from 90 to 100 percent. 
These reconstructed votes dealt with six subjects: the principle of 
protective tariffs, discrimination between tonnage and imposts duties 
for American and foreign owned ships, the matter of titles, the 
President's powers of removal (two votes), the judiciary bill, and the 
location of the capital (five votes). There was one common thread of 
concern than ran through all of these issues--concern for the proper 
limits of power. On the matter of tariffs and tonnage, the Southern men 
wished, among other things, to limit the power of the government to 
favor one interest over another, in this case, the Northern commercial 
and shipping interests'~ver the Southern agricultur~l interests that 
Ellswo CT 
Dalton MA 
Strong MA 
King NY Grayso VA 
Schuly NY Lee VA 
Paters NJ Langdo NH Butler SC 
Morris PA Elmer NJ Wing at NH Carrol MD Maclay PA Few GA 
Read DE Basset DE Johnst CT Henry MD Izard SC Gunn GA 
100-90 89-:-90 79-70 69-60 59:-50 50-59 60-69 70-79 80-89 90-100 
Percentage of Federalist Support Percentage of Republican Support 
Figure 1. Histogram Showing Distribution of Party Loyalty Scores, First Session of First Congress, 
on 10 Party Unity Votes Reconstructed from Maclay's Journal and the Annals of Congress 
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would bear the extra costs in the long run. The relation of the 
judicial system and the President's powers of removal to the central 
theme are obvious. The issues of tariffs and tonnage, and that of the 
residence had a heavy element of sectional rivalry intermixed with the 
ideological concerns. Each element intensified the other. For both 
the Federalist and Republican types, the contest over the dimensions 
of government seem to focus on executivism--the desire to strengthen 
the national government by extending the powers of the President and 
the executive departments under his administration. 
Richard Heniy Lee wrote to the Governor of Virginia, Patrick Henry, 
two days before the end of the first session, and the fear of "Consolida-
tion" and executivism formed the theme of his report: 
The powers of displacing officers was cbntested with a zeal 
and contancy that the nature of it deserved. In the Senate 
we were divided, so that the V. P. determined the questions 
as you will see in the Journal. This i~ one of the ill 
consequences derived from giving a person the right of vot-
ing in the Senate who is not a member of it, and who has so 
probable a prospect, as he may think, of coming to the 
possession of that power which he agrees to magnify!,63 
Lee also predicted that, in the next session, "The next attempt, 
and which will probably succeed, is to send forth all the processes in 
64 the name of the P. [President] instead of the U. S. only." Patronage 
was being handled by the President in a partisan manner with the 
appointments to the executive departments being given "pretty universally 
among the most zealous Federalists 1165 Lee also saw the larger 
salaries for the appointees, which Maclay reported were so bitterly 
fought over and decided by the vote of John Adams, as being a part of 
the efforts at consolidation, for "the salaries are vast and the state 
departments and supports weakened by the drafts in this way made from 
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them." 66 Lee had npt been impressed favorably by the public role of 
Washington, for "where Consolidation is the plan, the states' authority 
must be kept out of view as much as possible, and the head of the empire 
67 
shewn as much as may be." Lee was doubtful of the outcome of the 
political struggle, for "Consolidation must therefore inevitably take 
place in process of time, without great care and much wisdom on the part 
68 
of the states." Therefore, it would be necessary for the "friends of 
freedom" in both "the state and federal governments" to "invariably'' 
pursue the measures that would prevent the state governments from suf-
fering "invasion" by the federal government. Regarding the action most 
needed to prevent consolidation, he suggested partisan type efforts on 
the state level: 
Let us take counsel from what \ve see, and fill our state 
offices with men of known attachments to radical amendments, 
and whose firmness and abilities may serve as a counterpoise 
to any attempts that may be made against statistical rights.69 
The following day Lee and Grayson wrote to the Speaker of the House 
of Representatives of Virginia, and their tone was somber as they warned 
of future probabilities. They thought it impossible "not to see the 
necessary tendency to consolidated Empire in the natural operation of 
the Constitution if no further Amended than now proposed." They were 
fearful the government would alienate the people and would then resort 
to controlling through "fear resulting from great force and excessive 
70 power in Government." Clearly, these men who had opposed the 
dominant majority felt that, as the first session of Congress was ending, 
a long and arduous political struggle was only beginning. 
Rufus King of New York, a prominent figure among the advocates of 
an expansive government with a vigorous executive, obviously shared the 
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view that members of the Senate had been consciously engaged in a 
struggle over the proper degree of power to give the new central govern-
ment and he had spent his energies in establishing the type of govern-
ment that Lee, Maclay, and others had opposed. During the first weeks 
of the Second Congress, King wrote to Robert Southgate that his time in 
the Senate was costing him "painful sacrifice." But King was there for 
a purpose. He declared, "I had much anxiety to see a Government estab-
lished which would afford a prospect of Stability and Peace ..• " 71 
The voting record of King, as well as his general correspondence and 
reputation, makes it clear that he felt "Stability" would best be secured 
through a government led by an energetic executive. Looking back, 
largely to the first session, he declared that "I have not been without 
72 
zeal in the progress of this important event." None in the Senate 
would have disputed King's estimate of his own role. 
Outside the Congress, John Fenno, the editor of the Gazette££ the 
United States, interpreted the conflict over the legislative measures of 
the first session in much the same way as did the Senators. As noted 
earlier, he advocated monarchic titles for the President, 73 opposed the 
first amendments to the Constitution as unneeded and dangerous, 74 praised 
75 the high salaries of the Congress as essential and proper, and charged 
the state and local governments with "stretches of power and acts of 
oppression."76 Dissatisfaction with the administration was condemned 
77 
as the greatest curse, and the "propensity to change" was branded as 
an insidious evil. 78 Fenno knew that there was resistance to the 
Federalists' plans for creating a government enlarged beyond the demands 
of the Constitution and was doing his best to create the needed popular 
79 
support. 
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Because the Senate operated in relative secrecy, the newspaper 
accounts of the proceedings of Congress usually focused on the debates 
and proceedings of the House where observers were permitted. Since 
legislative parties did not occur in the House until some time later, 
many did ri<;>t realize the extent to which the Senate had been polarized. 
Since neither group within the Senate had designated leaders or formal 
organization, it was possible for Senators to deny partisanship on their 
own part while at the same time pointing an accusing finger at the 
consistent alignment of their opposition. 
But many knew then what is now obvious--the Senate was. divided into 
two determined groups who were in constant conflict over executivism 
and the proper limits of power for the national government. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE SENATE AND PARTIES WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT 
Introduction 
The partisan alignments that formed the Senate during the first 
session, although often obsecured by maneuvering, continued with general 
consistency in the following sessions. By the end of the Congress the 
partisan spirit had spread into the administration and the legislative 
parties of the Senate had become a working part of what can best be 
called parties within the government. By the end of the third session 
James Monroe of Virginia was an informal leader of the Senate Repub-
licans, and Ellsworth, King, and Morris provided the Federalist leader-
ship within the Senate. Hamilton was recognized by most as the leader 
of the Federalists within the government, while Thomas Jefferson, work-
ing more discreetly than Hamilton, was emerging as the leading figure 
among the Republican element of the government, with James Madison of 
the House and James Monroe of the Senate as his close associates. 
The advancement in partisanship was closely related to the long 
and bitter struggle over the location of the national capital and the 
contention over Alexander Hamilton's fiscal system. These issues 
intermixed as they moved through the Senate and House in the second and 
third sessions of the First Congress, and neither could be resolved 
independently of the other. Their settlement was the result of partisan 
i'li! 
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bargaining and the solutions adopted were to many so distasteful that· 
they remained objects of contention and helped to accelerate the growth 
and development of national parties. 
The Capital, Finance, and Regional Interests 
The question of residence gave rise to more roll calls, prompted 
more letters from Congressmen, and consumed more time in the First 
Congress than any other issue. It had defied solution in the Continental 
Congress, 1 the Constitutional Convention, 2 and had been a point of con-
tention during the struggle over ratification. The resolution of the 
mat.ter was difficult because the issue stirred visceral ideological con-
flicts and aroused sectional hopes for political and economic gain, and 
the long history of conflict tended to intensify the emotional dimensions 
of the struggle. 
Under the new Constitution the struggle became more intense·and 
involved, and as bargains were made and broken, sectional jealousies 
increased and personal animosities multiplied. By the time the first 
roll-call votes on the matter were taken in the Senate, Robert Morris 
had broken a bargain with Virginia which had looked toward an eventual 
location on the Potomac and had secured passage of a bill through both 
Houses which placed the capital in or near Philadelphia. The House was 
influenced by Madison to attach what seemed to be a reasonable amendment, 
but it was designed to throw the bill back to the Senate where the 
friends of the Potomac joined the supporters of New York in postponing 
considera.tion of the amended bill until the next session at which time 
they hoped to defeat the bill. 
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During the Congressional recess, Southerners from various levels 
and branches of government began to work together in preparation for a 
renewed struggle in the next session. Senator William Grayson expressed 
widely held sentiments when he reported to Governor Patrick Henry at the 
close of the first session that the members "would have parted in toler-
able good temper if the disagreeable altercations on the score of the 
seat of government had not left very strong impressions on the minds of 
the southern gentlemen " The Southerners feared "with too much 
reason" that the same kind of bargaining they had faced on the residence 
matter would "also take effect in other great national matters, which 
b . d f 1 k d . . " 3 may e very oppresslve to a e ense ess na e mlnorlty. Grayson 
anticipated a renewal of the bargaining over the residence in the next 
session and went to Philadelphia to gather intelligence regarding the 
attitudes of the Pennsylvanians before returning to Virginia. He wrote 
to James Madison that the Potomac was gaining friends and that he was 
for the first time hopeful of a final victory if Virginians followed the 
proper strategy. Knowing that the combined Northern vote could locate 
the capital in the central region he thought the great danger was in 
"frightening the Yankees into measures which (if left to themselves) 
they abhor • n4 Grayson thus recognized the need for caution against 
driving the two rival Northern factions into a compromise that would 
deprive the South of the residence, but he did not intend to suggest a 
course of inaction by the South. Daniel Carroll, Congressman from 
Maryland, wrote to Madison that he and Grayson believed that the opposi-
tion would be at work during the Congressional recess and they intended 
to counter these efforts by having "some papers published on the question 
5 
respecting the permanent Seat of Congress." 
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James Madison was also actively prompting pro-Southern action from 
diverse political figures. Julian Boyd has contended that Madison 
played a leading role in ultimate resolution of the matter. He credited 
Madison with the defeat of the first residence bill, prompting the early 
Virginia session of land along the Potomac, alerting Washington to the 
duplicity of Robert Morris and the complicated tactical maneuvering 
which he expected in the second session, and constantly planning action 
on the matter during the second session. Madison, therefore, became the 
"foremost strategist in the organized campaign that ultimately placed· 
the capital on the Potomac."6 While the implication that Madison was 
the primary architect of the winning strategy may be open to modifica-
tion, the affirmation of a Southern "organized campaign" is amply 
justified.· Supporters of New York and Philadelphia also mounted 
campaigns in the second session. Even though the matter did not come 
before either House until the end of May, it was a major concern of 
many from the very beginning of the session, and as Hamilton's fiscal 
plans became a subject of contention, the two issues quickly intermixed. 
Hamilton's Report on the Public Credit reached the House on January 
14, and even though the proposals on funding the national debt found 
broad public support, the scheme to assume the state debts stirred ardent 
and persistent controversy. As early as April 4, bargains that involved 
swapping the capital for assumption began to reach Maclay as Congressmen 
Clymer of Pennsylvania and Jackson of Georgia tried to interest him in 
securing the residence for his State by swapping Pennsylvania's votes 
on assumption for the votes of Massachusetts and South Carolina on the· 
residence. Maclay responded by speaking his "sentiments sincerely on the 
villainy of bartering 'Votes," and declared that assumption "was so 
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radically wrong that nothing could justify the act." 7 Such intran-
sigence soon excluded Maclay from many negotiations and often prevented 
him from learning all the details of offers and bargains. Even though 
his accounts often lack vital information, his Journal entries through 
May, June, and July reveal proffered deals and rumors of bargains of 
amazing complexity. But Maclay was not alone in his inability to keep· 
abreast of all the bargaining and conniving. Of all the contenders, 
none were more persistent nor more skillful than the Southern advocates 
of the Potomac. 
The Campaign for a Southern Capital 
There was of course a great deal of diversity in the ideas and 
preferences of the Southern delegates, for no one person or group 
constituted a recognized leadership. But as the bargaining on the 
capital went on behind the scenes and became intertwined with the con-
flict over Hamilton's fiscal program, during the first five months of 
the second session, the Southern response shows a remarkable degree of 
unity as legislation on assumption came officially before the Congress 
in the last half of the session. 
The fact of the general Southern campaign for the Potomac residence 
has been largely obscured by the tangled voting patterns, and the fac-
tional rhetoric on and off the floors of Congress, that resulted from 
the many temporary bargains, double dealings, and stratagems that 
characterized Congressional behavior during the struggle. Richard Henry 
Lee who was in the midst of bargaining on the matter often complained 
to his nephew, Thomas Lee Shippen of Philadelphia, of the tactics used 
by the friends of New York. In early June he declared that, in 
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Philadelphia, "Heaven & Hell are now moved to keep us here •.• " 8 As 
the matter was nearing the close, he complained that "to attempt the 
detail of all the Votes, Manoeuveres, & detours that have perplexed 
Congress upon the business of Residence, I should tire both you and 
myself." 9 After the bill had passed the Senate he said that "every art 
that can be devised" had been practiced in the Senate and predicted 
that the bill would meet with the same "arts of division" in the House. 10 
The maneuvers, detours, and perplexing votes grew out of the fact 
that neither the advocates of Philadelphia, New York, nor the Potomac 
could pass a bill without the assistance of one of the rival alliances, 
and when an alliance learned of a bargain being made by their two foes 
they immediately set about to undermine the arrangement, either.by 
threats or efforts to outbid one of the rivals. In order to be protected 
in case a bargain with one competitor was shattered, secret and conflict-
ing bargains were often simultaneously made with the other competitor. 
·This extensive dissimulation by members of the three alliances often 
made the alignments on some roll calls extremely baffling to many 
participants as well as the contemporary and later observers. The con-
fusion and mystery were furthered by the partial truths and puzzling 
allusions in the conversations and correspondence of many. Hence, James 
Madison wrote to a friend that these schemes and manipulations had 
become a "labrinth from which the votes printed furnish no clue."11 
Madison knew that many of the roll calls were tactical and diversionary 
in purpose and were intended to nbscure bargains and plans. By correlat-
ing roll call analysis with knowledge of their bargains and schemes 
derived from sources other than the Annals ~Congress, it is possible 
to reconstruct the gene'tal strategy purs~ed by each of the alliances and 
deduct the tactical purposes of most of the otherwise puzzling roll 
calls taken in the Senate. 
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In light of the Southern victory and the impact of the residence 
struggle upon the development of the Southern-based Republican party, 
the strategy and tactics of the Southern alliance is emphasized in this 
study. However, a general understanding of the strategy developed by 
the Northern alliance is helpful, for the Southern approach was primarily 
a response to the methods used by the champions of Philadelphia and New 
York. By the second session, both of the Northern contenders had 
decided that an extended "temporary" residence would be preferable to 
allowing the capital to reside with their rival for a number of years 
while they waited for a promised "permanent" residence. Failing a 
bargain with their middle state rival, both New York and Philadelphia 
sought a bargain with the South whereby they could host the capital 
temporarily. Many in both the North and South saw this as a stratagem 
whereby the host city would use the "temporary" period to so intercon-
nect the government with the locality and to so habituate the Congress 
and the nation to the arrangement that it would become permanently 
attached to the city, even if repealing a former act of Congress were 
to be required. Southern leaders pursued an adroit counter-strategy. 
The following description is offered as a hypothesis which best 
explains the voting patterns of the Senate and the behavior of Madison 
and his allies in the House and elucidates the role of Jefferson 
as a party leader. Recognizing the need for the help of the Pennsyl-
vanian delegation in passing any Potomac legislation, the Congressmen 
of Virginia and Maryland, including Madison, followed the lead of 
Pennsylvania very consistently with only one exception. In the Senate, 
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the Southerners pursued a stratagem of their own. Maryland and Virginia 
I 
followed the lead of Robert Morris with only one exception. On the 
other hand, the Senators from North and South Carolina and Georgia gave 
consistent support to New York's efforts to secure the temporary 
residence or break the unity of the Philadelphia-Potomac coalition by 
other tactical proposals with only a few crucial exceptions. This 
division of Southern votes left both coalitions just short of the votes 
needed to win the temporary residence, and had the desired effect of 
keeping the Northern rivals opposing each other while they both kept 
negotiations alive with the South. The Southern Senators thus kept 
themselves free to combine their votes for obtaining the permanent 
residence for the Potomac, while maintaining an excellent tactical 
position for negotiating a bargain with either of their rivals. 
The residence problem came before the Senate officially on May 24 
when Robert Morris introduced a resolution for meeting the next session 
of Congress in Philadelphia. Opponents of Philadelphia voted a postpone-
ment of the resolution for three consecutive days. Lee considered 
the third vote on May 26 a test of the support for Philadelphia which 
received the support of the Senators from Virginia, Maryland, Delaware, 
New Hampshire, and Elmer of New Jersey, in addition to those of 
Pennsylvania. Opposing were the Senators from Connecticut, New York, 
Massachusetts, Paterson of New Jersey, and South Carolina, North Carolina 
d G . 12 an eorg1a. Following a vote Butler announced his intention to bring 
in a bill to fix the permanent residence, and Morris quickly withdrew 
his resolution. On May 31, the House passed a resolution calling for 
the next session to meet in Philadelphia, and Butler surprised the 
Philadelphia alliance '])y introducing a bill to determine both the 
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permanent and temporary. residence. Robert Morris was conveniently 
absent even though Butler had given previous warning of his intentions. 
The next development was both surprising and revealing to many for 
-both the House resolution for removing to Philadelphia and Butler's bill 
were assigned to a single committee favorable to the Potomac. The 
special committee named was made up of four advocates of the Potomac 
and one advocate of New York as the best location for the permanent 
residence: Butler of South Carolina, Johnston of North Carolina, Lee of 
Virginia, and Henry of Maryland, all advocates of the Potomac, and 
Dalton of Massachusetts, who supported New York. Three of the five 
were known to support New York over Philadelphia as a temporary 
residence. Since Senate committees were picked by ballot, the selection 
of this committee suggests that either a New York-Deep South or an 
Assumption-Potomac bargain had already been secretly agreed upon. 
Robert Morris' absence (Maclay thought they could have picked a more 
favorable committee had Morris been present, for without him they 
divided evenly) suggests the possibility of the latter, when viewed in 
light of the committee recommendation. 13 
Even more revealing was Butler's committee report of June 7. The 
committee recommended to the Senate that the Potomac be named as the 
permanent capital, but the committee was too divided to arrive at a 
recommendation on a temporary site. This failure to name a temporary 
site is another strong indication that Southern strategy was then being 
followed. The voting records suggest that Lee and Henry would have sup-
ported Philadelphia, and that Dalton, Butler and Johnston would have 
I 
voted for New York. The indecision was therefore surprising. One of 
the three supposed sup'porters of New York had evidently withheld their 
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vote or championed a third location as a means of skirting a choice 
between Philadelphia and New York. The most probable explanation is 
that the Southerners were pursuing a devious strategy and issued a 
report which served their purpose but obsecured their goal. The com-
mittee action set the stage for another month of intrigue, and placed 
the South in an excellent bargaining position for gaining both the 
residence and an altered assumption that would result in a more favor-
able settlement for the South. 
The House resolution for removing to Philadelphia was defeated in 
the Senate on June 8, at which time further consideration of Butler's 
bill was postponed without having decided on either a permanent or 
temporary site. The House quickly passed a resolution for removing to 
Baltimore and that too was postponed. Meanwhile, the general terms of 
the final bargain were negotiated by party leaders before the Senate 
resumed consideration of the Butler bill on June 28. 
The role which Jefferson and Madison played previous to the settle-
ment of the matter by the Senate in late June and early July throws 
significant light on the unfolding of the Southern strat~gy and the 
process by which the Senatorial parties were related to the development 
of parties extending into the various branches of the government. Since 
Madison and some other Southerners had voted for the removal to both 
Philadelphia and Baltimore, and the Senators from the lower South had 
voted consistently with the New York coalition, some historians have 
conclud~d that the Southerners were deeply divided. 14 This ignores a 
number of very cogent facts. On the very day that Butler introduced 
his surprise bill for combining the temporary and permanent sites into 
one bill, Madison voted for a similar measure in the House. On that 
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day, Congressman Budinot of New Jersey introduced a motion to attach the 
question of a permanent residence in Pennsylvania to the consideration 
of the temporary residence then being debated by the House. The 
Pennsylvanians unanimously opposed the move, but Madison, Giles, and 
Richard Lee of Virginia, along with Stone, Smith and Seney of Maryland, 
broke with Pennsylvania on the matter and voted for the motion. The 
motion failed by one vote, but it indicates that Madison probably was 
pleased by Butler's surprise move in the Senate. Indeed, the occurrence 
of both moves on the same day suggests that they may have been planned. 
It will also be recalled that Madison's private efforts had been expended 
on behalf of the Potomac. 
There is also an interesting letter written by Madison to James 
Monroe on June 17, written within a week of the vote he had given in 
support of Baltimore. In it he seemed to deny any personal support 
for Baltimore by saying that "the Senate have hung up on Baltimore, 
which, as you may suppose, could not have been seriously meant by many 
who joined it." He also seemed to imply approval for Butler's bill when 
he said that "it is not improbable that the permanent seat may be coupled 
with the temporary one."15 
Recognizing Madison's support of the Southern strategy explains a 
very interesting pattern in his behavior in the House. Neither Madison, 
Henry Lee, nor Daniel Carroll took any part in the floor debates which 
preceeded the resolution for moving to Philadelphia or the resolution 
of June 11 which named Baltimore as the temporary seat, following the 
defeat of the resolution naming Philadelphia in the Senate. However, 
after the House began to consider the Senate bill which granted the 
permanent residence tiDthe Potomac (passed by the Senate on July 1), 
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Madison took a leading part in the debates on behalf of the Senate bill 
and helped to fend off all efforts to destroy the bargain. Therefore, 
it can be seen that the nature of his support for any proposal relating 
to the capital varied in keeping with the purposes of the Southern 
alliance. 
Compromise and Parties Within 
the Government 
It is most likely that both Madison and Jefferson had either 
influenced the production of Butler's hili and the subsequent committee 
report or they were immediately influenced by Butler's deeds. Both were 
working for a compromise through the month of June and writing letters 
to prepare the minds of Virginians for the passage of assumption even 
though the House had rejected assumption and the matter had not yet been 
voted on in the Senate. As early as April 12, ten days after the House 
had rejected the assumption bill, Madison seemed to imply that a 
compromise on assumption could be worked out. He went on to suggest 
that if some form of assumption were not passed the Union would be 
endangered. Norman K. Risjord has argued the Pennsylvania-Potomac 
alliance in the House was involved in compromise efforts with the 
proponents of assumption after the failure of the assumption bill on 
April 12. The result was the drafting of the bill for the settlement 
of accounts with the states which gave more generous terms to the 
South than originally planned, postponement of further consideration 
of assumption, and the introduction and quick passage of the resolution 
for meeting the next session in Philadelphia. Thus, Madison would have 
been involved in a secret move to wed assumption to the residence at 
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16 least by late April and May. The the middle of June, all the tendered 
bargains involving the residence were coupled with assumption, and on 
June 17, Madison wrote to James Monroe in Virginia that the "Potomac 
stands a bad chance, and yet it is not impossible that in the 
vicissitudes of the business it may turn up jn some form or another." 
He went on to the subject of the assumption and told Monroe, an ardent 
foe of assumption in any form, that, "I suspect that it will yet be 
17 
unavoidable to admit the evil in some qualified shape." On June 22 
he wrote to Edmund Pendleton that: 
· The affair of the State debts has been the great source of 
delay and embarrassment threatens a very unhappy issue 
to the session, unless some scheme £f accommodation should 
be devised. The business of the seat of Government is 
become a labyrinth, for which the votes printed furnish no 
clue, and which it is impossible in a letter to explain to 
you. We are endeavoring to keep the pretensions of the 
Potomac in view, and to give all the circumstances that occur 
a turn favorable to it. If any arrangement should be made 
that will answer our wishes, it will be the effect of a 18 
coincidence of causes as fortuitous as it will be propitious. 
Jefferson was likewise working for the success of a plan to barter 
assumption for the capital several days before the Senate resumed con-
sidcration of Butler's bill. On June 13, Jefferson wrote five letters 
in which he spoke of the residence issue in an obvious effort to prepare 
the r'ecipients for a compromise. In the letter to George Mason, a power-
ful foe of assumption, he reasoned that the opponents of assumption 
should be less confident and more willing to compromise in return for 
compensation of the debts they had already paid. Although Jefferson 
protested that his duties in government prevented him from mingling in 
these matters, he went on to declare that in general, "I think it 
. 19 
necessary to give as well as take in a government like ours." It was 
only two days after Jefferson had written these letters that Morris 
informed Maclay and the Pennsylvania delegation that Jefferson had 
proposed a temporary residence of 15 years in Philadelphia and a 
permanent residence at Georgetown on the Potomac. 20 Hence, Jefferson 
was actively acting as broker of Southern votes by the middle of June 
or earlier. 
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On June 20, Jefferson described for Thomas Mann Randolph the out-
line of a proposed compromise which he favored and used the reference 
to a 15 years residence that Maclay had noted in his Journal five days 
previous. (This seems to add credibility to the report which Maclay 
received through Morris of Jefferson's initiative in the bargaining.) 
The letter was long and persuasive: 
Congress are much embarrassed by the two questions of 
assumption, and residence. All proceedings seem to be ar-
rested till these can be got over. And for the peace & 
continuance of the union . . . if every one retains inflex-
ibly his present opinion, there will be no bill passed at 
all for funding the public debts, & if they separate without 
funding, there is an end of government .... The assumption 
must be admitted, but in so qualified a form as to divest it 
of its injustice .... On the question of residence, the 
compromise proposed is to give it to Philadelphia for 15 
years, & then permanently to Georgetown by the same act. This 
is the best arrangement we have now any prospect of, & there-
fore the one to which all our wishes are~ present pointed. 
If this does not take place, something much worse will; to wit 
an unqualified assumption & the permanent seat on the Delaware. 
[Emphasis added.]21 
Furthermore, Jefferson seemed to be professing a close knowledge of the 
bargains and behavior of the Cor.gressional delegations. 
The delegations of this state and Pennsylvania have conducted 
themselves with great honor and wisdom on these questions. 
They have by a steady (yet not a stipulated) concurrence 
avoided insidious baits which have been held out to divide 
them and defeat their object.22 
23 Jefferson also wrote a similar letter to Monroe on the same date. 
These letters of Jefferson and Maclay's report of Jefferson seeking 
to arrange bargains on behalf of the South are vital indicators of 
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Jefferson's connections with legislative affairs and the leadership role 
that he assumed soon after becoming Secretary of State. It is interest-
ing to note that the correspondence from Jefferson shows a progression 
from general hopes of a compromise to confident expressions of the terms 
of the final settlement weeks before any part of the bargain was passed 
by the Senate or House. 
At the tiree Jefferson wrote to Randolph and Monroe describing with 
amazing accuracy the outcome of both the residence and the assumption 
issues, there was nothing in the official proceedings of Congress to 
even hint that this might be the eventual result. By June 8, the New 
York-Deep South coalition had rejected both the Morris and the House 
resolutions for holding the next session in Philadelphia, and the 
Phil~delphia-Potomac coaliti6n h~d defeated a motion to locate the 
permanent residence on the Potomac. On June 14, New York and her allies 
succeeded in postponing for two weeks consideration of the House 
resolution (passed on June 11) to meet the next session in Baltimore. 
The residence bill would not be passed by the Senate until July 1, and 
the assumption did not pass Congress until later in the summer. Yet 
Jefferson described the details of the ultimate outcome with general 
accuracy before the voting was hardly started, This is an indication 
that he believed the Southern element within the Senate, despite its 
outwardappearance of division, was responsive to leadership management. 
Events proved him to be correct. 
The Southern Strategy and Roll Call Evidence 
The Southern unity on the residence is largely obscured by the vot-
ing patterns which were produced by the Southern strategy. On 
three-fourths (18 out of 24) of the roll-call votes dealing directly 
with the residence, the Senators from Virginia and Maryland voted 
opposite to those from North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia. 
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Upon a full examination of the roll calls it was found that all but two 
fell into one of two categories: those votes which were clearly 
essential to secure the permanent capital to the Potomac and those deal-
ing with the struggle between New York and Philadelphia over the 
temporary residence. While some in the last category appear on the 
surface to have been over the permanent residence, an examination of 
Maclay's Journal and other evidence leads to the conclusions that their 
primary design was to shatter the opposing coalition in order to win 
the temporary residence. On two roll calls the Senators of the Deep 
South voted against the rest of the body. Table XXVII separates the 
roll calls into the proper categories and shows how the individual 
Senators voted on each question. 
By referring to Table XXVII, it is relatively easy to see the 
application of the hypothesized Southern strategy in the Senate. At 
the beginning of the session, the Southern Senators who were present 
joined in passing a procedural rule (vote one) designed to kill the 
bill for removing to Philadelphia which had almost passed in the first 
session of Congress .. This was part of the scheme engineered by 
Madison and Izard of South Carolina, although Izard voted against the 
rule (probably to mask the part he had played from Morris). Butler's 
bill for determining both the temporary and the permanent residence was 
assigned to a very favorable committee by the New York-Deep South 
coalition. Virginia and Maryland had voted wi~h Pennsylvania in oppos-
ing the bill and the c'omrnittee to which it was referred in order to 
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TABLE XXVII 
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preserve their nlliance with Pennsylvania. No doubt the bill met with 
their secret approval for it gave the South increased bargaining power, 
and, if enacted, an additional safeguard against the promise to remove to 
the Potomac being scuttled. Tangible evidence that it met with approval 
from Virginians can be seen in Madison's support of the effort to couple 
the permanent residence to that of the temporary in the House on May 31, 
the very day that Butler introduced his bill into the Senate. 24 
The first roll calls directly on the residence question came on 
June 8 (votes 2 to 5). The Southern Senators divided as they had on the 
earlier non-roll-call votes, with Virginia and Maryland following the 
lead of Pennsylvania and the Deep South voting with New York. On the 
first three roll calls taken that day, only one needs further explana-
tion. On vote 3, the New York coalition voted for the residence to be 
placed permanently on the Potomac, while the Virginians and Marylanders 
joined Pennsylvania in voting against it. Although technically a vote 
on the permanent residence, it was designed to test the Pennsylvania-
Potumac alliance which had contracted the night before to vote against 
25 
any place proposed by the New Yorkers. Otherwise, Virginia and 
Man'land certainly would not have opposed the motion. 
New York pursued general delaying tactics on the residence question 
until the arrival of the Senators from the new State of Rhode Island, 
expecting them to give her a definite majority within the Senate. How-
ever, Jefferson, eight days before the voting began on Butler's bill 
and five days before the arrival of the Rhode Islanders, wrote to Thomas 
Mann Randolph and confidently described the bargain that was ultimately 
passed. He even observed that by the bargain there would be "something 
to displease and something to soothe every part of the Union, but New 
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York, which must be content with what she has had." 26 Jefferson's 
confidence seems ill-founded if the past voting margins are examined, 
for the two Senators from Rhode Island were expected to give New York 
a winning number of votes for without any defections the New York 
coalition would have commanded 15 out of 26 votes. However, Jefferson 
seemed unpreturbed by the prospect. When the 13 roll calls were taken 
on the 28th, it was discovered that two Senators from the Deep South 
(Ha\vkins of North Carolina and Gunn of Georgia) had moved to the 
Philadelphia-Potomac coalition and thus, the two coalitions were in 
general still equally matched in strength. June 28 was the crucial day 
for the Potomac and every Southern Senator supported the three votes 
that assured the permanent residence to the Potomac. The hypothesized 
str~tegy called for the Southern vote on tactical maneuvers between New 
York and Philadelphia to be divided in order to keep the two sides evenly 
balanced and struggling in hopes of winning victory away from the foe, 
and yet, at the same time, to assure that the bargain between Virginia 
and Pennsylvania be enacted. It is precisely this pattern of voting 
that is found. The Deep South supported the Potomac, and offset the 
vote's of Rhode Island. Vote 14 presents another interesting case of 
Southern vote changing to meet the demands of the strategy. On this 
vote, Lee, Carroll, and Bassett voted with New York on a motion to keep 
the temporary residence in New York until 1800. Maclay thought the vote 
was proof of a bargain to give the residence to New York rather than 
Philadelphia and that it had failed only because Massachusetts adamantly 
refused to make a bargain to give the capital to any Southern location. 27 
But it should be noted that two more Senators from the Deep South, 
Butler of South Carolirta and Few of Georgia (this was his only vote 
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against New York) helped to prevent the motion from passing. A shift in 
either Butler's or Few's votes would have given the temporary capital 
to New York! Hence, it is obvious that the South was committed to enact-
ing the general compromise agreed upon by the leadership. The vote may 
have been an attempt to frighten Philadelphia into accepting a 10 year 
residence rather than the 15 years spoken of in earlier negotiations, 
in which case it shows genuine Southern unity none the less. 
When the motion to give the temporary residence to Philadelphia 
resulted in an indecisive vote (vote number 19), which the Vice-President 
decided in the negative, Butler again switched his vote and assured 
Philadelphia the residence. One other maneuver was attempted, probably 
on behalf of New York. Senator Carroll tried on June 30 to get the bill 
passed tu a third reading with the name of Philadelphia stricken from 
the blank designating the temporary residence (this would have reopened 
the contest). The effort failed and Maclay reported that Butler had 
28 helped defeat the effort. 
Of the two remaining roll calls, when the Deep South stood alone, 
at least one (number 5) was probably a tactical maneuver on behalf of 
· Sen;Jtor Carroll (as was vote 7) who wished to have Baltimore ruled 
29 
out. In debating against Baltimore in the House on July 6, Madison 
argued that "it would be risking the bill with a place which has been 
repeatedly rejected by the Senate .•. " He "religiously believed •. 
the bill would never pass the Senate."30 
So it can now be seen how the South chose to keep both New York and 
Philadelphia nearly balanced but switched votes as was needed to assure 
victory for the Potomac-Philadelphia arrangement that had been worked 
out in general design before roll-call voting on it began. The 
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hypothesized strategy explains Southern behavior on 23 out of the 24 
roll calls on the residence. The role of the Senate was crucial and 
in retrospect it can be seen that members of the Southern alliance in 
the Senate maneuvered with the precision of a Greek phalanx. 
It should be emphasized that in this case of involved voting 
patterns reliance on a straight statistical measure of bloc or sectional 
voting proves misleading. Obviously, the votes cast by men from 
Pennsylvania, New Jersey and Delaware did not constitute a permanent 
shift to the opposition party. Nor were Southern men shifting to the 
administration party when they cast their votes in harmony with New York 
and its New England allies. In short, the Senators of North Carolina 
were not drifting toward a support of commercial interests and Robert 
Morris was not becoming a supporter of agrarian localism even though a 
straight quantitative analysis would indicate that this was so. 
The Significance of the Residency Struggle 
Why had the issue of the capital defied political settlement for 
so long? A complex mixture of geopolitical and ideological factors 
operated throughout the entirety of the controversy. All believed that 
the capital would bring a great influx of wealth to the host region. 
During the Continental period it was estimated that the presence of 
Congress had brought $100,000 in annual trade to the merchants of 
Philadelphia. 31 When the enlarged government b~ing constructed under the 
Constitution, Jefferson came to estimate a Potomac presence would mean 
11 I lf ill' 11 V. ' . 1 32 a 1a · a m 1on a year to 1rg1n1a a one. Obviously this meant 
much to the state or states winning the capital, but it does not explain 
the keen involvement of New England and the lower South in the long 
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struggle. It was the ideological and politi~al implications that 
inflamed all regions and most if not all Senators became ardent partisans 
in Lhe conflict. 
James Henderson found that in the earliest period of the struggle, 
Parochialists and others were alarmed over the prospects of a return to 
Philadelphia for they remembered when Robert Morris' establishment had 
by lormal and informal connections exerted great influence over the 
policies adopted by Congress. Many translated ideological fears and 
parochial jealousies into fears of a developing aristocracy and monarchy 
if the capital were to be located in a great commercial and financial 
33 
center. As the issue persisted through the years of the Confederation, 
agrarians and localists backed the plan to build a virgin city on the 
banks of a major central river but outside the baneful influence of the 
. 34 
mercantile class of the large cities such as New York and Philadelphia. 
The new Constitution intensified the geopolitical and ideological 
dimensions of the residence conflict because it created a much larger 
and more powerful government. 
Under the new Constitution, Southerners wanted the capital not only 
for the prosperity it would bring to the upper South, but for the 
polLtical advantages they thought would accompany it. All seemed to 
believe that the section nearest the government would furnish bhe great-
est share of government appointees, and would have a greater opportunity 
to Lmpress their views upon the Congress. Bowling thought the South also 
saw a Southern location as a means of better protecting the institution 
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of slavery. One of the South's best arguments in the debate had been 
that the Potomac's headwaters could be connected by roads with the waters 
of the Ohio and thus serve as a vital connecting link with the West which 
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would facilitate the development of the West. While this hope for the 
Western development had definite economic advantage incorporated 
within, it also illustrates·how the ideological intertwined with various 
practical questions. As the South saw itself pitted in a struggle 
against the commercial North, the development of the West carried 
special advantages to the South, for the regions of Tennessee, Kentucky, 
and the Northwest Territory were thought of as political extensions of 
the South. 
Agrarians and parochialists outside the South often favored the 
Potomac over Philadelphia or New York. Typical of this group was 
WilLiam Maclay, who, after losing his fight to locate the capital on 
the Susquehanna, preferred the rural setting of the South to that of 
].lhiladelphia for the permanent capital. After the passage of the 
residence bill, he wrote in his Journal of his concern that losing the 
capttal to an agrarian society would probably cause New England to 
subvert the government, and that a great commercial city would probably 
arise that would draw much trade away from Philadelphia. Yet he felt 
tha L it .would not be as commercial as Philadelphia, for "the genius of 
Virginia and Maryland is rather adverse to exclusive commerce." Then 
he '"rote what he probably dared not say to others: 
For my own part, I would rather wish that the residence 
of Congress should not be subject to commercial influence. 
Too much has that influence, conducted by the interest 
of New England, whose naval connections throw them into that 
scale, governed--nay tyrannized--in the councils of the 
Union. My consolation for going to the Potomac is, that it 
may give a preponderance to the agricultural interest. Dire, 
indee36 will be the contest, but I hope it will prevail 
. . . ' . 
In one sense the struggle over the residenGe was not a partisan 
struggle, for factions and voting alignments arose which cut across the 
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partisan lines that were developing. But in another sense, the struggle 
had a partisan dimension and resulted in a quicker growth and develop-
menr of both pnrtics. In the final analysis, the contest over locating 
the capital pitted the Southern proponents of a Potomac residence 
agaLnst two Northern rivals. Most of those in the party seeking to 
strengthen and extend the federal government, soon to be commonly 
known as the Federalist party, supported one of the Northern sites, 
. while most members of the opposition party, soon to be commonly referred 
to as the Republican party supported the Potomac. As observed above, 
the contention over the location of the capital had a strong ideological 
dimension, a dimension very closely related to conflict over the nature 
of government in a republican society. Most of those within the Senate 
who wished for an extended national government with a vigorous executive 
wished to place the permanent capital in either New York or Philadelphia. 
On the other hand, most of those in the Senate who opposed the consolida-
tion of power under a strong central government and feared the Federal-
ists were secretly planning to establish an aristocracy and a monarchy 
wen~ advocates of the Potomac residence. 
Hamilton's Fiscal System 
This tendency of the contest over the residency to settle ultimately 
into a partisan contest \vas greatly enhanced by the bargains involved in 
resolving the conflict. At least three of the major elements of 
Alexander Hamilton's fiscal system received great assistance in adoption 
as a result of vote trading on two major bills involving the residency. 
These were the assumption of state debts in the second session and the 
! . 
exd se tax and the cre'ation of a national bank which were p1;1ssed in the 
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third session. These three measures were not only unpopular with the 
Southerners and Republicans of the Senate and their constituents, but 
they came to be highly unpopular with many in the middle and New England 
states. Therefore, the enactment of Hamilton's fiscal system--which 
became the engine of the Federalist party, and which Republicans pointed 
to as the instruments for consolidating governmental powers and creating 
an aristocracy of wealth--ensured the continuation of the partisan 
conflict under the guidance of the leadership that began to emerge dur-
ing the struggle over the residence. Furthermore, contention over the 
Federalists' fiscal system produced the concrete domestic issues which 
generated a national constituency for the Republican party. 
In January of 1790, Hamilton delivered his Report on Public Credit 
to Congress. It called for honoring all the debt except for Continental 
currenacy at the face value, converting all outstanding interest to 
principal, assuming the war debt of all the states, and then funding the 
entire debt. The funding process was to follow the British system of 
issuing negotiable government bonds which were backed by a guaranteed 
source of revenue that would pay the interest and reduce the principal 
concurrently. At the time, the national government had an indebtedness 
of over $50 million, nearly a fourth of it owed to European creditors, 
and was far behind on interest payments at home and abroad. Creditors 
were pressing for payment of overdue interest. 37 Congress and the 
public generally recognized the need to protect national credit. By 
April 26, the House of Representatives had agreed to a funding program 
for the national debt, but a deadlock had occurred over the proposal to 
assume the state debts. On the same day the House defeated· the proposal 
for assuming the states debts by a vote of 32 to 18. 
The issue surrounding Hamilton's proposals stirred class and 
regional conflicts that resulted in the pofarization of the Senate 
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along familiar lines. All the Senators from the states below Maryland, 
except for those from debt-ridden South Carolina, opposed Hamilton's 
plan for assuming the state debts and for funding them t~rough the 
colJection of impost duties which Southerners felt would fall to an 
unfair degree upon the Southern importers. On the other hand, support 
for the measures came from the states north of Virginia. New Hampshire, 
Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Delaware divided their votes while all the 
other middle and New England states, with the exception of almost debt-
free Rhode Island, gave avid support to Hamilton's proposals. 
It has already been demonstrated that these issues intertwined with 
that of the residence and deadlocked the Congress until such time as the 
emerging leaders of the two parties entered into an agreement to support 
the bargain whereby the South agreed to the assumption in return for' 
recL~iv:ing the permanent residence after 1800. It was inevitable that· 
the bargain would suggest itself to the men of the Senate especially. 
All the opponents of the assumption, except Wingate of New Hampshire and 
Foster and Stanton of Rhode Island, supported the Potomac as the· 
permanent residence. All those who voted for assumption, except Carroll 
of Maryland ·and the two Senators from South Carolina, supported either 
New York or Philadelphia as the permanent seat of government. 
In accordance with the provisions of the bargained compromise, 
three major bills were passed: the residence bill; a bill for settling 
accounts between the federal government and the states which were 
alluwed a more favorable settlement for the Southern states than had the 
original proposal; and'the bill for the assumption of the states debts 
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and the funding of the resultant national debt. 
The Senate authored the residence bill, sending it to the House on 
·July 1. The Senate had received the settlement bill from the House on 
June 23, and after some revisions, it was passed by the Senate following 
the House approval of the residence bill on July 9. The Senate received 
the funding bill on June 2. Debates in the Senate were extended and 
restrlted in many revisions, and on July 16, it was combined with the 
Senate bill for the assumption of state debts. The combined funding and 
assumption bill was passed in the Senate on July 21 by a vote of 14 to 
12, and the House accepted assumption on July 26 by a vote of 34 to 28. 
The differences over amendments were settled on July 29. President 
Washington signed the bill into law on August 4, 1790. 
The contest over the funding and assumption issues generated 11 
party unity roll calls. Three were connected with the attaching of the 
states debts to the funding bill, and two others were related to the 
final passage of the Senate version of the combined bill. It is these 
five roll calls that delineate the friends from the foes of assumption, 
and are grouped together in Table XXVIII. The other six party unity 
roll calls contained one procedural vote and questions of interest rates 
and the dates to be assigned preferred stock. These votes show the 
general pattern as the five primary votes with one principal exception, 
ElL,;worth, a strong proponent of assumption, voting consistently with 
the opposition on behalf of lower interest rates. 
There were also 13 non-partisan roll calls generated by the funding 
and assumption which arrayed both the foes and proponents of assumption 
in both parties against a minority that attempted to augment the benefits 
to l10lders of the debts, primarily by raising interest rates. The core 
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TABLE XXVll I 
PARTY UNITY ROLL-CALL VOTES ON AS.SUMPTION AND FUNDING 
Attitude on Assumption 
Vote Number 
Profits Allowed Creditors 
Vote Number 
Senator 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Langdon NH 
Wingate NH 
Ellsworth CT 
Johnston CT 
Dalton MA 
Strong MA 
Fosler RI 
Stanton RI 
King NY 
Schuyler NY 
Elmer NJ 
Paterson NJ 
Maclay PA 
Morris 
Bassett 
Read 
Carroll 
Henry 
Lee 
Walker 
Hawkins 
PA 
DE 
DE 
MD 
MD 
VA 
VA 
NC 
Johnston NC 
ButLer sc 
Izard SC 
Few GA 
Gunn GA 
Fed Yea/Nay 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
0 
y 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
y 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
y 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
N 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
y 
Key: + = support, - = against, 0 =absent. 
Votes on Assumption: 
+ 
+ 
0 
0 
+ 
+ 
0 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
N 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
N 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
y 
+ 
0 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
0 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
y 
+ 
0 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
0 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
y 
1. .July 14; Y=l4, N=ll; Agree to assume state debts to $21,000,000. 
2. July 14; Y=lS, N=ll; Agree to preamble of assumption bill. 
3 . .July 16; Y=l5, N=ll; Combine assumption and funding bills. 
4. July 20; Y=l2, N=l4; Strike assumption from bill. 
5. July 21; Y=l4, N=l2; Passage of the bill. 
Votes on Profits Allowed to Investors: 
1. .rune 21; Y=l3, N=lO; Set four percent limit (settlement bill). 
2. July 14; Y=l5, N=lO; Four percent on portion unsubscribed.· 
3. July 14; Y=lO, N=l6; Committee report/bill to a new committee. 
4. July 28; Y=l3, N=ll; Increase second certificate six percent after 
1800. 
5. July 28; Y=ll, N=l3; Change date of second certificate to 1797. 
6 •. fuly 28; Y=l2+VP, N=l2; Eight percent instead of seven on assumed. 
6 
+ 
0 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
0 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
y 
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group of high interest advocates consisted of Langdon of New Hampshire, 
King and Schuyler of New York, Paterson of New Jersey, Morris of 
Pennsylvania, and two ardent foes of assumption and high interest rates, 
Walker of Virginia and Henry of Maryland, who were probably trying to 
run up the price of assumption ia order to make it more objectionable. 
One non-partisan roll call was on an exploratory vote called by the 
advocates of low interest in which a ceiling of four percent on all the 
domestic debt was proposed. Oliver Ellsworth voted for it. The other 
seven who supported the motion were staunch foes of assumption as were 
five who voted against the ceiling. 
It is obvious that these roll calls are not a reliable criterion 
of partisan loyalty. It is altogether possible that the first half of 
these votes were called in order to embarrass William Maclay in the eyes 
of the Philadelphia credit holders and speculators in the public debts, 
in the hopes that they would defeat his reelection bid in the fall. 
These six votes came on July 19. Morris entered the Senate chamber in 
an "ireful disposition" and declared that he would "have the yeas and 
nays on every question." Maclay observed that this was in fact, "declar-
ing war against me only, as it is me only whom they can effect in 
Pennsylvania.". And, "I know they mean to slay me with the sword of the 
public creditors." Morris was as good as his word and uniformly called 
38 for the roll calls. Maclay was so disheartened that he left the 
Congress for home in two days. Unfortunately, Maclay's sudden departure 
prevented his noting the events of the remaining three weeks of the 
session. The same voting patterns were repeated on similar measures on 
the 28th after the House returned the funding and assumption bill to the 
Senate with a number of amendments. The minority had no chance of 
161 
winning the higher rates, and may have made the motions calling for yeas 
and nays in order to sharpen the comparison between the voting efforts 
of Maclay and Morris. 
The assumptions of states debts was never popular with the mass of 
the people, and the resistance in Congress was stubborn. After months 
of debate and lobbying, the prospects were still bleak until Hamilton 
agreed to trade both the temporary and permanent residence for its 
passage. Even then it passed by a margin of only one vote. As the 
assumption and funding proposals came to an impasse and intertwined with 
the struggle over the residence, the debates in the Senate became 
extremely acrimonious. Richard Henry Lee in wtiting to Patrick Henry 
about the debates over assumption said: 
It is impossible for me to describe the scene here, and I 
shall content myself with saying, that everything me.t with in 
my former life is mere trifling, compared with this, and you 
know that I have been in very stormy legislative scenes.39 
The stormy sessions were a reflection both of the complexity of the 
issues and the importance that Senators attached to the eventual out-
come. The assumption and funding proposals stirred visceral ideological 
co~nitments by the partisans on each side, as well as personal, state, 
and regional self interest. While much Southern hostility flowed from 
being taxed to pay debts from which they would not receive reciprocal 
benefits, many in both the North and South strongly feared that assump-
tion would produce growth of the federal power at the expense of the 
40 
states. This fear corresponded to the hopes of Hamilton and his 
Federalist allies. 
In the Report on Public Credit, Hamilton made it very clear that 
his proposals were based heavily on political considerations as well as 
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fiscal principles. Known as a firm and persistent advocate of a power-
ful central government, Hamilton thought the state debts must be pre-
empted by the national government in order to prevent "collision and 
confusion" between the two levels of government particularly over the 
few "productive objects of revenue." If the states were relieved of 
their debts, they would have no need to compete with the national 
government for revenue. The indication was that the assumption would, 
therefore, facilitate the national government pre-empting the major 
share of tax resources. Evidently believing in the implications of the 
ancient proverb which holds that "where your treasure is, there will 
your heart be also," Hamilton argued that assumption of the state debts 
could cause all public creditors to have the same common interest in 
. 41 
supporting the central government. 
In a letter to Edward Carrington, a Virginia Federalist, Hamilton 
affirmed that the "leading objects" of assumption and funding had been 
"an accession of strength to the national government, and an assurance 
·of order and vigor in. the national finances, by doing away with the 
necessity of 13 complicated and conflicting systems of finance ... " 42 
What Hamilton called "an accession of strength to the national 
government,'' his opponents referred to as "consolidation," their term 
for the process of appropriating the powers and authority of the states 
by the national gov.ernment. In the South, exclusive of Charleston, 
South Carolina, the fear of consolidation was intermingled with 
regional economic rivalry. Oliver Wolcott, an ardent champion of 
as~umption, gave one of the best summaries of Southern feeling in a 
personal letter to Nathan Strong. 
;J' 
In Virginia and some other states, there is a determined 
opposition. They fear a consolidation of the government; and 
also that if their state debts are assumed, all the securities 
will be purchased by foreigners, and by their neighbors. They 
say that the system of raising revenues by imposts operates 
unequally, they being the greatest consumers; that to remedy 
this inequality by a land tax, will make such establishments 
necessary as will render the general government formidable; 
that though the assumption will be a temporary relief • • • 
in the end it will operate to them like a foreign debt 
These arguments have weijht upon the principles of the gentle-
men who urge them •.• 4 
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It is easy to understand how many felt that the assumption was un-
fair to the Southern states. One outstanding reason was that by 1790 
four-fifths of the national debt had come to be owned by citizens north 
of tl~ Mason and Dixon Line, and except for South Carolina most of the 
state debts likewise had been sold into the hands of Northern specula-
44 tors. The Southern anti-assumptionists saw that even though generous 
settlements might be made with the Southern states that repayment of the 
debt to a great degree would come from the imposts paid by Southern 
importers, and that the. profits from the whole business would go into 
the hands of citizens of the North. The reality on which this fear was 
founded is illustrated by the fact that in 1795 the federal government 
dispersed $309,500 in interest payments to the citizens of Massachusetts 
whiLe paying only $62,300 to the citizens of Virginia. Citizens of New 
York received $367,000 in interest while those of Georgia received only 
$6,800. 45 
The strong sectional orientation of the conflict over assumption in 
the Senate is misleading in one aspect. The opposition to the funding 
and assumption program was by no means as centered in the South as the 
divisions within the Senate indicate. There was opposition from every 
state. For example, three of the six Representatives from New York 
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voted against assumption, as did four of the seven from Pennsylvania. 
Samuel Eliot Morison has .aruged that the remonstrance against assumpti.on 
thaL was authored by Patrick Henry and adopted by the Virginia Assembly 
on December 23, 1790, "expressed the misgivings of plain folk throughout 
46 the country as well as those of the Virginia gentry." The remonstrance 
denounced the monied and commercial interests, and expressed ideological 
concerns about the acretions of power by the central government through 
extra-Constitutional means. 
In an agricultural country like this •.• To erect, and 
concentrate, and perpetuate a large monied interest, is a 
measure which your memorialists apprehend must in the course 
o.f human events product one or two evils, the prostration of 
agriculture at the fee of commerce, or a change in the present 
form of federal government, fatal to the existence of American 
liberty . . . Your memorialists can find no clause in the 
constitution authorizing Congress to assume the debts of the 
States.47 
Hamilton reflected an awareness that the Virginia Assembly was 
speaking for a wider portion of the population when he wrote, "This is 
· the first symptom, of a spirit which must either be killed or will kill 
the constitution of the United States."48 No one knew better than 
Hamilton the explosive potential of the funding program. The public 
securities had depreciated greatly and the present holders purchased 
the government securities at a fraction of their face value. Most 
people expected all securities to be depreciated in the final settle-
ment. But Hamilton's program redeemed all securities at face value and 
converted all the back interest into principal. This raised the total 
face value of the public debt considerably (from around $50,000,000 to 
$80,000,000) and multiplied several fold the value of the securities 
49 held by the creditors and investors. · Large, fortunes were thereby 
created instantly for many speculators. After examining the extant 
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public records, E. James Ferguson concluded that the program directly 
benefited a very small number of people in any state of the union. The 
"mass of the population certainly had no stake in the funding program 
of L790."50 On the other hand, servicing the debt required around 80 
51 percent of the total government expenditures. It was facts such as 
these that made Hamilton alert to any influential critics, and it was 
facts such as these that helped to make plausible the Republican charge 
that the basic purpose of the program was to create a monied aristocracy 
that would support Hamilton in his alleged desire for establishing a 
monarchy. 
Thus it was that one unexpected effect of the compromise of 1790 
was to create an issue that would help to make the emerging Southern 
based Republican party a national party. For, even though Southerners 
and many agrarian localists of the North were glad to see the p~rmanent 
residence moved to the Potomac, their' opposition to the assumption and 
the Hamiltonian program only increased with time. The compromise of 
1790 ensured the continuation of a Union that was being widely questioned 
.in 1790, but it also ensured the continuation and escalation of the 
partisan conflict. 
The Bank of the United States 
On December 13, 1790, one week after the opening of the third 
session, Hamilton sent to the House of Representatives his Report on a 
NaUonal Bank in which he recommended the creation of a Bank of the 
United States. He envisioned a number of purposes to be served by this 
bank. It would be the principal depository of government funds, a loan 
agency for the government in times of financial need, and the chief 
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fiscal agent of the Treasury Department. It would exert central control 
upon the operations of the state banks. Most important of all, it would 
issue bank notes payable upon demand in gold and silver that would be 
receivable for all payments due to the United States government and 
serve as the principal circulating medium of the country. 52 Hence, it 
was another significant extension of the power and functions of the 
central government. 
Vigorous opposition began to be expressed by agrarian spokesmen in 
Congress. As the bank was not designed to serve directly the 
agricultural interests of the country, it was looked upon as a proj~ct 
designed to benefit only the commercial and financial interests. The 
bill provided that the government would supply one-fifth of the stock 
of Lhe bank and appoint five of the directors. The remaining 80 percent 
of Lhe stock would be sold to private citizens who would in turn appoint 
20 directors to the Board of Directors. And particularly obnoxious to 
some was the provision that the private investors could pay three-fourths 
of the v~lue of their stock with government securities bonds purchased 
by trading in government certificates. In other words, certificates 
issued in funding the debt could now be traded for stock in the new 
bank. As with the funding program, the bank was intended to serve 
important political purposes as well as practical financial needs. The 
govt~rnment would license the bank and supply a significant portion of 
the working capital, yet it would allow the investors to direct the 
affairs of the bank. As John C. Miller has observed, "The JSich men of 
the United States, already the owners of government securities, as the 
stockholders in the bank of the United States would be bound even more 
53 
closely to the federal government." 
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The Senate appointed a committee to consider Hamilton's proposal 
for a bank. Four of the committee, Strong, Morris, Schuyler, and 
Ellsworth, were strong advocates of the proposal and one, Butler, was 
opposed. The committee produced a bill which conformed to Hamilton's 
recommendations. States north of Maryland supported the bill and all 
from Maryland and states to the south opposed it. 
Maclay, who was now preoccupied with his desire to win reelection 
obviously did not want to stir the wrath of the monied interest in 
Philadelphia, deserted the Republicans on this issue. No friend of 
banks, Maclay found it hard to rationalize his support. It was not 
forbidden in the .Constitution and the support for it was so strong as 
to make opposition useless, yet he confided to.his dairy that 
... considered as an aristocratic engine, I have no great 
predilection for banks. They may be considered, in some 
measure, as operating like a tax in favor of the rich, against 
the poor, tending to the accumulating [of wealth] in a few 
. hands; and under this view may be regarded as opposed to 
Republicanism ..• The great point is, if possible, to pre-
vent the making of it a machine for the mischievous purposes 
of bad ministers; and this must demand more on the vigilance 
of future legislators than on either the virtue or foresight 
of the present ones.S4 
On the day the bank bill was reported, he noted, "It is totally in vain 
to oppose this bill. The only useful part I can act is to try to make 
it of some benefit to the public which reaps none from the existing 
b k "55 an s. 
On the 15th when he made an effort to increase public benefit from 
the bank, he sounded as if he were speaking for the opponents of the 
bank. "I ·told them plainly," he wrote, "that I was no advocate of the 
banking systems; that I considered them as machines for promoting the 
56 profits of unproductive men." He denounced allowing the holders of 
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public securities to purchase stock with their securities. He noted in 
his diary the following day that he had never seen "the spirit of 
speculation display itself in stronger colors."57 
The leaders of the opposition were James Monroe, who succeeded John 
Walker, Izard, and Butler. 58 Monroe. wrote to Richard Henry Lee, who was 
absl'nt due to illness, for his opinion as soon as the Senate committee 
read Hamilton's report. Lee's reply, which came to Monroe after the bill 
had passed, was probably representative of Southern and Western 
attitudes. Lee declared that the public should not become bankers, 
"because Banks are capable of great abuses, and because such abuses 
practiced by Government, leave injured Individuals too much without 
redress . ,59 He went on to cite Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations 
condemnation of the bank operated by the British government, and said 
the arguments applied to American affairs with very increased force. 
The Southerners, with no hope of defeating the measure in the 
Sen< I te, at tempted a weakening of the political and financial power of 
the bank by the amending process. They failed in their efforts to get 
the charter's duration reduced from 20 to 10 years, to allow Congress 
the option to cancel the charter.after 10 years, and to remove its 
monopoly status. No Senator from north of Maryland supported them in 
any effort at amendment when a roll-call vote was taken. 
Some charged that Southern opposition stemmed from the fact ·that 
the bank's existence in Philadelphia would constitute a major threat to 
the plans for a removal to the Potomac in 1800. John Rutledge, 
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, wrote shortly afterward that 
Viq~inians and Marylanders thought it to be a "thing which would retard 
60 the moving of the seat southwardly." It was widely thought that the 
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President would neither sign nor veto the bill and this gave great 
une:1siness. Maclay also noted the blending of the two issues and 
decJared that the "Potomac interest seemed to regard it as a machine 
which, in the hands of the Philadelphians, might retard the removal of 
61 . Con1~ress." He judged that the "destruction of it, of course, was 
their object."62 Maclay saw the repeated attempts to shorten the length 
of the charter as a means of destroying the bank. All the monied men 
told him they would not invest their money for any less than the 20 
year period. After the bill passed, he wrote, "Accident threw me in the 
company of the Southern opposition, but I abhor their design of destroy-
63 ing the bank altogether." 
The Southerners dislike of the bank was genuine and they would, no 
douht, have opposed its establishment separate and apart from the threat 
which it seemed to pose to a removal to the Potomac after 10 years. 
HowPver, there can be no doubt that the two issues mixed in the minds of 
many, and the passage of the bank and the second residence bill became 
intermixed much like the assumption of state debts and the first 
residence had done. 
When George Washington issued his proclamation relating to his 
selection of a site on January.24, it was clear he had located one-
third of the district outside the area authorized by Congress. This 
seemed to necessitate Congressional action. This involved a risk that 
Congress might not approve, or might ev€n undo the Potomac agreement. 
Washington evidently gambled on his prestige and the weight of the 
recent compromise to gain Congressional approval for his action. The 
Senate was less than enthusiastic about Washington's action. Carroll 
finally attempted to bring in a supplementary residence bill designed 
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to amend the.original act to make it conform to Washington's choice. The 
opposition organized quickly and on February 18, the bill was postponed 
until February 25 by a vote of 15 to 10. All Senators north of Maryland 
were in the opposition and the delay held off consideration of the bill 
until the last week of the session. During the week of delay, the 
Senate and House deadlocked over the efforts of the House to amend the 
excise bill which was so unpopular in the South and West but desired by 
Hamilton. Carroll and his Southern allies were using delaying tactics 
against.the House supplement to the bank bill. Washington held the bank 
bilJ which Jefferson and Randolph had advised him to veto on the grounds 
that it was unconstitutional, and asked Hamilton to make a reply. 
Malcom Boyd presents the idea that Hamilton feared that Washington would 
either veto or allow the bank bill to become law without his signature 
(given the unpopularity of banks and the general opposition to Hamilton's 
entire system, he feared Washington's withholding his signature almost 
as ntuch as his veto) and used his influence to secure Senate acceptance 
of the House amendment to the excise tax and passage of Carroll's 
amendatory residence bill in exchange for acceptance of the House sup-
plement to the bank bill and Washington's signature to the act creating 
the bank. He presents notes exchanged by Washington and Hamilton which 
suggest the plausibility of the bargain. 64 At any rate, on the day that 
Washington.signed the bank bill four ardent supporters of the bank, 
Langdon, Schuyler, Morris, and Read, threw their support behind Carroll's 
bill and ensured its passage. The Senate conferees accepted the House 
amendments of the excise bill and the Southern bloc allowed the supple-
ment to the bank bill to pass without further resistance. The evidence 
for a bargain between ~he President, the Secretary of Treasury and 
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partisan leaders within the Senate is strong. Since a legislative log 
jam involving the Hamiltonian programs and the amended residence act 
broke on the day the President signed the bank bill, it seems the 
lea~t that can be inferred is that there was a significant amount of 
manl'uveting and bargaining going on that had to involve confidential-· 
itil'.S and cooperation between partisan leaders in both houses of 
Congress. 
As Washington hesitated over signing the bank bill, he may have 
pondered the possible threat that a national bank in Philadelphia might 
pose for the removal to the Potomac, ;3.nd he may have used delay as a 
tactic in pressuring Hamilton to allow the passage of the second 
residence bill. But there can be no doubt that Washington was concerned 
over the question of Constitutionality which Madison had raised in the 
Hou~'e debates and which Attorney General Randolph and Secretary of State 
Jefferson had made as grounds for a Presidential veto of the bill. 
Washington delayed while waiting for Hamilton to make a reply. Washing-
ton was no doubt aware that the ideological dispute over the Constitu-
tionality of the bank was an outgrowth of the partisan conflict over the 
nature of republican government and that the briefs summitted by 
Jefferson and Hamilton were incisive expositions of the fundamental 
diflerence between the two parties applied to the specific question for 
a national bank. 
Jefferson spoke for those who wanted to confine the government to 
those functions called for by the Constitution under a literal reading 
of the Constitution, and argued that Article XII specific.ally reserved 
to t.he states and to the people all power not specifically granted to 
the Congress. To give a broad interpretation to the "general welfare" 
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and "necessary and proper" clause ~7ould make the specific enumerations 
and restrictions of power worthless in preventing the growth of govern-
65 
mental powers. Hamilton argued for the elastic interpretation of the 
Constitutional phrases in order to justify a strong and vigorous govern-
66 
ruent. Washington's decision was a choice between two partisan 
phiJosophies, and once the choice was made, it resulted fn increased 
efforts <1mong those whose views of government and the Constitution had 
been rejf'cted. The Federalists of the Senate had probably helped to 
nudge the President toward the implied endorsement of their Constitu-
tiona! principles by blocking the second residence bill until the 
President gave his prestigious endorsement to the bank by signing the 
bank bill. 
Party Contention and Commercial Policy 
Jefferson's open break with Hamilton and his assumption of the role 
as <1 leader of the emerging opposition party came two weeks prior to 
denr1uncing Hamilton's bank proposal as unconstitutional. The original 
bre<~k with Hamilton grew out of their divergent views on American rela-
tions wiLh France and Great Britain. The serious differences date at 
least from the last part of January when Jefferson elected to. defy 
Hamilton and advocate a navigation act which would retaliate the British 
navigation laws and give a boost to the revival of the American carrying 
trade. Hamilton had consistently resisted such ideas and recently 
objected to Jefferson's proposals for giving reductions in tonnage 
dutLes to French merchantmen. Jefferson had prepared a report. on the 
French protest of America's new tonnage laws and sought Hamilton's 
approval for his proposed tonnage concessions to France. Hamilton 
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reacted sharply. On January 11 he wrote to Jefferson stating his general 
rejection of any concessions becaube even though there was a "collateral" 
element there was a want of "reciprocity" in the plan. 
Two days later he revealed his practical reasons. It would "beget 
discontents elsewhere." He frankly stated without false modesty that 
"My commercial system turns very much on giving a free course to trade, 
. 67 
and cultivating good humor with all the world." Hamiltqn was an 
advocate of protective tariffs, and was, therefore, being less than 
din·ct. However, his general meaning was clear as he proceeded to 
declare that "I feel a particular reluctance to hazard anything, in the 
prenent state of our affairs, which may lead to a commercial warfare 
. 68 
with any Power." Jefferson could not escape his intended message--
such concession to France would disturb Britain and possibly provoke 
cornmerical war with Britain, and this could be fatal to the whole 
structure of Hamiltonian finance. Jefferson sent his report to 
Wasl1ington who in turn forwarded it to the Senate. Jefferson denied 
that the tonnage laws violated the treaty with France but presented 
alt(·r:-nate plahs for making tonnage concessions in return for the 
privilege of duty free sale of American whale oil in France. The 
Sennte received the report on January 19 and immediately insured that 
nothing displeasing to Hamilton would come of it by referring it to a 
committee composed of Morris, Izard, King, Strong, and Ellsworth. All 
were staunch Hamiltonians with the partial exception of Izard who had 
supported assumption but was opposing the bank. They delayed action 
until the end of the sessin and then recommended a rejection of the 
French demands in ~'thE) most friendly manner." 
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If Hamilton had mistaken Jefferson's non-commital report as a sign 
of acquiescence, he was soon disillusioned. On February 1, the President 
signed and passed on to the House of Representatives a report on the 
plight and needs of the nation's cod and whale fisheries which the House 
had instructed him to prepare in August of 1790. The Hamiltonian 
Federalists were caught off guard by the report on the fisheries. The 
representatives of the Massachusetts-based industry had presented 
memorials to Congress which asked for reductions of import duties used by 
the industry in order that it might meet British competition. In as 
much as it was the chief training ground for American seamen, the 
proHperity had long been discovered as a vital national interest. Cur-
rently the industry was in danger of extinction, and the Federalist 
mercantile interest even in Massachusetts had ignored their plight 
rather than risk irritating Britain whose continued trade they coveted. 
The report was an impressive review of the history and present plight 
of the fishing industry, and recommended removing the tonnage and naval 
dutles on the ships employed and supplies used by the industry. 
Jefferson inserted in the report a severe attack on Great Britain and 
calLed for navigation laws that would set up a policy of retaliation 
toward Britain. 
Before the members of the House had a chance to study the report, 
Madison helped get the report referred to Senate immediately. The 
Sen;lte received the report on March 4 and the following day they ordered 
it to be printed. The partisan thrust ,.;ras evidently not expected. 
Maclay thought that Jefferson's real purpose was "to make them a nursery 
69 for seamen, that we, like all nations of the earth, may have a navy." 
Evidently the report ~~s ordered to be printed without examination. 
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Maclay simply noted on Saturday, March 5, that it was ordered to be 
printed. But he also indicated that Adams, who was in the Senate 
chambers on both days, as well as Hamilton, were anxiously involved in 
70 
revising the excise bill sent up from the House. On order from the 
Sennte, the report was printed in pamphlet form by Childs and Swaine 
and was immediately reprinted in the Gazette of the United States by 
71 John Fenno, who then reprinted it in pamphlet form. It was then 
72 
extensively reprinted throughout the country. 
The Federalists soon learned the real political intent of the 
report. On Monday, Rufus Kirig argued that the minutes from Saturday 
wert' in error. Maclay said that the report which had been ordered to 
be printed on Saturday, "he wished to be postponed to the 28th of 
. 73 
December next, and corrected the minutes of Saturday to read so." 
However, later in the day they were amended again and set nearer the 
truth. It is easy to understand why King would try to kill the report 
by ;1 year's postponement, for Jefferson had intermixed a sharply worded 
conJemnation of Britain and argued for the United States' passing 
retaliatory navigation laws based on the British model. This was a 
public.challenge to the very base of the Hamiltonian fiscal system, for 
the funding of the assumed national debt and proposed national bank all 
depended upon revenue collected from extensive British trade and carry-
ing service. If Jefferson's proposals were to be adopted commercial 
war and a rapid collapse of the nation's finances might immediately 
follow. 
Jefferson interspersed enough clear references to Britain to make 
it perfectly clear that they were, in his eyes, the great threat to 
American maritime prosperity. The "plan of the English Government since 
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the peace has been to prohibit all foreign fish in their markets," and 
b . h" . 1 1 . . h i d. . 74 to pay ount1es to s.1pp1ng vesse s comp y1ng w1t certa n con 1t1ons. 
The British had tempted our fishermen to move to Nova Scotia and England 
by paying enticing bounties, while prohibiting the sale of their products 
in their markets if they remained in America. Some statements were 
rather brash: 
The only nation whose oil is brought hither for competi-
tion with our own, makes ours pay a duty of about 82 dollars 
the ton in their Ports. Theirs is brought here too, to be 
reshipped fraudently under our flag into ports where it could 
not be received under theirs, and ought not to be covered by 
ours, if we mean to preserve our own admission into them.75 
They charged a heavy duty on our oil and refused to receive any oil 
shipped in American vessels. Therefore, he concluded that the "exparte 
regulations which they have begun for mounting their navigation on the 
76 
ruin of ours, can only be opposed counter-regulations on our part." 
There could be no mistake, Jefferson was challenging the well known 
Hamiltonian policy of acquiescing to British policy in order to continue 
harmonious trade relations. He was calling for navigation laws that 
would encompass the whole of American trade and not just the fishing 
industry for he spoke "tobacco . livestock . . . Rice . . • other 
77 grain ... Ship timber, potash, and peltry." America could employ 
10,000 seamen and earn $2 million dollars annually by relcaiming the 
portion of carrying trade in the hands of foreigners who did not have 
the fair treaty arrangements with the United States. This and more 
could be done if the United States would pass regulations which were 
' 78 
"exactly the counter part of those established against us." He drew 
these demands to a pointed conclusion by saying "if there be anything' 
79 
unfriendly in this, it was in the first example." 
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Jefferson had taken a bold and decisive step in publicly posturing 
as a spokesman for those in the House and Congress who had set them-
selves against these domestic and foreign fiscal policies of Hamilton. 
Having lost the irrrrnediate battle on domestic affairs, the party of the 
opposition was deliberately carrying the controversy into the public 
arena in order to gain popular support and win additional allies for 
Congress by securing the election of men who shared their views. 
Obviously, Jefferson had worked in cooperation with Madison and Monroe 
and their allies in the Congress in bringing the report on the fisheries 
into the public eye with what appeared to be the approval of the 
President and both Houses of Congress, This is confirmed by evidence 
from certain correspondence. On March 4, the day the Senate received 
the report and the day before the Senate ordered it printed, Jefferson 
wrote to George Mason of his sympathy for the French Revolution and his 
efforts to aid France in her struggle with Britain and confided that "I 
will send you a copy of a report I have given in, as soon as it is 
printed. ,SO 
Jefferson not only expected the report to be printed by the Senate, 
but he seems to interpret the significance of the report for Mason by 
placing it in the context of the partisan struggle which had then spread 
into the government from the Senate and the House. If the French 
Revolution could be successful it would spread all over Europe.· And 
even more significantly he explained that, "I consider 'the establishment 
and success of the government as necessary to stay up our own and prevent 
it from falling back to that kind of Half-way-house, the English 
C . . 1181 onst~tut~on. Continuing, he seems to refer to Hamilton and his 
Federalist allies when~be says: 
It cannot be denied that we have among us a sect who 
believe that [the British Constitution] to contain whatever 
is perfect in human institutions; that the members of this 
sect have, many of them, names and offices which stand high 
in the estimation of our countrymen.82 
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He had "bee·n endeavoring to obtain some little distinction for our use-
83 ful Customers the French." In the report he had presented the French 
as our best customer in the long run of affairs. It was clear he ex-
pected a fight to develop over his reconunendations, for "there is a 
particular interest opposed to it which I fear will prove too strong. 
We shall soon see. I will send you a copy of a report I have given 
in 1184 
Jefferson continued to write from the perspective of a participant 
in a partisan struggle. He not only doubted the proposals would pass 
the Congress, but he predicted the programs of the "sect" he had 
referred to would "all pass. The excise will pass. The bank will 
85 pass." Furthermore, he obviously expected the partisan strife would 
continue and gave Mason, a leading political power in Virginia, his view 
of l1ow to secure success for their side: 
The only corrective of what is amiss in our present government 
will be the augmentation of the members in the lower house, so 
as to get a more agricultural representation, which may put 
that interest above that of the stock-jobbers.86 
Hamilton was a key leader of a phalanx in both Houses of Congress, 
and it is clear that Jefferson was assuming a similar role among the 
opposition both in and out of Congress throughout the entirety of the 
third session. Boyd has concluded that Jefferson and Madison were see-
ing each other almost daily nad were "engaged in constant, confidential, 
and unalterable opposition" to the Hamiltonian forces." 87 He was also in 
constant communication with members of the Senate. As early· as January 
18 he could write a hasty note to Monroe and ask him to reply to certain 
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important friends and explain the lack of jobs at his disposal. He had 
no hesitation seemingly when he said, "I must beg you to make answer for 
me • Your taking the trouble to write thus much, and apologize for 
my not writing will oblige Dear Sir Your sincere friend & servt."88 
The Increasing Visibility of Parties 
Sometime early in the third session, Jefferson, Madison, and others 
decided on the necessity of a party newspaper to counter the influence 
of John Fenno's Gazette of the United States. In early February, 
Madison and Henry Lee recommended Philip Freneau to Jefferson as a man 
suited for the job. 89 A vacancy within the State Department opened the 
way. Jefferson wrote his first invitation to Freneau on February 28. 
His letter implies that Freneau was already aware of their general 
desjre, for Jefferson did not mention publishing a newspaper, but 
cautiously suggested that the job "g~ves so little to do as not to 
interfere with any other calling the person may chose, which would not 
90 
absent him from the seat of government." Their bargain was not 
settled until late in July, but the negotiating had started after the 
bank bill had passed the Senate, and after the report on the fisheries 
had been published, but well before Jefferson was asked by the President 
to write his opinion on the Constitutionality of the bank. 
The partisan struggle within the government was causing many to 
object to the secr~cy in which the Senate conducted all of its business. 
The legislatures of Virginia,·Pennsylvania, New York, North Carolina, 
and South Carolina, had during that session of Congress passed resolves 
91 
calling upon the Senate to open its doors. Monroe, acting in obedience 
to the Virginia resolve, introduced a resolution for opening the doors 
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beginning with the next session on February 24. Monroe argued that the 
Senate, as a representative body in a republican society, should be open 
to public scrutiny at all times. He argued that experience had 
demonstrated bodies with delegated powers, which operated in secrecy, 
tended to e~tend their powers. Only by exposure to the public view could 
the people guard against the adoption of the measures ·~angerous to the 
public liberty."92 Maclay recorded that Morris, Ellsworth, and others 
argued that state legislatures had no power to instruct a Senator on any 
matter. Maclay spoke sentiments similar to those of Monroe, but the 
matter was easily defeated by a two to one margin. 93 The fight to open 
the doorH of the Senate to the public had begun. 
It is, therefore, evident that the loosely knit Senatorial parties 
of the first session persisted into the second and third sessions and 
became a working part of developing parties within the government. By 
the end of the First Congress, the party that formed in support of 
expanding the government beyond the requirements·of a literal reading 
of the Constitution had won a series of legislative bodies that had 
resulted in the adoption of most of the fiscal programs set forth by 
Alexander Hamilton. The opposition party had gained strength and hop~:~ 
as Hadison, Jefferson, and Monroe joined an effort to carry the partisan 
struggle to the people. This soon resulted in a growing polarization of 
the general electorate. 
,. 
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CHAPTER V 
THE SENATE AND NATIONAL PARTIES 
Overview 
Although there was still no official designated party leadership or 
organization within the Senatorial parties that emerged in the first 
session or the enlarged parties within the government which appeared in 
in the second session, by the end of the third session of the First 
Congress, the leaders of the Southern dominated minority launched a move 
to appeal to the general electorate for support. They wished to marshall 
public opinion against the programs, purposes, and trends of the 
Hamiltonian Federalists. The efforts to stir public opposition to the 
Federalists created counter measures from the Federalists. The result 
of this escalated partisan struggle, which had appeared first in the 
Senate and spread through the government, was the development of two 
competitive national parties that would endure through the administra-
tion of the nation's first four Presidents. 
Republican Party Building 
As the First Congress drew to a close, Jefferson, Madison, and 
Monroe were cautiously, but surely, setting out to build public opposi-
tion to the Hamiltonian measures, and at the same time to create support 
for the Republican candidates in the next year's elections. Jefferson's 
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correspondence reflects these purposes. After the Senate had passed the 
bank bill and Jefferson had submitted his report on the fisheries, he 
began to seek political intelligence from his correspondents and, at the 
same time, subtly planted the idea that he wsa interested in opposition 
to the Hamiltonian measures. His letter of February 4 to George Mason 
left Mason little room to doubt Jefferson's political intentions. He 
talked of the "sect". that thought the British Constitution perfect and 
labeled the view "heresy." He asked, "What is said in our country of 
the fiscal arrangements now going on?" He further volunteered that he 
feared their effect "when I consider the present temper of the Southern 
states."1 He was of the opinion that "more attention should be paid to 
2 the general opinion." However, the whole Hamiltonian program then be-
fore Congress would pass. The "only corrective" of "what is amiss in 
our present government" would come only by "more agricultural representa-
tion" in the House of Representatives. 3 On the same day he wrote to 
Chancellor Robert R. Livingston in New York ostensibly on scientific 
matters. Yet, he concluded by inquiring if the people in his quarter 
were "as well contented with the proceedings of our government, as their 
representatives say they are?" 4 Jefferson advised him that "a vast 
discontent" had gathered in the South, and "how and when it will break 
God knows. I look forward to it with some anxiety." 5 
Ten days after the close of Congress, Jefferson wrote to James 
Innes of Kentucky on legal matters but quickly turned to a lengthy 
political discussion in which he adroitly stirred troubled waters and 
urged him to come to Congress. Jefferson asked what people were saying 
of the proceedings of the First Congress. He specifically was interested 
in Innes' opinion of the measures passed for carrying into effect the 
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assumption of state debts which Innes opposed. Also, Jefferson inquired 
of what he thought of "measures taken for forcing Gr. Britain, by a 
navigation act to come forward in fair treaty" thus letting us trade 
with her islands in exchange for her privileges of trade with the United 
6 States.· This, Jefferson assured him, would be profitable to agricul-
ture. Jefferson wished he would come to Congress "and give your 
7 
assistance on a larger scale." Jefferson was satisfied Innes could 
"render essential service." He went on to say, "I have such confidence 
in the purity of your republicanism, that I know your efforts would go 
in the right direction."8 Jefferson deliberately implied that the 
partisan situation in the government was likely to continue into future 
administrations when he declared: 
Zeal and talents added to the republican scale will do no harm 
in Congress. It is forunate that our first executive 
magistrate is purely and zealously republican. We avail our-
sevles of the present day to establish principles and examples 
which may fence us against future heresies preached now, to be 
practiced later.9 
If Jefferson was not meaning to recommend himself as a successor to 
Washington, he was certainly meaning to stir thoughts of the importance 
of the right selection in view of the ongoing partisan struggle. 
Jefferson and his allies were not alone in viewing the government as 
divided into two parties by .the end of the First Congress. About this 
time, William Stephen Smith, an ally of Robert Morris and Alexander 
Hamilton, wrote a confidential report on the politic~! situation in 
America for Lord Greenville who was about to become the British Secretary 
of Foreign Affairs. Smith declared that there were "two parties in the 
Amer. Gov., composed of the principle leading men of the country--one set 
of individuals very powerful and respectable in favor of France--and 
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; 10 
another in favor of England." 
C:iven this partisan atmosphere, there is little need to doubt that 
Jef lerson' s and Madison's month long tour of New York and the New 
11 England states during the spring had heavy political overtones. They 
were aware of the political benefits of Washington's trips between the 
capital and Mount Vernon and his tours of New England and Rhode Island. 
In fact, Washington was on an extended tour in the Deep South at the 
tinw Jefferson and Madison were in New England. They did see a number 
of political friends, and the Federalists of New York put their own 
interpretation on the trip. Robert Troup wrote to Hamilton that 
Livingston, Burr, Jefferson, and Madison gave "every appearance of an 
ardent courtship."12 They probably created their alliance with the 
Clintonian faction of New York which looked forward to the election of 
the Vice President and Representatives to the Third Congress in the 
coming year. 
After leaving New York, they traveled through New England to 
.Vermont, which had been admitted to the Union on March 4. Boyd has 
suggested that even though Vermont was known to them as a region of 
land speculations and serious intrigues with the British, they also knew 
of signs of liberalism such as abolition of slavery, a unicameral 
legislature, religious tolerance, and free manhood suffrage. Therefore, 
it Has concluded that a chief object of the trip may have been to learn 
. 13 
which political element was predominanant among the people. The two 
were probably not displeased with the publicity their journey received 
in the newspapers, especially when their's was favorable compared to 
that of Washington's in the South. One article, reprinted in more than 
one paper, probably delighted both by declaring that the Secretary of 
I 
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State was accompanied by "the Charles Fox of America, the celebrated 
Madison," thus implying that Madison was the recognized leader of the 
14 
opposition in Congress. This tour which allowed the two to meet lead-
ing political figures in various states and draw personal conclusions 
about public opinion constituted an important element in the development 
15 
of parties. 
Monroe, who served on a committee to revise the Virginia Constitu-
tion in the summer of 1791, kept in touch with Jefferson through the 
summer and devoted considerable thought and energy to the matter of party 
development. Monroe had assured Jefferson that the Virginia delegation 
felt the paramount issue was the growing attempt to centralize power in 
the hands of the central government. Jefferson wrote to Monroe enclosing 
. I 
a copy of Tom Paine's controversial tract, The Rights of Man, and 
informed Monroe that he had observed with dismay "the growing tendency 
16 
of the general government toward Monarchy." He probably had his mind 
on Monroe's part in revising the state constitution as he added that the 
only remedy to the problem lay in having each state erect "such barriers 
at the constitutional line as cannot be surmounted either by themselves 
17 
or by the General Government." Monroe's biographer, W. P. Cresson, 
( 
concluded that it was "to Jefferson's plan to strengthen the state 
governments as the strength of the federal government increased that 
Monroe gave his time. "18 Cresson also credited the influence o'f Monroe 
as a factor in Madison's move from the position of administratipn leader 
in the House to an avowed member of the opposition. As Federalism 
became "more and more dogmatic in its devotion to a centralized govern-
ment," and the "Hamiltonian clique" revealed ever more clearly their 
"willingness to destroy the liberties of the people," Madison found 
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himself more willing to "subscribe to the program to which the partisan 
Monroe and the leaders of the Southern democracy were already laying 
. 19 
foundations." 
Monroe was evidently thinking of future national party building, as 
well as the revision of the Virginia Constitution, in the summer of 
1791. On June 17, he wrote to Jefferson that upon political matters 
"we perfectly agree, and particularly in the reprobation of all measures 
that may be calculated to elevate the 20 government above the people;" 
To keep the government in proper bounds would require "virtue" on the 
part "of the publilck [sic] servants."21 He believed that a majority 
of the people were "for democracy" and "if they are well informed" the 
22 
efforts at extending the government would be curbed." It is not known 
if }1onroe knew of Jefferson's efforts to secure Freneau as a publisher 
of a partisan newspaper, but he obviously would have favored the project. 
He went on confidently to tell Jefferson that "I shall see you in 
Sep[tembe]r at wh. time we will confer more fully on these subjects."23 
Jefferson seemed to relish the idea of future conferences and quickly 
pioposed to Monroe that he quarter his horses in his stables during the 
24 
next session of Congress. This was obviously designed partly to 
furnish frequent opportunities for unobtrusive personal meetings. 
As the Second Congress got underway, the influence of Monioe was 
significant. Harry Ammon has argued that his role in the Senate "was 
similar to that of Madison in the House: organizer and leader" of the 
Republican opposition. 25 Monroe was soon sharing his partisan views 
with a national audience after Philip Freneau began to publish the 
Nati~nal Gazette. 
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After repeated urging from Jefferson and Madison over a five month 
period, Freneau agreed to move to Philadelphia. Arrangements were made 
for Francis Childs, Freneau's employer in New York, to underwrite the 
venture. Freneau shared as a third partner without investing any 
capital. Jefferson signed his connnission as "clerk of foreign languages" 
on August 16 •. He arrived in Philadelphia in late September and issued 
the first edition of the National Gazette on October 31, one week after 
the opening of the Second Congress. During the first few months the 
26 papl•r 's partisanship was of a moderate nature. Within four months it 
would make vicious partisan attacks on the Federalists and Hamilton's 
program. 
Senator Monroe made his debut in the National Gazette in a series 
printed on November 14, 24, and December 12, .1791. The series, written 
under the pseudonym "Aratus," argued that the French Revolution was 
insl~parably linked to the domestic political contest in America. The 
widt~spread condemnation of the French Revolution in this country sug-
gested the existence of a Monarchial party here. This was true because 
thet-e was an indivisible unity between the French Revolution and freedom 
and human rights everywhere. The American Revolution had been based on 
the same principles as the French. In America the tyranny was in 
embryo and seated at a distance. In France the oppression was full 
grown and within their homeland. But in both instances "the power which 
belonged to the body of the people was resumed." Furthermore, "whoever 
owns the the principle of one revolution must cherish those of the 
27 
other." To try to distinguish the two was the result of blind 
prejudice or a perversion of.reason. America was obligated to return 
the assistance given to her by the French. To fail to do so would be 
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an abandonment of the principles of freedom. Since the Revolutions 
were inseparable, failure in France would endanger liberty in America. 28 
In this series Monroe sounded a theme that Republicans would soon be 
repeating for the next decade--the enemies of France at home, as well 
as abroad, were monarchists and determined to subvert republican 
institutions. Here was a reinterpretation of the American Revolution 
29 that gave great impetus to the Republican party. If Jefferson's 
report on the fisheries was a declaration of war, this was the issuing 
of the party battle cry. 
Madison also contributed to the National Gazette through the winter 
and spring of 1791-1792. By late January, he was ready to admit that 
political parties were inevitable. "In every political society," he 
declared, "parties are unavoidable." They grew out of the "nature of 
things" in all ,societies. 30 This public attempt to explain the natural 
origin of parties furnishes clear proof that the readers of the National 
Gazette were being prepared to accept with approbation the existence 
of the opposition party, in order that Madison and his colleagues 
might promote its development into the party of the majority. 
On February 23, 1792, Freneau ended the moderation of earlier 
months and "loosed without, warning a barrage of hypercritical comment 
. . • that surprised Federalist leaders and shook the administration 
to its foundations." 31 Three series of articles, attributed to "A 
Farmer," "Butus," and "Sidney," made a sustained and incisive attack 
almost continuously through the month of May. The series by "A Farmer" 
was addressed to "the Yeomenry of the United States," and ran from the 
1 t f F b · unt1"l Apr1·1. 32 as o e ruary "Though the American Aristocrats have 
failed ..• to establish titles by distinction of law," the "Farmer" 
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declared, "yet the destructive principles of Aristocracy are too 
33 prevalent amongst us." From March 15 to April 9 "Brutus" savagely 
attacked Hamilton's funding and assumption program which "like Pandora's 
box ••. is pregnant with every mischief."34 Its victims were "the 
industrious merchant, the laborious farmer, and generally the poor and 
middling classes."35 The "political bark" was gliding down the stream 
from "freedom to slavery." The "inevitable and fatal" results of the 
complicated system would be "an impoverished peasantry on the one hand, 
and a privileged aristocracy on the other." 36 A threat to the 
Federalists was plain: "Let the Secretary of the Treasury and his 
adherents beware ... let them remember, that altho' the republican 
. l f h 1 1 f . h . . . . ,J] Jea ousy o t e peop e may s eep or a t1me, t at 1t 1s not ext1nct. 
After this series the National Gazette was permanently marked as an 
38 
"organ of ultral-Republican propaganda." "Sidney" attacked Hamilton's 
excise tax with infinite precision from every conceivable angle from 
April 23 through May 24 in articles that sometimes covered an entire 
39 pageor more. By June, Freneau was openly pointing to the elections 
in November which would produce a "new era" and the dawning of a glorious 
day in which "republicanism flourishes and is again in fashion. ,,40 
The verbal fusillade of the Republican writers caught the Federal-
ists off guard. Fenno's replies were "more suggestive of retreat than 
41 
of resistance." Through May and June, Fenno made personal attacks 
on Freneau. Accused of electioneering for a faction, Freneau replied 
that a faction did indeeq exist and it was made up of a "very respectable 
numher of the anti-aristocratical and anti-monarchial people in the 
42 United States," whom the editor would "be proud to serve at all times." 
During the spring while Fenno sputtered in rage at Freneau in the pages 
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of the Gazette of the United States, a number of leading Federalists 
from various branches of the government began to take actions designed 
to ~tir support from the ranks of the electorate. They postured as 
non-partisan patriots defending the government and nation from a 
dangerous "faction" or "party" bent upon subverting the Constitution 
by denuding the federal government of its power and abil.ity to direct 
and defend an orderly society. 
The Federalist Counterattack 
In late May, Alexander Hamilton addressed a lengthy letter to 
Edward Carrington of Virginia. The letter reads more like a political 
pamphlet than a personal letter and was probably intended for use as 
a circular letter. In the letter Hamilton declares that Jefferson heads 
a party which attacks his fiscal measures and favors closer ties with 
France at the price of disrupted relations with Britain. Hamilton, by 
implication, clearly revealed that he himself was a self-conscious 
leader of the party in control of the administration and, as such, 
realized that he was the chief target of the opposition that was forming 
under the leadership of Jefferson and Madison. 
He wrote to Carrington for the purpose of revealing himself "on the 
f 1 . . 1 . d. . 1143 present state o po ~t~ca part~es an v~ews. Hamilton affirmed that 
he had been reluctant to come to his conclusions but stated that during 
the last session, the first session of the Second Congress, 
I became unequivocally convinced of the following truth: 
That Mr. Madison, cooperating with Mr. Jeffersion, is at the 
head of a faction decidedly hostile to me and my administra-
tion; and actuated by views, in my judgement subversive of 
the principles of good government and dangerous to the Union, 
peace, and happiness of the country.44 · · · 
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Hamilton seemed to be calling Carrington (and others) to open action, 
for his description of the party situation "was a truth which ought to 
be told, and well attended to by all the friends of the Union and 
45 
efficient national government." 
Hamilton stated that the primary issue between the parties involved 
the proper dimensions of governmental power. 
[In almost] all the questions, great and small, which have 
arisen since the First Session of Congress, Mr. Jefferson 
and Mr. Madison have been found among those who are disposed 
to narrow the federal authority. The question of a national 
bank is one example. The question of bounties to the fish-
eries is another ... On the militia bill, and in a variety 
of minor cases, he [Mr. Madison] has leaned to abridging the 
exercise of federal authority and leaving as much as possible 
to the states; and he lost no opportunity of sounding the 
alarm, with great effective solemnity at encroachments, 
mediatated on the right of the States, and of holding up the 
bugbear of a faction in the government having designs un-
friendly to liberty.46 
In the mind of the opposition, he declared, there "is some dreadful 
combination against the State government and Republicanism; which 
according to them, are convertible terms." 47 
While Hamilton did not on paper admit directly that he hi~self 
headed what amounted to a political party, he did recognize the change 
and answered it. He said, "I am told that serious apprehensions are 
disseminated in your state as to the existence of a monarchial party 
meditating the destruction of State and Republican government."48 He 
assured Carrington that there was no shadow of foundation for such a 
charge. He affirmed his own devotion to republican principles and 
confessed to a fear that the large states would encroach upon the powers 
of the national government. He explained that his own solution to the 
problem created by the conflict between the states and the national 
government was: 
. . . a disposition on my part toward the liberal construc-
tion of the powers of the national government, and to erect 
every fence, to guard it from degradations which is, in my 
opinion, consistent with constitutional propriety. As to 
any combination to prostrate the State governments, I dis-
avow and deny it.49 · 
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There can be no doubt Hamilton and his political associates now saw 
the political arena as a battleground between two parties locked in 
mortal conflicts. Hamilton's staunch ally in the House, William 
Laughton Smith of South Carolina, wrote a campaign booklet entitled 
Politicks and Views~~ Certain Party Displayed in which he labeled 
Jefferson the "Generalissimo" and Madison the "General" of a "system 
• faction ..• and party !ISO Smith had considered the reason 
for the long abuse aimed at certain measures of the federal government 
and he decided that it was "principally issued from one quarter and 
confined to one Gazette."51 Also, 
I have discovered the origin, motives, progress and design of 
the System as wicked, profligate, malevolent as ever disgraced 
the most corrupt and adandoned government • faction • • • 
A system established to promote private and party purposes 
and not the public good."S2 
Smith analyzed the objectives of the Republicans in a manner highly 
similar to Hamilton. 
Washington was so alarmed over the partisan conflict that he 
appealed to both Hamilton and Jefferson to cease their disruptive 
actjvities. Both responded on September 9, Jefferson protested his 
innocence of exerting leadership in the legislature, writing articles 
in newspapers, or influencing Freneau in the publication of the Gazette. 
Although he did a very effect;:ive job of arguing his own position, in 
essence, Jefferson admitted the basic charges made against him by 
Hamilton, and, when the rhetoric is stripped away, his analysis of the 
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difference between the two parties being on the matter of the proper 
limits of government's power is very similar to the analysis made by 
Hamilton. Jefferson was strong in his denuncia.tion of the Federalists' 
programs and the constitutional principles from which they were derived. 
He hit hard at Hamilton's latest proposals: 
In a Report on the Subject of Manufacturers (still to be 
acted on) it was expressely assumed that the general govern-
ment has a right to exercise all powers which may be for the 
general welfare. That is to say, all the legitimate powers 
of government: Since no government has a legitimate right to 
do what is not for the welfare of the governed • • • Thus the 
object of these plans taken together is to draw all the powers 
of government into the hands of the general legislature, to 
establish means for corrupting a sufficient core in that 
legislature to provide the honest votes and preponderate, by 
their own, the scale which suited, and to have that core 
under the command of the Secretary of the Treasury for the 
purposes of subverting step by step the principles of the 
Constitution; which he has so often declared to be a thing of 
nothing which must be changed.53 
It is obvious that both Federalists and Republicans were consciously 
competing for popular support in a high degree of self-conscious 
partisanship in 1792. Since partisan conflict had appeared first in the 
Senate and remained a factor in each session, it is not surprising to 
find members of the Senate playing key roles in the party campaigns of 
1792. 
Cresson concluded that the line between Republican and Federalist 
was definitely marked by then and that Monroe was in close communica-
tion with Jefferson and Madison through the summer. His analysis of 
their correspondence indicated that the "correspondence passing among 
Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe was almost entirely related to matters 
54 
of party strategy." Cresson's contention that Jefferson, Madison, 
and Monroe were involved in a deliberate party building effort partie-
ularly through the period of the Second Congress seems well founded. 
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The Election of 1792 
The Republican leadership focused its main attention on efforts to 
displace Adams as Vice-President. Governor George Clinton of New York 
was the agreed upon replacement. But when the Virginians learned that 
he had won the recent gubernatorial election only by a resort to fraud, 
Jefferson was obviously shaken. Monroe agreed that the incident was 
regrettable and condemned Clinton for undesirable character traits, 
but he smoothed Jefferson by saying that since Clinton was a "center 
of the Union to the Republican party in that state it may be necessary 
to support him . ,55 But Monroe firmly refused a request by Aaron 
Burr that Monroe write a letter approving Clinton's conduct. Yet, when 
two of Burr's ardent backers in New York, Malancthon Smith and Marinus 
Willett, wrote to Monroe and Madison trying to persuade them to replace 
Clinton as the Vice-Presidential candidate with Aaron Burr, Monroe 
firmly bl eked the effort. He argued that a man more advanced in years 
and of longer standing in public service could be trusted to act in a 
more decisive way. 56 Monroe had no doubt been unfavorably impressed by 
Burt's performance in his maiden session of the Senate. 
The war of the partisan newspapers escalated through the summer and 
fall. The Gazette ~ the United States mounted a weighty counterattack 
in July by pointing out the relationship between Jefferson and Freneau. 
Monroe and Madison published a long series in his defense which helped 
to establish Monroe as a partisan leader. In the middle of August, 
Freneau's electioneering began in earnest. Washington the man was 
praised, but bitter criticism was heaped upon the administration and 
Vice-President Adams. It became apparent the Republican election 
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strategy, as reflected in the National Gazette, was to concentrate on 
removing Adams from the Vice-Presidency and replacing him with Governor 
Cl . 57 1 nton. 
Rufus King, an appreciative observer of the significanct role 
played by John Adams as President of the Senate, was quick to detect 
the Republican strategy. He explained the significance of the move to 
Alexander Hamilton on September 17. He suspected the move by Clinton, 
Burr, Jefferson, and others to make Clinton the Vice-President. But he 
also suspected Burr of angling for it himself. This prospect of division 
provided their main ground of hope. He warned that if "the enemies of 
58 the Government are secret and united we shall lose Mr. Adams." This 
loss of the Vice-Presidency would only be the first step in losing the 
whole administration. King further informed Hamilton that Jefferson 
and Madison, Burr of New York, and Alexander J. Dallas of Pennsylvania, 
werl' organizing the drive to capture the Vice-Presidency. 59 King was 
mounting his own personal counterattack and wrote to others in a similar 
vein. He urged that though "we may be wearied with politicks, and dis-
gusted with politicians," the friends of Adams must act to preserve 
d d b h k . h . f h . . . 60 government an or er y c ec 1ng t e maneuver1ng o t e oppos1t1on. 
Kin;!, had more than one reason to be happy on February 13. The 
electors were found to have cast 77 ballots for Adams and only 50 for 
Clinton. 
By mid-December, when it became obvious that Adams had been re-
elected, Freneau's National Gazette signaled to the nation that the 
Republican party would continue its fight against what was thought to 
be Lhe unrepublican tendencies of those in power. All other tactics 
had failed and an opert attack on Washington himself began on December 12. 
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An article ascribed to "Mirabeau," and entitled "Forerunners of Monarchy 
and Aristocracy in the United States," heaped scorn on the "ceremonial 
distance between the officers of the government and the people." 
"Mirabeau" also struck at celebrating the birthdays of "servants of the 
61 people." Washington was the unmistakable target of this and many more 
similar articles during the next three months. This verbal barrage 
against the official and social demeanor of the President caused 
Washington to consult the Senate on plans for his second inaugural 
celebration. Given the Federalist majority there, this was the equiv-
alent of consulting the party leaders. They advised a very restrained 
observance. This was in contrast with the first observance and probably 
was a great disappointment to many ardent admirers and party men who had 
1 l d f d h 1 b . 62 oo<e orwar to anot er extravagant ce e rat1on. The course chosen 
by the Senate was, no doubt, the course of wisdom in the face of the 
determined Republicans. 
It seems beyond dispute that during the Second Congress most 
polLtical actors on the national scene thought and acted from the 
perspective of a two-party conflict and personally identified with one 
of the parties. Most Senators, if not all, would have agreed with 
veteran Congressman Fisher Ames when he advised newly elected Henry 
Dearborn before the start of the Third Congress that to be successful 
he "must pick a side and stick to it."63 It is clear that both of the 
parties were seeking to build support among the national electorate 
and were in conflict over filling certain national offices. A third 
truth is also evident. The emerging national parties were struggling 
to define and establish proper limits of power for the national govern-
ment. This issue, mingled with strong sectional rivalry, produced the 
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Senatorial parties that emerged early in the First Congress, and this 
issue continued to be an important factor in party.competition and the· 
major legislative battles through the remaining five Congresses of the 
Federalist era. 
Reapportionment 
Following the first census of 1790, the Second Congress set about 
to reapportion the House of Representatives in keeping with Article I of 
the Constitution, which specified that representation was to be appor-
tioned according to population and that the number of representatives 
shall not exceed one for every 30,000. The sharp partisan conflict 
created by the issue in the Senate is reflected in the average index of 
polarized cohesion of 74.5 generated in the 20 roll call votes on the 
subject. 
The Republican bloc consisted of all Senators from south of the 
Mason and Dixon Line plus those of Delaware, Robert Morris, the only 
Senator from Pennsylvania that session, and Phiiemon Dickinson of New 
Jersey. They achieved an average cohesion index of over 97 percent. 
Aaron Burr divided his votes equally but gave his support to the 
Federalists on the crucial roll calls. All others supported the 
Federalists a majority of the time, creating an average Federalist 
cohesion index of 87 percent. If Morris and Dickinson, who were in 
reality strong Federalists, had been counted as Federalists in 
the calculation, the Federalist average would fall close 11o 75 percent 
and the Republican index would have risen insignificantly. 
Three separate bills were formulated and debated before the problem 
was resolved. The House first passed a bill that granted every state 
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one representative for every 30,000 inhabitants. This would have 
resulted in a House membership of 112. In the Senate, the Federalists 
first tried to change the formula for determining the total number of 
representatives by dividing the national population by 30,000 for a 
total number of 120 members. The eight extra members were to be assigned 
to those states with the largest "fractions11 of population left over 
after dividing the number of state inhabitants by 30,000. Failing in 
this effort, they then amended the bill to give one representative to 
every 33,000 inhabitants in a state. This would have resulted, when the 
census from South Carolina was completed, in a 105 member House. The 
House refused to accept these amendments and the bill was lost. 
The Senate then formulated a second bill producing a 100 member 
House on the basis of one representative for every 34,000 in a state. 
The House of Representatives then framed a compromise bill which 
utilized the Senate formula until November of 1797 when, on the basis 
of a census which the bill stipulated should be taken in 1796, the House 
would be enlarged by a formula giving each state one representative for 
every 30,000 inhabitants. In the Senate, the Federalists succeeded in 
stopping the compromise provisions and substituting their old plan for 
a 120 member House based on the largest fractions. President Washington 
chose to deliver to this bill his first and only yeto on the grounds 
that it granted eight states representation in excess of the Constitu-
tional standard. 
When the House failed to override the President's veto, Congress, 
without roll calls in either house, quickly passed a third bill estab-
lishing a 105 member House on the basis of one representative for every 
33,000 inhabit~nts of the various states. 
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Republicans voted more consistently than did the Federalists on 
the~e issues. Republican ideology called for making the House as large 
as 1)ossible in order to make it more reflective of the people 1 s will 
and, at the same time, to .adhere to their understanding of a strict 
interpretation of the Constitution.. This resulted in. championing the 
ratio of one representative for every 30,000 inhabitants of each state. 
The Federalists, in general, were reluctant to increase the 
representation fearing a rise in the influence of the "licentious" 
masses. Yet, in this controversy, Federalists were the champions of 
the larger 120 member House. Political considerations were clearly at 
work. The Federalist formula for granting eight additional representa-
tivcs resulted in five of the extra representatives going to states 
east of the Delaware River: Vermont, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, 
Connecticut and New Jersey; the other three going to Delaware, North 
Carolina, and South Carolina. This meant that the predominantly Federal-
ist region would receive three times as many of the additional represent-
atives as would the predominantly Republican areas. Thus, the 
regionally based parties each had very practical considerations to 
comhine with their ideology. The correspondence of the Virginia 
Senators illustrate as much, for while the next bill was being debated, 
they reported to their Governor that they hoped the second bill would 
terminate "more Constitutionally" than the first, which had been designed 
to "abridge the representation of the South, and add to that of the 
North."64 After the second bill had been passed, but before it was 
vetoed, Lee wrote to his kinsman, Henry Lee, that the "plain Constitu-
tiona! mode" had not been followed. By a "certain Arithmetico political 
Sophistry an arrangement of 6 to 2 in favor of the North against the 
I 
I 
South has been made of the 8 Members gained by this Sophism."65 He 
predicted that this "ingenious Theory may hereafter change when the 
fractional application shall be found to benefit the South as now it 
does the North." 66 
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The Senators' practical concern of relative state and sectional 
power produced by the various formulas, seriously affected the 
Congressional debates. Not only did·a state's power change if a 
representative was gained or lost, but even with the same number of 
representatives the relative voting power of a state changed according 
to the total number of representatives. for example, the schemes 
championed by both parties gave Virginia 21 representatives, but under 
.the Republican plan for a 112 member House, Virginia would have 
possessed 18.8 percent of the total voting power. But in a 120 member 
House, championed by the Federalists, her representatives would have 
possessed only 17.5 percent of the total vote. Fortuitously, most 
Senators found that state interests and party loyalty coincided, but 
this was not always so, as in .the case of Robert Morris who voted with 
the Republicans because their plan favored Pennsylvania. 
There were instances where party and regional loyalty seemed to 
triumph over individual state power interest. Both North and South 
Carolina would have had more representatives in the Congress as well as 
greater relative power under the Federalist plan than under the plan 
championed by the Republicans, yet the Senators from those states sup-
ported the Republican position cautiously. Georgia and Kentucky fared 
best of all under the Federalist scheme for a 105 member House, but 
when the first bill was being considered the Senators from those states 
voted against the Federalist plan. Connecticut fared best under the 
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Federalist plan for a 120 member House, but Roger Sherman voted 
consistently against such a scheme. He, no doubt, did so through the 
conviction that it was both unconstitutional and unwise. In the 
Constitutional Convention he had voted against all efforts to increase 
the representation beyond a total of 65 members and had argued that an 
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even smaller House would be better. In this case ideology obviously 
took precedence over the pragmatic partisan struggle. 
Ideologically speaking, the Republicans had won a Constitutional 
battle when Washington vetoed the second bill. But from the standpoint 
of a regional power struggle, the reapportionment controversy ended in 
a stalemate •. Under the original apportionment,· the Southern states, 
excluding Delaware, had wielded 44.6 percent of the total voting power 
of the House. And under the new system, they would possess 44.7 percent. 
If Pennsylvania and Delaware (who voted with the South) are included in 
the count, there was a decline of total power from 58.5 percent to 58 
percent. The states east of the Delaware River won only a slight 
increase in power with their total rising from 41.5 percent to 41.9 
percent. However, from the standpoint of the partisan politics it was 
a Federalist victory of sorts for it reduced the number of new Congres-
sional seats that many Republicans had counted on winning in all three 
regions of the country during the upcoming Congressional elections. 
The Federalist success in the reapportionment controversy inter-
mingled with new proposals from Alexander Hamilton and touched off a 
violent ideological assault on the entire fiscal system in 1792. 
Hamilton's "Report on the Subject of Manufacturers," delivered to the 
Second Congress in December, 1791, had reconnnended that protective 
duj:ies be laid on foreign manufacturers which the United States could 
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produce and that bounties be paid to encourage the development of 
domestic manufacturing. The Federalist-dominated Senate quickly 
transformed his proposal for bounties into a bill which provided 
bounties to the New England cod.fisheries. This bill reached the House 
shortly before Hamilton's proposal for an additional assumption of 
state debts designed to cover the balances remaining in Massachusetts 
and South Carolina. 
The Republicans saw these new measures as additional proof that 
Hamilton and his allies intended to usurp powers to an extent that 
threatened the essential liberty of the people. With their hopes 
reduced for redressing the balance of power in Congress following the 
census of 1790, they had to find other means of combatting the central-
ist schemes of the administration party. They resorted to a stepped up 
public attack on Hamilton and his total fiscal program as part of a 
deliberate drive to rally public opinion behind their. efforts to gain 
control of the House and the Vice-Presidency in the fall elections. 
Foreign Affairs 
From the beginning, Britain and France, the rival super powers of 
Europe, attempted to influence the course of America to their own 
advantage. After war broke out between them in 1793, each attempted to 
pressur~ the United States into being a supportive ally. The young 
nation was not able to agree on the proper response to the pressures, 
and the difference of opinion played an important role in the growth 
and development of the early party system. The proclivity of the 
Federalists toward conunercial relations with Britain was opposed by the 
Republican's affinity toward France and the French Revolution. For both 
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parties, there was a vital interdependence between the domestic and 
foreign policies they supported. 
Federalist foreign and domestic policies at the time were supportive 
of the programs outlined by Alexander Hamilton. Hamilton's foreign and 
domestic policies were inseparable. He believed that Anglo-American 
commerce was valuable to Britain and vital to America--and the British 
were aware of our dependence upon them. Three quarters of the American 
foreign commerce was with Britain. Ninety percent of American imports 
came from Britain, and Hamilton planned to finance his new fiscal system 
with the custom duties collected from this trade, for this was the only 
68 
significant source of revenue open to the federal government. England 
was in a much better position to practice commercial retaliation than 
America, and Hamilton knew that she would retaliate if Congress elected 
to pursue that course. Federalists believed that commercial warfare 
with Britain, even if it did not lead to armed conflict, would destroy 
the financial system because it would destroy credit, deprive the coun-
try's importers, close the bulk of the markets for agricultural goods, 
and wreck the funding of the assumed debts upon which the fiscal system 
was based. Hamilton and his friends could foresee the end of the 
Constitutional experiment if this all took place. Therefore, the 
Federalists were determined to maintain commercial relations with 
69 Britain if at all possible. . 
If, on the other hand, relations with Britain were not disturbed, 
Hamilton envisioned the skillful use of protective tariffs to nurture 
the development of large-scale manufacturing in this country. By 
avoiding commercial warfare with Britain, Americans could continue to 
market the bulk of their agricultural surplus in British channels. 
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Until American industries could supply 1the domestic needs, Americans 
could continue to purchase needed manufactured goods through the tradi-
tional British suppliers. British credit and capital would still be 
available. Any foreign policy measures which threatened to result in 
commercial warfare with Great Britain were strongly reprobated by 
Hamilton and the Federalists. Thus, Jefferson was not misinterpreting 
Hamilton when he complained to Senator Monroe late in the First Congress, 
after he·and Madison had both issued calls for discrimination against 
Britain, that Hamilton's attitude toward Britain was "passive obedience 
and non-resistance, lest any misunderstanding with them should affect 
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our credit, or the prices of our public paper." 
By the Second Congress, Republicans had generally come to adopt the 
views of Madison and Jefferson on discrimination. Jefferson had expressed 
devotion to the cause in his report on the fisheries issued in early 
1791. .Several considerations contributed to the Republican views. As 
the partisan spirit developed, many Republicans would have favored most 
any reasonable policy that held promise of wrecking Hamilton's system 
and unseating the Federalists. Hatred of the British and appreciation 
of the French carried over from the Revolution made it eRsy for many to 
be convinced of alleged fallacies in any foreign policies which seemed 
to serve British interests. For those who accepted Monroe's interpreta-
tion of the inseparability of the American and French Revolutions which 
he had set forth in the "Aratus" series, it was reason enough to support 
most any policy designed to aid the French advocates of liberty in their 
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struggle against the Monarchists of Britain. In addition to these 
factors, Drew R. McCoy has also made a persuasive case for the impact 
of republican ideology. 
210 
McCoy focused attention upon the relation of James Madison's views 
on commercial discrimination against Britain in view of his total 
ideological system. It has been generally recognized that Madison was 
originally a nationalist who envisioned the development of manufactur-
ing in America. McCoy demonstrated that Madison's view of the manufac-
turing to be developed was considerably different from that envisioned 
by the Hamiltonians. Madison, in keeping with the republicanism popular 
in l·:ngland and America. during the Revolution, had a strong commitment 
to individualism. In his view, genuine independence meant the ability 
to subsist without the kind of dependence on others that the workers 
in the industrial centers of England were then experiencing. He 
believed that American industry should be based upon-household manufac-
turing that could be carried on by single families on their own sub-
sistence farms. This was united with the belief that the agriculture 
of 1\.merica constituted necessities which Britain could not afford to 
do without. Therefore, he did not fear a trade war. If Britain should 
be foolish enough to start one, America could survive much better than 
Britain. By freeing herself from the British mercantile system, 
America ~.vould be free to trade with all natural customers. Her agricul-
tural markets would continue to expand. This would hasten the develop-
ment of the American West. This economy, based on agriculture but 
producing most of her own manufactured goods, would need little assist-
ance from government. Protective tariffs, bounties and expensive fund-
ing programs would be unnecessary. The federal government would remain· 
relatively simple and operate within the confines of the Constitution 
and wquld not promote the prosperity of one section or class at the 
expense of others. Matiison favored foreign policy, therefore, was an 
integral part of his domestic program and a part of a "system" which 
72 flowed from his variety of republican ideology. 
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Jefferson's proposals and efforts in the State Department seem to 
have been the administrative counterpart to the legislative proposals 
set forth by Madison in the House. Jefferson, and probably most 
Republicans, shared the general views of Madison. 
The Spanish control of the Mississippi was another factor entering 
into Hamilton's choice of friendship over Britain in preference to that 
of France. Hamilton said the single largest problem facing America was 
not lack of British commercial treaties or British occupation of the 
Northwestern posts, but the Spanish control of New Orleans cutting off 
the flow of American trade irt the West to the Mississippi. And, as 
Hamilton saw it, friendship with Great Britain put greater pressure 
upon Spain to grant commercial rights to America on the Mississippi than 
would friendship with France. In fact, he saw an alliance with France 
as actually an impedance to acquisition of· Louisiana. 73 
The full impact of the French Revolution on American politics was 
not felt until the outbreak of the general war in Europe of 1793. The 
French war with Austria and Prussia had made little difference to 
Americans, but when France declared war on Great Britain, Spain, and the 
Netherlands on February 3., 1793, the impact was great for the war now 
involved the great maritime and colonial powers of the world. This 
within itself would have created problems for the United States as a 
young maritime nation. Both sides in the European struggle coveted 
American commerce to the exclusion of their adversaries. Britain had 
great naval superiority over France, but Washington'!i> desire to pursue 
a policy of neutrality:was further complicated by the existence of two 
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treaties between the United States and France. The Franco-American 
Tre:1ty of Alliance of 1778 bound the United States to defend France's 
West India possessions, and the Franco-American Treaty of Amity and 
Commerce of 1778 allowed France to bring captured ships and prizes into 
American ports. At the same time, the enemies of France were denied 
this right and forbidden to arm or take on provisions in American ports. 
Obviously these treaties compromised the American pretense of neutrality. 
Richard Buel's study of public opinion led him to the conclusion 
that an even more serious obstacle to neutrality was the public opinion 
in America, for their own revolutionary experience had made most 
Americans very sympathetic toward France and extremely hostile to Great 
Britain. Most Americans did not remember that France had threatened to 
sacrifice American independence during the peace negotiations of 1782, 
but looked upon her as the faithful ally whose navy had supported 
Washington at Yorktown. At the same time, the Anglophobia created 
during the Revolution had been maintained by Great Britain's refusal 
fully to execute the peace treaty. So the French attack on Britain in 
February of 1793, seemed to most Americans to be an extension of the 
1 hi h h d b i h h Am i R . 1 . 74 strugg e w c a egun w t t e er can eva ut~on. 
In spite of public opinion and the treaties with France, Washington 
was determined to follow a course of neturality. Accordingly, on April 
22, he issued what is know now as the Neutrality Proclamation in which 
he urged Americans to pursue a course of impartiality and friendliness 
toward both belligerent powers. He went on to say that he had given 
instructions for the courts to prosecute .anyone who violated the law of 
nations in respect to any of the powers at war. This brought heavy 
public censure on Washington from the friends of France who were ready 
to rush into war with Great Britain. Not surprisingly, Jefferson was 
one who challenged privately the constitutionality and expediency of 
the Proclamation. Jefferson believed that it was beyond the power of 
the President to declare that there would be no war. He thought this 
an infringement of the rights of Congress to decide the questions of 
war and peace. He also thought it highly unwise to proclaim the 
neutrality that would be understood as a renunciation of our treaties 
with France. Even though Jefferson succeeded in getting the word 
11neutrality11 stricken from the Proclamation, the Proclamation still 
allowed the public to assume the administration would abrogate the 
alliance in order to maintain peace with Britain. 75 
213 
Jefferson was far from happy even though he accepted the Proclama-
tion publicly. He wrote a number of letters to friends in which he 
complained of being outnumbered in the cabinet. On May 13, 1793, he 
wrote to James Madison that things are going on in the same spirit, the 
cabinet is meeting almost every day on the question of neutrality and 
11Anglophobia has seized violently on three members of our counci1."76 
Everything was depending on the opinion of a single person--Washington--
and that 11single person" was the most indecisive one he ever had to do 
business with. 11 He always contrives to agree in principle with one 
but in conclusion with the other." 77 He observed pessimistically that: 
, 
Anglophobia, secret anti-gallomany, a federal!sme outree, 
and the present ease in his circumstances not usual, have 
decided the complexion of our dispositions and our proceed-
ings toward the conspirators of human liberty, and the 
asserters of it, which is unjustifiable in principle, in 78 
interest, and in respect to the wishes of our constituents. 
He thought the events were polarizing the electorate and bringing them 
to support one or the other of the two parties. 
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The early stir over the constitutionality of the Neutrality 
Proclamation became a permanent part of the struggle between leaders of 
the two parties as the journalistic debate between Hamilton and Jefferson 
took place. Hamilton wrote under the pseudonym of "Pacificus." Install-
ments of the series ran twice a week in the Gazette of the United States 
-""---- -- --
from June 29 through July 20, 1793. Jefferson prompted Madison to reply, 
and his series, as "Helvidius," ran in the National Gazette from August 
24 through September 18, 1793. Their debate centered around the 
respective powers of the executive and the Congress under the constitu-
tion. 
"Pacificus" defined the powers of the President as broadly as pos-
sibLe. He saw no limits beyond those expressly stated in the Constitu-
tion. The initiative in foreign relations lay with the executive, not 
the Congress. He had the power to proclaim neutrality and to declare 
treaties void. This did not obligate the Congress to back all actions 
of the President, but he argued that it should demand proper weight be 
given to his deeds. "Helvidius" denied the "extraordinary doctrine" 
that the powers of making war and treaties were executive in nature. 
Congress had the initiative in foreign affairs since it was Congress 
alone that had the power to declare war. The principles advanced by 
"Pacificus" struck "at the very vital of the [the nations] Constitution, 
as well as its honor and true interests."79 As usual, the Republican 
charged that the ideas advanced by "Pacificus" about Presidential 
powers were derived from the British monarchial model, expecially those 
I 
1 i h d 1 i f d ki . 80 re at ng to t e ec ar ng o war ~n ma ng treat~es. 
Hence, the question of the proper limits of power as applied to the 
executive branch which had arisen early in the Firs't Congress came to 
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the fore of the debate over foreign policy. It was an issue that 
remained prominent throughout the decade and was usually connected in 
some manner to most of the great controversies in the Senate. 
The general subservience of foreign policy to domestic politics as 
well as a cardinal role for ideology was demonstrated by the reluctance 
of the Republicans to agree with the Federalists on war preparations 
when a war with Britain seemed inevitable during the early part of 1794. 
Both the French and British navies made it their practice in early 1793 
to capture American ships bound for enemy territory. But in the summer 
of 1793, France made a bid for increased American trade with the West 
Indi.es by opening up the French West Indies to unrestricted trade. This 
concerned the British very much and in November secret orders were 
issued by the British Council directing British Men of War to seize all 
American ships and cargos containing either colonial goods or provisions 
and supplies destined to the French colonies. The secrecy of the order 
allowed the British fleet to capture upward of 350 American merchant men 
by the end of the year. Outrage swept America and the Congress as they 
learned of this latest British maneuver. 
As the first session of the Third Congress got underway, James 
Madison renewed Republican efforts for commercial retaliation on the 
British by introducing a number of resolutions into the House: higher 
tonnage taxes. on ships of countries· having no commercial treaty with the 
United States, port restrictions on the shipping of nations whose ports 
81 discriminated against American vessels. Federalists did not want war, 
but they feared that such measures coupled with a lack of military 
strength would invite war. Consequently, King and others began.to join 
a growing demand for defense measures. King advocated stronger harbor 
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defenses, the fitting out of stout frigates, the raising of an army, and 
the levying of extra taxes. He believed that America could protect her 
82 
maritime rights only from a position of strength. 
Knowing Britain was preparing for war, King and his colleagues in 
the Senate wanted to try negotiations with Britain at the same time they 
prepared for war. On March 10, Ellsworth, Cabot and Strong met with 
King in his home and all agreed that Ellsworth should go to the 
President with a number of suggestions: calm the public, adopt vigorous 
defensive measures, appoint a special agent to the West Indies to assess 
American losses and assist aggrieved merchants and seamen, and send a 
special envoy to England to negotiate an adjustment of differences 
between the two countries. He was to suggest either Hamilton or John 
Jay. Ellsworth named Hamilton to the President who was doubtful ha 
that Hamilton was the man for the job due to the broad public opposition 
to him. King persuaded Robert Morris to back the mission to England, 
and, when Washington called on him for advice, he supported the idea 
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enthusiastically. 
Jay at first refused the mission, but after a visit from Ellsworth, 
King, Cabot, Strong and Hamilton, he agreed to accept the appointment. 
The Senate confirmed the appointment on April 20 by a vote of 18 to 8. 
The day after his confirmation, Jay met with Hamilton, King, Ellsworth 
and Cabot to discuss his mission. They agreed that the President need 
not consult the Senate in drafting Jay's instructions and that any 
treaty Jay secured should b~ signed subject to the Senate's ratifica-
84 tion. They then reviewed all the points of dispute with him. A few 
days later, Jay urged King to accompany him on the mission, but King 
85 
refused due to the slim Federalist majority in the Senate. 
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In the meantime, by a joint resolution on March 26, Congress 
placed a 30-day embargo on all exports and renewed it for another 30 
days at the time of its expiration. Many Federalists as well as the 
Republicans recognized the danger of war with Britain, but Republican 
efforts were not calculated to soothe troubled waters at that time. On 
April 7, Abraham Clark, a Republican of New Jersey, introduced a resolu-
tion into the House calling for the stopping of all commercial inter-
course with Great Britain and Ireland. 
After the House passed the Clark resolution on April 25, Washington 
immediately sent to the Senate the nomination of John Jay as Envoy 
Extraordinary to Great Britain. Following the confirmation of Jay, the 
Senate took up the matter of the embargo and cecession of all commercial 
intercourse with Great Britain and in a straight party line vote (three 
Federalists and one Republican were absent) the Senate deadlocked with 
Vice-President Adams casting a vote against the Resolution. The 
Federalists had felt that it was a total mistake to cut off trade with 
Great Britain at the time that John Jay was being.sent to London to 
negotiate a peaceful settlement of all American and British differences 
and argued that what the United States needed to do was build up its 
national defenses in order to negotiate with the British from a position 
86 
of strength. The Federalists' plan called for the development of a 
navy, the bolstering of the coastal and harbor defenses of the seaboard, 
and the creation of a 15,00 man army if the President thought an 
invasion was threatened. Surprisingly enough, the Republicans were 
suspicious of the Federalists' desires to arm for a potential conflict 
with Great Britain. In spite of the traditional militarism of the 
Southe~ners and their eagerness to force an economic showdown with Great 
218 
Britain, they vehemently opposed every effort to strengthen the defenses 
of the nation. When it became known that Alexander Hamilton would 
probably command the new army, Monroe and other Republicans hardened 
their resolve to resist the creation of a 15,000 man army. 87 The House 
Republicans skillfully substituted a provision for calling a force of 
80,000 milita men for 15,000 provisional army. Monroe explained the 
Republican willingness to accept this because it allowed them to 
claim credit for supporting defense measures, yet it avoided placing 
military power in the hands of the "British party."88 
On March 13, the roll call approving the final passage of the 
Defense of the Ports and Harbors Bill found the Federalists and 
Republicans perfectly opposed. John Adams cast the deciding vote in 
favor of this bill. This type behavior should not be taken as an 
indication that the Republicans wished the military defeat of their 
country by either France or Britain, but they were reluctant to see a 
military machine placed in the hands of their Federalist enemies who 
controlled the government at that time. 
During the entire session, nine out of ten roll-call votes on 
foreign affairs were party unity votes in which Federalists obtained 
an average relative party unity index of 92 percent, while the 
Republicans obtained a unity index of 91 percent. On the questions 
pertaining to military matters in response to the European crisis, six 
out of seven votes were party unity votes in which the Federalists 
obtained a party unity level of 93 percent against a Republican average 
of 84 percent. Thus, it is obvious. that strong polarization on foreign 
policy matters predates the struggle over the ratification of the Jay 
Trenty~ 
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The Third Congress opened in the midst of partisan bitterness. 
There was a significant increase in the number of Republicans in the 
House, a11d the Senate was more closely'balanced than at any other time. 
Sixteen voted as Federalists and 14 voted as Republicans. Absences 
sometimes allowed the Senate to divide evenly in straight party-line 
voting. Partisanship was evident as the Federalists expelled Albert 
Gallatin, a naturalized Frenchman and staunch Republican, on a highly 
questionable technicality. Rufus King managed the Federalist effort 
against him and Aaron Burr, assisted by Monroe and John Taylor of 
Virginia, managed his defense. One Republican, Hawkins of North 
Carolina, voted against him. Republicans, under Monroe's leadership, 
soon avenged ,themselves by securing the rejection of Kensey Johns, 
newLy appointed Federalist of Delaware, on a more substantial 
technicality. The voting patterns reveal that both cases were prompted 
mainly by partisanship. 
The Jay Treaty, contrary to the argument of some historians, was 
not responsible for the beginning of legislative parties within the 
Senate. Washington called for a special Third Session of the Senate 
in June, 1795. Seven of the 30 Senators assembled were new to the 
Sen<lte that session. Of the seven new Senators, only Paine of Vermont 
voted contrary to the partisan alignment of his predecessor in the 
previous session of Congress. His predecessor, Bradley, had voted in 
the Second Congress with the Federalists but in the first two sessions 
of the Third Congress had voted solidly with the core of the Republican 
party. 
Among the 13 members of the Senate.who had previous experience in 
that body, only one, Gunn of Georgia, deviated from his previous 
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alignment. Gunn had been in the Senate from the first session on and 
had voted with the Republicans a majority of the time, but he voted 
with the Federalists on the treaty. Thereafter, Gunn's party identity 
was not stable. 
One other Senator, Livermore of New Hampshire, voted solidly for 
I the treaty. 'He had, in the second session of Congress, voted in slight 
favor of the Republicans, but he had voted solidly with the Federalists 
core in the first session of the Third Congress. He had voted with the 
Federalists on previous foreign policy issues, and his votes on the 
treaty are in harmony with the general pattern that he had established 
in the beginning. But again, he was one of the few Senators who 
continued to oscillate between parties. In the first session of the 
Fourth Congress he voted with the Federalists a vast majority of the 
time but reverted to the lower levels of the Republican party for two 
sessions before returning to the Federalist side of the Senate. for the 
next four sessions. 
The party identity of the other new Senators in no way contrasted 
with the voting patterns of their predecessors. In summary it can be 
said that beginning with the third session of the Third Congress, the 
Federalists gained one Senate seat in Vermont and picked up vital 
temporary support from Humphrey Marshall of Kentucky and Gunn of Georgia. 
Even though the Southern Senators, in general, tended to vehemently 
oppose the treaty as prejudicial to the interests·of the South, it may 
well be that both Gunn and Marshall saw in the treaty the best chance 
of pressuring Spain into making concessions regarding the navigation of 
the Mississippi River. 
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Even when French reactions to the Jay Treaty led to an undeclared 
naval war between the United States and France during the Fifth and 
Sixth Congresses, Republicans in the Senate continued to give almost 
total opposition to efforts to.reduce diplomatic or commercial relations 
with France and consistently opposed measures for military preparation 
that were proposed by the Federalist administration.. The proclivities 
of both parties in matters relating to foreign affairs remained very 
constant throughout the Federalist era. Out of 129 roll calls relating 
to foreign relations and national defense in the Third through the 
Sixth Congress, 111 were party unity votes. Of those dealing with 
foreign policy, Federalists attained an average party unity index of 
93 percent while the Republicans achieved an average unity index of 90 
percent. On the question of proper military response to the European 
problems, the Federalists maintained an average unity index of 91 per-
cent against a Republican average of 87 percent. 
Western Lands and Protection of 
the Frontier 
Issues over the administration of the western lands arose in every 
Congress and created partisan conflict in every Congress except the 
First. Of the 35 roll calls on this general topic, 27 were party unit 
votes in which the Federalists achieved.a mean index of relative party 
unity of 84 percent while the Republicans achieved a unity index of 85 
percent. 
In the regulation of .Indian affairs, a definite pattern emerged. 
The Republicans tended to work for a minimum of restrictions on the 
white man with less proteGtion for the Indians. The Federalists, on the 
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other hand, favored more protection and the guarantee of rights to the 
Indlans nlong with more restrictions on soldiers and others dealing with 
the Indians. In the second session of the Second Congress, 78 percent 
of the Republicans opted for licensing "any" person as a trader with the 
Indians to the Federalist preference for "proper" persons. Nearly half 
of the votes in this category were spent on admission of Tennessee in 
the Fourth Congress. The Republicans consistently supported efforts 
designed to hasten the Tennessee admission and to maximize their 
representation in the Congress. Of the Republicans who favored state-
hood for Tennessee and the organization of the territory of Mississippi, 
76 percent of them opposed accepting the Western Reserve of Connecticut 
in both the Fifth and Sixth Congresses. 
Out fo 21 roll calls relating to the policing of the western 
frontier, only 11 were party unity votes. Six of the 10 non-partisan 
votes occurred in the First Congress. In the Third Congress, a high 
level of partisanship was demonstrated. There was agreement between 
the two parties on raising a federalized militia of 10,000 men in the 
Southern states to protect the south-western territory. Both parties 
also rejected the proposal to raise soldiers'. pay $1.00 a month but 
here the general agreement stopped. Republicans opposed the President's 
being the one authorized to augment rations for the army. The 
Federalists sought to increase the length of federalized service from 
six months to three years but were opposed by two-thirds of the 
Republicans. The Republicans also opposed the Federalist measure to 
subject to the rules and articles of war any armed man south of the 
Ohio River on Indian territory outside the jurisdiction of the United 
States, a move obviously designed to prevent the feared Southern 
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provocation of Indian conflict. During the first sessfon of the Third 
Congress, when voting on issues not directly reflecting an attitude of 
militarism, the Federalists scored an average unity index of 89 percent 
against a 73 percent index for the Republicans. 
In the next session of the Congress, however, conflict over 
frontier affairs increased significantly when Federalists achieved a 97 
percent average index and the Republican average unity index rose to 85 
percent. But, here again, the issues were not militarism as such but 
the element of centralized power and state interest. On the matter of 
payment to the federal milita, 89 percent of the Republicans favored 
amending the bill to provide for federal reimbursement to the states for 
any salary that might be paid to men in the federalized militia. Ninety-
three percent of the Federalists opposed this matter. The same percent-
age of the Republicans opposed the final passage bill. Federalists 
achieved total unanimity in demanding that militia men be subject to 
the same punishment for violations of regulations as the regular troops, 
while 80 percent of the Republicans opposed this measure. Also, all 
Federalists supported protecting the Indians from unauthorized attack 
and violence against their property, while 78 percent of the Republicans 
opposed such safe guards for Indian possessions. 
Alien and Sedition Laws 
The ratification of the Jay Treaty in the surmner of 1795 averted 
what had shortly b~fore seemed an inevitable war between the United 
States and Great Britain. It did, on the other hand, drive a wedge 
between the United States and England's arch foe, France. France saw 
the treaty as a renunciation of her treaties with the United States and 
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be/g, an in retaliation France an aggressive campaign against the American 
merchant shipping that far eclipsed the British degradations of 1793 and 
soon broke diplomatic relations with the United States. A special 
session of the Congress was called in the spring of 1797, the first 
session of the Fifth Congress. 
The situation worsened as the Congress and the nation heard that 
the American peace commissioners had been improperly treated by the 
French, and French victories over the English seemed to make the invasion 
of Great Britain imminent. Americans also learned of French efforts to 
regain Louisiana. A great expectation of war spread over the country 
and Congesss passed several defense measures rapidly in the early part 
of the second session. President Adams suddenly became one of the most 
popular men in America and the defense measures, designed and passed by 
the Federalists,in Congress, seemed to receive the enthusiastic support 
of the American people. 
Some Republican newspapers and many Republicans in the Congress 
continued to give dogged resistance to the defense efforts. They 
denounced the building of a navy and the military expansion as efforts 
to build up the ability to wage aggressive war, strengthen the North 
over the South, exhalt the executive over the legislature. Republican 
leaders doubted that war would come except by action on the part of the 
United States. But if an invasion did come, all that was needed, accord-
ing to the Republicans, was a small regular army assisted by a large 
outpouring of the militia. American farmers would rise in mass and 
drive the invaders out and return immediately to their homes. The 
nation would be spared the pains and dangers of large standing armies 
which gave too much patronage and powers of oppression and aggression 
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to the executive. This resistance of the Republican leadership 
enraged many Federalists, especially in the Congress. 
Many Federalists in the Senate and House thought the great swelling 
of patriotism and unprecedented support of the Federalist party provided 
an opportunity for silencing their critics and virtually proscribing 
the Republican party. They devised the Alien and Sedition Laws, 
ostensibly as war measures, but basically three of the four laws were 
designed to immobilize and retard the Republican party. Ultimately they 
came to have a reverse effect. 
The first of the two alien bills authored by the House of Represent-
atives was the Naturalization Act. This act changed the requirement of 
probationary residence from five to 14 years for all aliens wishing to 
become citizens and required them to secure certificates which proved 
90 they were in compliance with the general requirements of the act. The 
law's political aim was to cut the growth of the Republican party as 
the bulk of the thousands of aliens who became citizens each year were 
believed to become ardent Republicans. The bill met little opposition 
in the Senate and passed by a vote of 13 to 8. One Federalist north of 
New York voted against it, and one Republican, Martin of North Carolina, 
voted for it. 
The alien bill authored by the House, the Act Respecting Alien 
Enemies often referred to as the Alien Enemies Act, was in its final 
form a genuine bi-partisan war time measure. It provided that in case 
of war or threatened invasion, the President was authorized to seize, 
secure or remove from the country all resident aliens who were citizens 
of the enemy country. It passed the Senate without a roll-call vote and 
was signed by the President on July 6. However, in as much as there 
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was only one enemy in view, many Republicans over the country objected 
91 
strenuously. But, in general, it came to be accepted and remains a 
part of the federal law today. 
The two bills authored by the Senate were far more sinister in 
their political application than was the anti-Republican Naturalization 
Act. As the Senate Federalists saw that the alien bill before the House 
was being stripped of its partisan character, they moved to correct the 
situation. On April 25, Senator Hillhouse of Connecticut proposed that 
a committee be formed to study the need for legislation to control 
dangerous aliens and made no reference to it as a war-time measure. The 
following day, a committee composed of all Federalists was formed: 
Livermore of New Hampshire, Hillhouse of Connecticut, Read of Delaware, 
Sedgwick of Massachusetts, and Laurance of New York. 
While they admitted the need for a war-time aliens bill, they 
reasoned that a general bill, not restricted to periods of declared wars, 
was needed. Some argued that the Directory of France might choose to 
not declare war and yet get their aliens to stir up rebellion. There-
fore, the wartime alien act was thought to be insufficient. The more 
weighty reason for the Federalist.s was that the House bill was limited 
to the restricting of the activity of alien enemies alone. As a 
Republican Congressman debating in the House suggested, the Federalists 
were more concerned with moving against alien friends, particularly the 
Irish, than they were the French aliens. Therefore, the Act Concerning 
Aliens (often called the Alien Friends Act) gave to the President power 
to depart at any time in peace or war, all aliens suspected by the 
President to be engaged in subversive activities. There was no require-
ment that the suspiciOn be proved, no remedy for mistreatment. Every 
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alien resident was required to register. Ship captains bringing in 
immigrants were required to report to the Office of Customs a list of 
all aliens brought in, specifying their names and ages and places of 
origin and other information. The Senate passed it by a vote of 16 to 
7. The only Republican voting for it was Martin of North Carolina. 
It was clearly a bill by the Federalists for the Federalists. 
The reactions and correspondence of leading Federalists outside the 
halls of Congress furnish clear evidence that the alien measures were 
intended primarily to gain an advantage in the partisan political strug-
gle going on within the country. For example, Uriah Tracy, a Federalist 
Senator from Connecticut, wrote to the Secretary of the Treasury on his 
observations made through a recent trip through Pennsylvania. "I have 
seen many many many, very many lrishmen, and with a very few exceptions, 
they are United Irishmen, Free Nations, and the most God-provoking 
Democrats on this side of Hell. "92 
In the summer of 1798, Rufus King, former Senator of New York and 
now Minister to Great Britain, succeeded in preventing Britain from 
further banishing Irish political prisoners to the United States. In 
a letter to Henry Jackson, King observed that the problem with the Irish 
immigrants had been that they parade themselves on the side of the 
93 Republicans. Senator William Bingham, a Federalist from Pennsylvania, 
expressed the same' general view in a letter to King at the end of the 
year in which he said that the Irish, 
• . • will join the party in opposition to the Government, & 
will vent their Resentments against Great Britain by attacking 
· those disposed,. to be on friendly Terms with her. They will be 
discontented & therefore disorganizing Characters, whose 
Residence amongst us cannot be otherwise .than injurious, in 
the present Moment of political aggitation.94 
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The Sedition bill styled, "An Act for the Punishment of Certain 
Crimes," like the Alien Friends Act, was passed during the peak of war 
hysteria, but its basic design was to proscribe the Republican party 
in either war or peace. Its original author was Senator James Lloyd, 
an arch-Federalist, of Maryland. In Lloyd's original version which he 
submitted to the Senate, the death penalty was assigned to anyone found 
guilty of adhering to or giving aid and comfort to either the people or 
the government of France. The section was removed by the Senate, but 
the bill remained highly rancorous to Republicans. 
As the original bill left the Senate it defined sedition as an 
attempt to defame or weaken the government and laws of the United States 
by inflammatory declarations or expressions tending to induce a belief 
of the citizens that the government enacting a law was induced to do so 
by motives hostile to the Constitution and liberties and happiness of 
the people. Thus, it was designed to put an end to Constitutional. ques-
tions that Republican types had raised from the First Congress. That 
they did not intend to follow the narrowest possible definitions of 
their own legislation was evident from the general tone of the bill. 
It further outlawed any person attempting to justify the nostile conduct 
of the French government toward the United States and attempts to defame 
the President or any other federal officials by declarations directly 
or indirectly tending to incriminate their motive in any official 
transaction. 
The bill was moderated some by the House of Representatives, but in 
its final form its key provisions were still highly objectionable to the 
Republican opposition which felt itself exceedingly vulnerable to 
charges under the law. For example, Section I provided among other 
things: 
If any person or persons, with intent shall counsel, 
advise or attempt to,procure any insurrection, rioting, un-
lawful assembly, or combination, whether such conspiracy, 
threatening, council, advice, or attempt shall have a pro-
posed effect or not, he ~5 they shall be deemed guilty of 
a high disdeamenor • . • 
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Section II of the Act prohibited "any person" from criticizing acts 
of officials of the government or giving any encouragement to any 
foreign nation that had hostile designs: 
And be ~further enacted, That if any person shall write, 
print, letter or publish, or shall cause or procure to be 
written, printed, lettered or published, or shall knowingly 
· and willingly assist or aid in writing, printing, lettering 
or publishing any thoughts, scandalous and malicious writing 
or writings against the government of the United States, or 
the President of the United States, with intent to defame the 
same government, or either House of the said Congress, or the 
said President or bring them, or either of them into contempt, 
or disrepute; or to excite against them, or any of them, the 
hatred of the good people of the United States, or to stir up 
sedition within the United States, or to excite any unlawful 
combinations therein ..•. to resist, oppose or defeat any 
such law or act, or to aid, encourage or abet any hostile 
designs of any foreign nation against the United States • • • 
Shall be punished by a fine not exceeding $2,000, and by im-
prisonment not exceeding two years.96 
The above quoted provisions were broad and sweeping in their nature 
and capable of being applied to the correspondence and conversations of 
members of the Congress and the Cabinet as well as against newspaper 
editors and other citizens. Interestingly enough, the bill did not 
protect Vice-President Jefferson from such criticisms. Another strong 
indLcation of the political nature of the bill was contained in its final 
section appended by the House of Representatives which stated that the 
Act would remain 
••• in force until the third day of March, one thousand 
eight hundred and one, and no longer; Providing, that the 
expiration of the Act shall not prevent ?r defeat a 
prosecution and punishment of any offense agcJ.inst the law, 
during the time it shall be in force.97 
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Therefore, the bill was not designed to cover a period of international 
crisis but to cover the specific period of the remainder of the Adams' 
administration. 
The Federalists of the Senate and the House had finally shown their 
fear and contempt for "excessive" democracy in a very concrete way. By 
intimidating individual leaders and muzzling the press, the only public 
media of the day, they were intending to make the opposition party 
politically impotent. For a time it seemed that they might succeed, for 
most newspapers in the country had only kind words for the Sedition Act 
which had muzzled them. However, powerful voices of discontent were 
soon raised over the country, and as the Federalists inadvertently 
demonstrated that they were guilty of Republican charges a public 
revulsion gradually set in. 
In November and December of. 1798 'the legislature of Kentucky and 
Virginia each adopted a set of Resolutions that had been secretly 
authored by Jefferson and Monroe respectively. These Resol-utions 
objected that the Alien and Sedition Acts were fully unconstitutional. 
The Congress had exceeded its enumerated powers, and it had clearly 
flaunted the First Amendment in making laws which abridged freedom 
of speech and freedom of the press. The Kentucky Resolutions declared 
the laws unconstitutional and called upon other state legislatures to 
do likewise. Copies were officially mailed to other legislatures. The 
Aurora guaranteed their further distribution by publishing the full 
text. The Virginia legislature sent a copy of its Resolution to each 
of the state legislatures and ordered 5,000 printed for distribution 
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within each of the counties of·Virginia. The Resolutions gave the 
whole nation notice that the Republicans meant to resist these latest 
legislative extensions of executive power, viewing them as instruments 
of domestic oppression rather than war-time defense measures. 
The Federalist Abuse of Power 
As the Sixth Congress got fully under way in early 1800, a deadlock 
in the Pennsylvania legislature over the method of selecting Presidential 
electors prompted Senator Ross of Pennsylvania to introduce a bill into 
the Senate for deciding disputed Presidential elections. His bill 
called for placing all such disputes that might arise in any state into 
the hands of a special committee that would be composed of an equal 
number of members from each House of Congress', plus a chairman nam~d by 
the Senate. This committee would decide on the validity of all disputed 
electoral votes. Republicans were quick to see that the bill would 
allow the Federalists to dictate.the outcome of the final election. By 
disputing votes in states where they were not likely .to win, Federalists 
could allow the committee an opportunity to disqualify enough votes to 
throw the·election into the House of Representatives. There, with the 
Representatives voting by states, the Federalists would thus have a 
clear majority, and would be able to name a Federalist President regard-
less of the will of the people. 
The bill ran .lnto trouble in the House due to the fact that John 
Marshall and other Southern Federalists refused to give the committee 
power to do more than make recommendations. The Federalists of the 
Senate were intransigent and the bill was ultimately lost at the end of 
98 
. the session. But even more negative in its influence than this 
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aborted attempt to legislate Federalist success, was the Senate's 
attempt to punish William Duane, editor of the Aurora, for publishing 
the text of the bill while it was still in the hands of the special 
committee and before it was discussed publicly on the floor of the 
Senate. 
After the demise of the National Gazette, the Aurora has become the 
leading Republican newspaper. Benjamin Bache, its former editor, had 
been indited for sedition under the Sedition Act, but had died of yellow 
fever in September before his trial could be held. Duane was, there-
fore, the editor whom the Federalists most wished to silence. 99 When 
Duane published the report of the bill for deciding disputed 
Presidential elections and other objectionable material on February 19, 
the Federalists were so anxious to bring him to trial that they decided 
to circumvent the time-consuming procedures of the judicial system and 
bring him to a speedy trial before the Senate itself. Accordingly, a 
"Committee of Privilege," consisting of four Federalists and one 
Republican was appointed on February 16. The committee soon found that 
Duane was guilty of a "breech of privilege of the Senate" and recommended 
that he be indited and brought to trial. On March 18, the Senate, by a 
vote of 18 to 10, condemned .the article· of February 19 as "false, 
defamatory, scandalous, and malicious'' and tending to defame the Senate 
and bring it into disrepute. The following day it agreed that "said. 
100 publication is a high breech of the privileges of this House." It 
was agreed that Duane be ordered to appear before the "bar of this 
House" on March 24. By a series of evasions, Duane and his attorneys 
frustrated the Senate's efforts to bring him to trial. Duane defiantly 
published the documents relating to the affair in .the Aurora. On 
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March 2 the Senate declared that Duane was guilty of contempt and 
ordered all "Marshals, deputy Marshals, and civil officers of the United 
. . 101 
States and every other person" to assist in the arrest of Duane." 
He continued to evade arrest while keeping the inflamatory Aurora on 
schedule. Finally at the eend of the session, the Senate passed a 
resolution calling on the President of the United States to instruct 
proper officers to proceed in his prosecution under the Sedition Act. 102 
The Sedition Act had been passed in a period of war hysteria, but 
the chances of wars had lessened and the tide of opinion was turning 
against the Act when the proceedings against Duane were initiated. Only 
three days before the Committee of Privilege was formed, an effort in 
the House of Representatives to repeal the SeditYon Act had failed by 
only two votes. The effort of the Federalists seems now to have been an 
act of both arrogance and desperation that was designed to still the 
leading Republican editor and intimidate the lesser publishers in order 
to prevent the further spread of discontent as the highly crucial na-
tional elections of 1800 drew near. 
In each major legislative battle of the first Six Congresses, there 
was always at least one dimension of the dispute which related to the 
conflict over the proper limits of power in a republic. In every 
dispute, the Federalists championed the extension of the power and 
scope of the national government, and usually the extension of power 
came through the enlargment of the powers and responsibilities of the 
executive branch. The Republicans consistently charged their opponents 
with secretly attempting to establish a monied aristocracy that would 
undcrgrid, and at the same time, be servecj. by a monarchy. The gradual 
expansion of the executive branch wa~ always seen as ~ part of the 
design to convert the office of the President into that of a monarch. 
The Republicans always opposed the extensions of power as unconstitu-
tional. Therefore, the conflicts over the Alien and Sedition Acts 
were extensions of the confl'ict which had polarized the Senate since 
the First Congress. The attempts at passing the election reform bill 
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and prosecuting William Duane seemed to give substance to the Republican 
charges against the Federalists, and played an important part in the loss 
of public confidence by the Federalists in 1800. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
As the new government under the Constitution took shape during the 
early sessions of Congress, the Senate proved to be·something both less 
and more than many thought the Constitution prescribed. In the process 
of "fleshing out" the Constitution, the friends of a powerful national 
government led by a strong executive had secured for the President the 
power to remove the appointive heads of the executive departments from 
office without securing the,approval of the Senate. This was a bitter 
disappointment for those who ~eared a strong executive, and the decision 
had a great and lasting impact of primary importance. If the Senate had 
been granted ·either the full removal power, or the more limited right 
to approve or reject a President's request for removal, the executive 
. 
departments would have in the last analysis been answerable to the 
Senate and a system similar to that of the British would have resulted. 
This early expansion of executive powers at such an expense of the 
Sem1te ~as a surprise to many for the general belief was that each 
branch of government would seek to enhance its own power at the expense 
of the other branches of government. This willing grant of power caused 
many such as Senator Maclay immediately to decide that the Senators who 
.had helped to gain the full removal power of the President were in a 
conspiracy to expand the Presidency into an elective monarchy. 
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The Senate also proved to be more powerful in some ways than had 
been anticipated by many. During the first session the precedent for 
"Senatorial courtesy" was established when the Senate refused to confirm 
a well qualified appointee to a federal post in Georgia because the two 
Georgia Senators had another man in mind. Thus, the practice was started 
whereby the President must clear appointees to federal positions within 
a state with the Senators of that state, or else risk having the Senate 
reject his nomination. This proved an unexpected advantage .to the 
Senate, and quickly became an adjunct to the party system, as only 
Senators from the President's own party were given the privileges of 
"vetoing" ~ nomination. 
Another precedent which developed in the First Congress diminished 
the role of the Senate in a vital area. Even though treaties were to 
be made by the President with the "advice and consent" of the Senate, 
Washington largely abandoned seeking prior advice and consent after the 
first session of Congress. The phrase came to mean little more than 
either granting or withholding approval after the·treaties were drawn 
up. In a similar way, Washington's sending troops to frontiers and 
issuing a Neutrality Proclmation with out consultation seemed to reduce 
the role of the Senate in foreign affairs even more. 
Those who had expected the Senate to rise above·"local interests" 
and think "nationally" had reason for a measure of disappointment when 
fiscal matters and the location of the capital were beingdealt wtth. 
However, even here, on both issues, there was a stanse in which~the 
various interests of the total nation had been debated and a workable 
balance being created. Also, in both instances, both parties were 
working to further their hopes and plans for the nation's future. 
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One of the primary purposes of the Senate was the protection of 
states' rights and interests. Each state would be equal to all others. 
Yet in practice, the Senate was the stronghold of those who wished to 
strengthen the national government at the expense of the states. This 
anomaly derived from the fact that the Senate was also designed to 
protect the interests of property owners. As John Adams had written in 
his Sixth Letter of "The Right Constitution of Commonwealth England" the 
rich, therefore, "ought to have an effectual barrier in the Constitution 
against being robbed, plundered, and murdered, as well as the poor; and 
1 this can never be without an independent Senate." At the Constitutional 
Convention, ,Elbridge Gerry argued for the election of Senators by the 
state legislatures by saying that "the great mercantile interest and 
[that] of stockholders, is not provided for in any mode,of election--they 
will however be better represented if the State legislatures choose the 
. 2 
second branch." By allowing the state legislatures to pick the 
Senators, the Constitution thus guaranteed that the politically dominant 
economic interest of a state would most likely cause the selection of men 
who could be trusted to represent their interests. In the case of some 
states with strong rival interests, a.compromise might allow one Senator 
to represent one interest and the other a second concern. Examples can 
be seen in the case of South Carolina after the middle of the Second 
Congress when one seat was occupied by a Federalist and the other by a 
Republican. In other instances, as with Pennsylvania after the rejection 
of William Maclay, .both Senat~rs represented the mercantile and financial 
interests even though the state had a heavy agrarian element in the 
economy. As in the case with most states, their delegation in the House, 
where the members were !.;elected by the people, the delegates were usually 
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divided between the parties and represented divergent economic interests. 
But with the exceptions of South Carolina and New Hampshire from the 
Third Congress onward, and New York from the Second through the Fourth 
Congress, the legislatures usually sent men from the same party who 
maintained very similar voting records. This resulted in the Senators 
from below the Potomac supporting the agrarian interests, and resisting 
the expansion of the powers of the national government. The Northern 
majority supported measures that advanced the commercial, financial, 
and shipping interests. This is not to say that the Senators were 
largely politico-economic prostitutes, but the economi~.forces were real 
and they were strong, and they helped to polari~e the Senate. 
The Senate had been designed to guard the·nation against the 
"excesses" of democracy. John Randolph argued at the Constitutional 
Convention that the Senate should be kept smaller than the House in 
order that it might be a more effective check on the Hou.se and keep up 
3 
"the balance, and to restrain, if possible, the fury of democracy." 
Madison wanted Senators elected for much longer terms than the Represent-
atives, in order to put a "check on the democracy--it cannot therefore 
be made too strong. ,.4 As Madison, Jay and Hamil ton argued the case in 
The Federalists Papers they reasoned that the Senate would be filled up 
by men who were among the best informed, most experienced, and most 
wise, men who by virtue of character, background, and long tenure in the 
Senate, would be able to correct mistakes made by the House where less 
experience and shorter terms would prevail. Too, the House would be 
more easily influenced by the sudden passions of the people, whereas the 
Senate would be resistant to the sudden, temporary, and unwise currents 
f 1 . i 5 o popu ar op1n on. But John Adams stated it most colorfully when he 
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said that a Senate would be found "the patron and guardian of liberty 
on many occasions, when the giddy, thoughless multitude, and even their 
representatives neglect, forget, or even insult it."6 
The Senate often did check the House. A major example was the 
Senate's repeated refusals to pass retalitatory navigation laws against 
Britain. They always stood as a potential check against laws that 
would destroy the rights of property, such as laws that would impair 
contracts. But whether it stood as guardian against the excesses of 
democracy, or a deterent to the growth of democracy; depends upon the 
viewpoint of the observer. In the Fifth Congress, the House acted as 
a brake upon the anti-democratic excesses of the Senate when it 
tempered the Alien Friends and Sedition Bills before allowing them to 
become law, and in those instances the senate was exploiting the public 
backlash from the XYZ incident. In the Sixth Congress the House again 
blocked a Senate measure which threatened to remove the Presidential 
election from the will of the people. Both instances are examples of 
efforts by the aristocratic branch to alter the constit,ution illegally 
being checked by the democratic branch. In these instances, the system 
of checks and balances prevented attempted seizures of power in the 
manner envisioned by traditional republican ideology. 
The Senate played a vital role in developing one major element in 
the political system which ran completely counter to republican 
ideology--the development of the two-party system of government. The 
two-party system emerged first within the Senate. In the early period 
the parties were groups held together by ideology and geopolitical 
influences. But these were powerful determinants of behavior that 
produced more cohesivehess in voting patterns than is characteristic 
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of more structured parties of the later and modern times. The legisla-
tivL~ parties emerged in the Senate during the first session. By:~the 
tim(~ the second session was underway, Hamilton was emerging as an 
important leader of the group within the Senate who favored a strong 
central government and the use of the government to promote the 
mercantile and fiscal interest of the country. He was an important link 
between them and those of the House who shared similar views, and were 
supporting the fiscal plans championed by Hamilton. At the same time, 
Madison of the House and Jefferson of the State Department were working 
to integrate and orchestrate the opposition forces of the Senate and the 
House. Thus, by the second session, both Senatorial parties had become 
working parts that can best be described as parties within the govern-
ment. Most Senators were behaving as dependable partisans but partisan-
ship within the House may not have claimed the allegiance of a majority 
of the membership for some time. When the party loyalty scores were 
' 
computed by Congress (the method which produces the lowest loyalty 
index~s for the First Congress) it was found that over two-thirds (69 
percent) of the Senators had supported their party from 67 to 100 percent 
of the time. In the Second Congress, the 94 percent met this measure 
of partisan loyalty. The level dropped to 90, 84, and 90 percent in 
the Third, Fourth and Fifth Congresses respectively. In the Sixth 
Congress~ 95 percent supported their party at this level. 
While the Senate was ·the staging ground for both parties, the 
Federalists were in the majority from the first. The Federalists were 
in a position to dictate the outcome of any question on which they 
retained a high level of unity. This is demonstrated by the fact that 
the Federalists won 8'3 percent of all party unity roll-call votes 
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(exclusive of the votes on the residence in the second session of the 
First Congress when the voting alliances were most unique, and straight 
statistical analysis is highly misleading) in the First through the 
Sixth Congress. In certain categories of issues, the Federalist showing 
was even stronger. On foreign policy (not including defense measures) 
Federalists won on 87 percent of the roll calls, and on m11tters of 
national defense their views triumphed 93 percent of the time. When all 
military matters pertaining to defense of the Western frontiers and 
responses to the European war are combined, the Federalist party triumphs 
fell to 91 percent. On non-mi~itary items pertaining to the frontier, 
the Republicans were able to win 23 percent of the votes. On procedural 
matters they won 28 percent'of the time. On votes pertaining te the 
fiscal system and policies, ,Federalists won 80 percent of the time, but 
on the spending of money, the Republicans gained their highest success 
ratio of 41 percent--one point more than they scored on the reapportion-
ment struggle. -Federalists dominated the committees which made the 
reports and recommendations on new legislation. Therefore, most items 
before the Senate were of Federalist design. Republican initiatives 
were mostly efforts to defeat, delay, or amend Federalist proposals. 
Fr.om the viewpoint of the Sertate, the first 12 years under the Constitu-
' tion were indeed the Federalist era. 
Why,did the parties emerge so quickly when all the leading political 
figures seemed to denounce parties as being subversive to republican 
government and the Constitution? Part of the answer lies in the fact 
that th~ nation was already. polarized at the ~ime the CC)nstitution was 
secured and each spokesman was consciously or unconsciously trying to· 
prevent the organizations and advancement of those ideologies and 
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program~ which were opposed to his own. Jackson Turner Main's study of 
partisanship in the states during the Confederation revealed that two 
different strains of political thought tended to divide each state 
legislature into two legislative parties which he labeled the Parochial-
ists and the Cosmopolitans. He also argued that the general public 
tended to fall into one or the other of the two persuasions. Many 
Localists saw parties as a vehicle for opposition to entrenched authority 
and the continuance of democratic society. Main thought the dominant 
core of the commercial-Cosmopolitans became "High" Federalists under the 
Constitution, and that the agrarian-Parochialists became dominant core 
Republicans. 
James Henderson's study of the politics of the Continental Congress 
revealed a history of legislative parties. The earlier partisanship was 
tri-polar, bu-t by the end of the Confederation era there was a strong 
tendency for the delegates from the middle states to divide their votes 
between the Eastern and Southern dominated blocs. Regardless of the 
issues, the Southern and Eastern delegates were in conflict during the 
Confederation. This was a reflection of regional tensions which the 
Constitution in no way mitigated. Thus, it seems logical that the 
regionally based partisanship grew out of the same causes which provoked 
the partisanship of the Confederation. 
Ideology obviously played an important role in early American 
political life. There was a dichotomy of thought regarding the nature 
and values of the American Revolution as Richard Buel emphasized. Some 
viewed the Revolution as primarily designed to win independence from the 
King and Parliament of Britain, with· American institutions and life re-
maining basically unaltered. This meant a.continuation of republican 
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government with the real leadership provided by the elite of the 
country. The divergent view holding that the Revolution. had been 
fought to free Americans of aristocratic dominance from all quarters. 
This differing view led to a division between those who wished a strong 
central government and those who wanted government to be as dispersed 
as possible and subject to local control. The adoption of the Constitu-
tion did not eliminate the conflicts between the centralists and local-
ists. It did call for a central government with power to enforce its 
decrees upon individual citizens, but it was deliberately vague and open 
to differing interpretations of vital interest to those interested in 
either limiting or extending national power. Congress had to decide 
between the two views as it fleshed out the Constitution in the First 
Congress. 
Lance Banning has suggested that the rapid emergence of parties 
was partly prompted by a view that was common to both the centralists 
and the localists. Both groups supported republican ideology and the 
Constitution after the new government began to function. The form of 
ideology to which most all subscribed held that powerful forces would 
work to "corrupt" any republican constitutional system in any nation. 
Those who favored a strong central government dominated by elites 
fear-ed that the "democratic" element would subvert the Constitution and 
deprive them of their rights and property. The "democratic" element 
feared the political and economic elites of the country would "corrupt" 
the Constitution by instituting an aristocracy and extending the 
executive into a defacto monarchy. With both elements on the alert 
against "corruption" of the Constitution the partisan spirit and 
activities are very plausible. 7 
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Republican ideology also tended to develop two competitive visions 
of the American future as exemplified by the agrarian nationalism of 
Madison, and the commercially oriented nationalism of Hamilton. Since 
all were aware of the task of fleshing out the Constitution and the 
importance of precedents to be established in the infancy of the 
country, adherents of the two conflicting theories went to work to 
secure their purposes and immediate partisan conflict was the result. 
In every major issue that confronted the nation in the Federalist era, 
this ideological divergence entered into the considerations. It was 
not always the controlling or precipitating cause, but it was always 
there. The debates in Congress and the party rhetoric outside of 
Congress seem to substantiate this beyond dispute. 
Partisanship engulfed the Senate before it did the House for a 
number of reasons. The growing rivalry between the North and South was 
only intensified by the creation of a strong government that could no 
longer be ignored if its decisions were not agreeable. In the same way 
divergent economic forces of the country had a vital interest in deter-
mining who and what principles guided the new government. Since the 
Senators were really the representatives of the predominant .economic 
interests of their states, and since the predominant interest of the 
South was agriculture and the politically dominant interests of 
most middle and Eastern states were those of finance and commerce, it 
was inevitable that sectional oriented conflict would soon arise. The 
immediacy of the development aided by the fact that two-thirds of the 
Senators who served in the First Congress were veterans of the 
Continental Congress, already conversant with how their state interests 
intermeshed with thos~ of other states, and accustomed to Congressional 
politics. Furthermore, the problems of finance, protecting and 
developing the West, locating the nation's capital, and dealing with 
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the European nations were already problems on which they had fixed 
opinions. The ideological and geopolitical forces which impelled the 
nation into a two-party system of government came into sharp conflict 
within the Senate. On the other hand, the House, made up of men 
selected by the people, and in some states selected by districts, did 
not have the same set of experiences and concerns. Therefore, some time 
passed before the majority of the House became consistent partisans. 
The Senate not only played a vital part in the development of the 
two-party system, but by its firm adherence to Federalist principles it 
helped to set the nation on a course that determined much of its later 
history. By agreeing to a Potomac residence for the capital on 
artificial weight was added to the weaker of the competing regions, 
this helped to ensure the continuing sectional conflict. But even more, 
by throwing its weight behind the programs of the government which was 
perceived as favoring the economic interests of the North the regional 
conflicts were intensified and extended into the future. On the other 
hand, by protecting national credit and solvency, and by keeping 
American and British trade relations in tact, they helped to pave the 
way for America's growth and modernization. 
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APPENDIX A 
HISTOGRAMS.DEPICTING LEVELS OF OPPOSITION 
TO THE FEDERALIST BLOC DERIVED FROM 
CUMULATIVE SCALING, FIRST THROUGH 
THE SIXTH CONGRESS, BY SESSION 
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Figure 6. Levels of Opposition to the Federalists Bloc Derived from Cumulative Scaling, 
First Congress, Third Session 
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Figure 7. Levels of Opposition to the Federalists Bloc Derived from Cumulative Scaling, 
Second Congress, First Session 
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Figure 8. 
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Levels of Opposition to the Federalists Bloc Derived from Cumulative Scaling, 
Second Congress, Second Session 
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Figure 9. Levels of Opposition to the Federalists Bloc Derived from Cumulative Scaling, 
Third Congress, First Session 
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Figure 10. Levels of Opposition to the Federalists Bloc Derived from Cumulative Scaling, 
Third Congress, Second Session 
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Figure 11. Levels. of Opposition to the Federalists Bloc Derived from Cumulative Scaling, 
Third Congress, Third Session · 
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Figure 12. 
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Levels of Opposition to the Federalists Bloc Derived from Cumulative Scaling, 
Fourth Congress, First Session 
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Figure 13. Levels of Opposition to the Federalists Bloc Derived from Cumulative Scaling, 
Fourth Congress, Second Session 
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Figure 14. Levels of Opposition to the Federalists Bloc Derived from Cumulative Scaling, 
Fifth Congress, First Session 
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when present divided his votes equally. 
This histogram was constructed from the first roll 
calls. After these votes the alien and sedition 
bill were debated and many Republicans went home 
to campaign. Scaling these highly polarized would 
have increased the levels of conflict on the scale. 
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Figure 15. Levels of Opposition to the Federalists Bloc Derived from Cumulative Scaling, 
Fifth Congress, Second Session 
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Figure 16. Levels of Opposition to the Federalists Bloc Derived .from Cumulative Scaling, 
Fifth Congress, Third Session 
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Figure 17. Levels of Opposition to the Federalists Bloc Derived from Cumulative Scaling, 
- Sixth Congres~, First Session 
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Figure 18. 
Gunn was absent over 50 percent 
of the time, but when present 
voted solidly with the Federalists. 
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APPENDIX B 
HISTOGRAMS DEPICTING LEVELS OF PARTY SUPPORT 
DERIVED FROM PARTY LOYALTY INDEXES ON 
PARTY UNITY ROLL CALLS, FIRST 
THROUGH THE SIXTH CONGRESS, 
BY SESSIONS 
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Figure 19. Levels of Party Support Derived from Party Loyalty Indexes on Party Unity 
Roll Calls, First Conress, First Session 
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Figure 20. Levels of Party Support Derived ·from Party Loyalty 
Roll Calls, First Congress, Second Session 
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Figure 21. Levels of Party Support Derived from Party Loyalty Indexes on Party Unity 
Roll Calls, First Congress,' Third Session 
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Figure 22. Levels of Party Support Derived from Party Loyalty Indexes on Party Unity 
Roll Calls, Second Congress, First Session 
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Figure 23. Levels of Party Support Derived from Party Loyalty Indexes on Party Unity 
Roll Calls, Second Congress, Second Session 
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Figure 24. Levels of Party Support Derived from Party Loyalty Indexes on Party Unity 
Roll Calls, Third Congress, First Session 
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votes but voted with the Federalists on issues 
in which the Republicans divided evenly; both 
are clearly Republican types. 
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Figure 25. Levels of Party Support Derived from Party Loyalty Indexes on Party Unity 
Roll Calls, Third Congress, Second Session 
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Figure 26. Levels of Party Support Derived from Party Loyalty Indexes on Party Unity 
Roll Calls, Third Congress, Third Session 
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Figure 27. Levels of Party Support Derived from Party Loyalty Indexes on Party Unity 
Roll Calls, Fourth Congress, First Session 
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Burr of New York divided equally between the two 
parties on party unity votes, but was absent for 
over one-third of these vot.es. When all votes 
are considered he must be classified as a 
Republican. 
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Figure 28. Levels of Party Support Derived from Party Loyalty Indexes on Party Unity 
Roll Calls, Fourth Congress, Second Session 
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Gunn of Georgia divided equally between the two 
parties on party unity votes. He was absent for 
three-fourths of all votes. When he is examined 
on all votes he is clearly a Republican type. 
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Figure 29. Levels of Party Support Derived from Party Loyalty Indexes on Party Unity 
Roll Calls, Fifth Congress, First Session 
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Gunn of Georgia divided evenly on party unity votes but was 
absent for 90 percent of the roll calls. 
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Figure 30. Levels of Party Support Derived from Party Loyalty Indexes on Party Unity 
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Figure 31. Levels of Party Support Derived from Party Loyalty Indexes on Party Unity 
Roll Calls, Fifth Congress, Third Session 
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Figure 32 •. Levels of Party Support Derived from Party Loyalty Indexes on Party Unity 
Roll Calls, Sixth Congress, First Session 
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Figure 33. Levels of Party Support Derived from Party Loyalty Indexes on Party Unity 
Roll Calls, Sixth Congress, Second Session 
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APPENDIX C 
HISTOGRAMS DEPICTING LEVELS OF PARTY 
SUPPORT DERIVED FROM PARTY LOYALTY 
INDEXES ON PARTY UNITY ROLL 
CALLS, FIRST THROUGH THE 
SIXTH CONGRESS, BY 
CONGRESS 
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Figure 34. Levels of Party Support Derived from Party Loyalty Indexes on Party Unity 
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Figure 35, Levels of Party Support Derived from Party Loyalty Indexes on Party Unity 
Roll Calls, Second Congress 
Potts MD 
Edward KY 
Taylor VA 
Butler sc 
91-100% 
N 
\0 
0'1 
( 
E11swo co 
Mite he co 
Trumbu co 
Cabot MA 
St_rong MA 
Bradfo RI 
King NY 
Bingha PA 
Morris PA 
Ruther NJ 
La time DE 
Izard sc 
100-91% 
Bradle VT 
Gall at PA 
Paine VT Brown KY 
Foster RI Edward KY 
Fre1in NJ Liverm NJ Martin NC 
Vinnin DE Henry MD Ross PA Butler sc 
Read sc Potts MD Marsha KY Gunn GA Hawkin NC Langdo NH Jackso GA 
90-81% 80-71% 70-61% 60-51% 51-60% 61-70% 71-80% 81-90% 
Federalist Republican 
Figure 36. Levels of Party Support Derived from Party Loyalty Indexes on Party Unity 
Roll Calls, Third Congress 
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Figure 37. Levels of Party Support Derived from Party Loyalty Indexes on Party Unity 
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Figure 38. Levels of Party Suppor-t Derived from Party Loyalty Indexes on Party Unity 
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